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ABSTRACT 
 
THE OTTOMAN SPECIAL ORGANIZATION - TEŞKİLAT-I MAHSUSA: A 
HISTORICAL ASSESSMENT WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO ITS 
OPERATIONS AGAINST BRITISH OCCUPIED EGYPT  
(1914-1916) 
 
Safi, Polat 
M.A., Department of History 
Supervisor: Ass. Prof. Oktay Özel 
 
September 2006 
 
 
The present level of the knowledge about the plans and operations of the 
Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa forces against Egypt during World War I is very poor in terms of the 
analysis of this phenomenon at a micro level in different localities. This study, in this 
context, is an attempt through the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa concentration, nourished mainly 
from Sinai, Libya, and to a lesser extent Sudan, against Egypt between 1914 and 1916 to 
further our understanding of not only the details of the Teşkilat’s activities in these 
regions but also its administrative and operational characteristics. 
 
Keywords: Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa, Umur-i Şarkiye Dairesi, Sinai, Egypt, Libya, 
Sudan, Süleyman Askeri, Mümtaz Bey, Hasan Efendi, Eşref Kuşçubaşı, Nuri Paşa, 
Cafer el-Askeri, Afrika Grupları Kumandanlığı.  
iv 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ÖZET 
 
TEŞKİLAT-I MAHSUSA: İNGİLİZ İŞGALİ ALTINDAKİ MISIR’A 
KARŞI YÜRÜTTÜĞÜ EYLEMLERE MAHSUS ATIFLA TARİHİ BİR 
DEĞERLENDİRME (1914-1916) 
 
Safi, Polat 
Yüksek Lisans, Tarih Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Oktay Özel 
 
Eylül 2006 
 
 
1. Dünya Savaşı esnasında, Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa kuvvetlerinin Mısır’a karşı 
planları ve operasyonları hakkındaki mevcut bilgi düzeyi bu hadisenin değişik 
mahallerde mikro bir seviyede analiz edilmesi bakımından oldukça fakirdir. Bu çalışma, 
bu bağlamda, Mısır’a karşı başlıca Sina, Libya ve daha az ölçüde Sudan’dan beslenen 
Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa konsantrasyonu yoluyla yalnızca Teşkilat’ın bu bölgelerdeki 
faaliyetlerinin ayrıntılarına ilişkin değil aynı zamanda idari ve eylemsel özelliklerine 
ilişkin anlayışın ilerlemesi için bir girişimdir.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa, Umur-i Şarkiye Dairesi, Sinai, Egypt, 
Libya, Sudan, Süleyman Askeri, Mümtaz Bey, Hasan Efendi, Eşref Kuşçubaşı, 
Nuri Paşa, Cafer el-Askeri, Afrika Grupları Kumandanlığı.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
A. Intelligence Studies in Turkey 
                       
The outbreak of the World War I (1914-1918) was marked by a deeper understanding of 
intelligence on the part of each state involved in the fighting.  Having entered the war on 
the side of the Triple alliance, the Ottoman Empire tested such an experience mainly by 
the foremost role of Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa1 (Ottoman special organization), which grew 
out, to a great extent, of the experiences of the İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti [Committee of 
Union and Progress (CUP)] in Tripoli and the Balkan Wars 1912-1913. As a European 
model of political and military intelligence association, the Teşkilat had no precedent in 
Ottoman history. It not only provided the field commanders and planning staff with 
intelligence required edabout the opponents but also recruited, trained, and directed the 
bands whose role was to be in close combat with the enemy and weaken her ability to 
fight in military and semi-military operations. Besides, it also propagated pan-Islamic 
discourse to strengthen Muslim solidarity and engaged in espionage and counter-
espionage facilities to reveal the interior and external threats to Ottoman interests. Thus, 
the Teşkilat fulfılled the broader functions of an intelligence organization.  
 
                                                 
1
 Hereafter Teşkilat.  
 2 
Despite its vital importance, studies on the history of the Teşkilat have not 
produced a reliable and sound account; the current level of knowledge on the subject, 
therefore, is not only extremely limited but also highly distorted and controversial. This 
can be attributed firstly to the specific circumstances of Turkey under which intelligence 
studies have been carried out.2 The academic sphere of inquiry regarding intelligence 
matters followed quite a peculiar path in Turkey, which neither developed a coherent 
understanding of the matter nor an institutional basis that works properly, unlike 
Western countries like USA3, England4, and France5.  
                                                 
2
 A short glance at the development of intelligence studies in Western historiography reveals an increasing 
academic interest in the subject. Having raised very little voice until the late1950s primarily due to very 
limited access to original documents and partly due to academicians’ sneering away the importance of 
intelligence, the sphere of inquiry on the intelligence dimension in historical research remained 
insufficient. For one of the earliest works on intelligence see; Sherman Kent, Strategic intelligence for 
American World Policy (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1949). However, with the dramatic 
expansion of the public knowledge about the subject, academicians have gradually become aware of the 
need to scrutinize the influence of intelligence and its role in policy-making and military operations in the 
past. Guided largely by the policy-oriented and conceptual approach of American scholars, study of 
intelligence and its role in historical events came into existence starting in the late 1970s. 
3
 Generally considered “parochial”, American approach reflected the paradigms of political science and 
policy analysis without being nourished by multi-disciplinary studies. Yet, the strategic importance of US 
in Western alliance combined with a variety of conceptual approaches was enough to mark US as the most 
productive center of intelligence studies. In this context, Kenneth G. Robertson defines four major 
approaches to the study of intelligence in United States. The very first one is constituted by a series of 
early works which stressed “analysis” as the key issue in intelligence studies. The liberal approach, on the 
other hand, suspects that alleged threats to domestic issues are overstated; therefore, the practices of 
intelligence services which are designed to encounter those threats put democracy in jeopardy. For the 
most prominent figure of this approach see; Harry Howe Ransom, The Intelligence Establishment 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1970). Thirdly, “Surprise school” deals with the crisis 
management by examining whether or not the intelligence information is the key to a good management in 
times of international crisis. This approach paved the way for a number of studies on particular 
intelligence services during specific historical periods. Thomas Troy, Donnovan and the CIA: A History of 
the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency (Frederick, Md: University Publications of America, 
1981). Realist approach, the fourth major approach in US, argues that intelligence capacity should be 
effective to defend the national security against international challenges. See, Kenneth G. Robertson, “The 
Study of Intelligence in the United States”, Roy Godson (ed), Comparing Foreign Intelligence: The U.S., 
the USSR, the U.K. and the Third World (Mclean, Virginia: Pergamon-Brassey’s International Defense 
Publishers, 1988), 7-41. Thus, led mainly by policy-oriented and conceptual approaches, the “surprise 
school” seems the only one having carried out historical study of particular intelligence organizations in 
American approaches. 
4
 No doubt, the other important center of intelligence studies has been the United Kingdom, where 
scholars generally pursue a more historical approach. It seems not possible, however, to allege that 
intelligence studies have been conducted with no trouble. The years subsequent to the revelation of the 
“Ultra Secret” (the decrypting by British intelligence of the German cipher machine called 'Enigma') and 
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“Double Cross System” (one of the greatest intelligence coups of the World War II ran to control the 
German espionage in the United Kingdom) documents in the mid 1970s, which might possibly be called a 
turning point in intelligence studies, witnessed a serious tendency to incorporate intelligence into historical 
accounts. The “biggest hole” a term used by David Khan marked the fundamental characteristic of 
intelligence studies of the era. In the article, having defined “intelligence gapes as the biggest hole in the 
historiography”, Kahn puts forward the reasons why we know very little about intelligence. Given the 
importance of the elements of intelligence, he offers some steps to link intelligence to operations. See 
David Kahn, “World War II History: The Biggest Hole” Military Affairs, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Apr., 1975), 74-
76. The first efforts were made to fill this ‘hole’, however, by a variety of nonacademic historians up to 
the late 1970s, but, not surprisingly, their works were considered either unreliable or uncheckable (or 
both). Definition of intelligence as the “missing dimension” of historiography in 1982 by Christopher 
Andrew and David Dilks, was followed by the foundation of inter-disciplinary academic journal of 
intelligence, “Intelligence and National Security”. See, Intelligence and National Security (Routledge, part 
of the Taylor & Francis Group). At the end of the 1980s, although the intelligence archives were closed to 
researchers by Official Secret Acts, serious academic works began to appear which demonstrated that the 
materials officially released or overlooked during the censorship process were enough for the study of the 
development of British intelligence organizations. See, Christopher Andrew, “Historical Research on the 
British Intelligence Community” Comparing Foreign Intelligence: The U.S., the USSR, the U.K. and the 
Third World, 43-64. An extreme focus on the alleged centrality of intelligence in military history, which 
might be called intelligence fetishism, was fashionable among British academicians up to the 1980s to an 
extent because they did not have intelligence archives at their disposal. But afterwards historians began to 
broaden their approaches and put forward better studies. Martin S. Alexander’s work in which he launches 
efforts to scrutinize the intelligence activities directed against friends and allies by ten case studies, is a 
good example for much more complicated and balanced studies in intelligence discipline. See Martin S. 
Alexander (ed), Knowing Your Friends: Intelligence Inside Alliances and Coalitions from 1914 to the 
Cold war, (London and Portland, Ore: Frank Cass, 1998). During the 1980s, historians launched efforts to 
find out descriptive information about the inner world of little known secret services and their 
organizational dynamics. This institutionalist approach provided the ground for a more contextualist 
attitude- the studies on the diverse impact of secret services on particular historical events, an approach 
which emerged in the 1990s and is still predominant among academicians. See, Richard J. Aldrich (ed), 
Espionage, Security and Intelligence in Britain 1945-1970, (Manchester and New York: Manchester 
University Press, 1998), 1-7. On the whole, however, it is plausible that British academic community, 
particularly discouraged by the public disclosure of Secret Service records until the mid 1990s, had to treat 
intelligence with little importance. British National Archives (Public Record Office) for a long time 
refused even to consult documents concerning some British military operations during and after World 
War I, for example the British occupation of Istanbul and parts of Anatolia and how Britain suppressed 
popular uprisings against British rule in India and Egypt. Exaggerated secrecy even about the intelligence 
reports relating to periods before and during the First World War paved the way for harsh criticism and the 
publication of official history of British Intelligence in the Second World War and the release of some 
wartime intelligence reports in Public Record Office were not enough to obviate those objections: “The 
proposition that the release of documents on British intelligence operations in Germany during the Agadir 
crisis of 1911 or in Russia before the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 might threaten national security in the 
1980s is so absurd that probably only Whitehall is capable of defending it. The judgment of those 
ministers and officials who take this extraordinary view has, I believe, been sadly warped by ancient and 
irrational taboos.”  See, Christopher Andrew, Her Majesty’s Secret Service: the Making of the British 
Intelligence Community, (New York: Elisabeth Sifton Books, Viking, 1985), XV. 
5
 ‘You may not see that!’ regulations, the official name of the well-known ongoing archival restrictions- 
the most important difficulty experienced by all historians of not only intelligence but also military 
operations-, posed more troubles for serious academic works in France almost until the end of the 
millennium. According to prominent historians of French intelligence, who had to compensate the archival 
obstacles by means of other sources, such restrictive laws reveal the reason behind the vague attitude of 
French governments towards intelligence: “Because the French services have a long history of spying on 
their own people, especially their political leaders, do those who pass these laws actually do so out of self-
interest rather than state interests?”. See, Douglas Porch, The French Secret Services From the Dreyfus 
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Intelligence has long been a subject of immense public interest in Turkey, 
particularly from the early 1960s onward; its political and legal dimensions have 
attracted a number of columnists and experts. Writings on intelligence drew great 
strength from the sophisticated clashes between left and right-wing political and armed 
groups, which Turkey lived through roughly between 1970 and 1980. The military coup 
d’etat on September 12, 1980, gave no stimulus to intelligence studies for a while. Under 
the growing influence of the policies of Turgut Özal government from 1983 onward, 
intelligence began to get on the scene once again. Discussions on intelligence subjects 
however gained momentum during the 1990s and became a popular subject of inquiry, 
despite diverse interpretations, particularly after the Susurluk accident on 3rd November 
1996 and the process of 28th February.   
During the 1990s, as specialists dealing with different dimensions of Turkish 
intelligence, a new term has stuck out as the most speculative and constant feature of not 
only intelligence studies but also of politics: “deep state”. The term generally refers to a 
state-within-the-state. Discussions on “deep state” accelerated the studies on 
intelligence, thus, increasing the relevant literature. To a great extent, hypotheses 
proposed have concerned, in mixed order of importance, with increasing PKK terrorism; 
a number of political assassinations; the military coup d’etats of 1960, 1971, and 1980; 
the process of 28th February 1996, which came to be known as “post-modern coup 
d’etat”; famous accident of Susurluk; the activities of and assassinations by the 
Armenian terror organization ASALA; international developments after 11th September; 
the relation between the mafia and Turkish intelligence organizations, etc…  
                                                                                                                                                
Affair to the Gulf War (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1995), XII. But again, this attitude applies 
regarding not only to intelligence but also to military documents. 
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It is therefore not easy to propose even a basic historiographical classification of 
different approaches to studies on Turkish intelligence services. One may refer to a 
number of factors in explaining this: rapid alterations in the domestic political 
environment, which, in return, bring about changes in the perception of international 
atmosphere; debates revolving around the ‘transparency’ of governmental acts; changing 
public perception and debates on the politicians and statecraft in Turkey; and finally, 
Turkey’s geo-strategic and geo-political location, which marks her as the point of 
intersection between East and West.  
A careful examination of intelligence studies, however, might demonstrate a 
number of common tendencies in the literature. Developing a proper definition of 
intelligence and its functions do seem to be the main question of all studies. Many of the 
researchers accept that intelligence permeate and dictate Republican Turkish statecraft. 
Nearly all works acknowledge that the mission of intelligence is to provide national 
security, despite the fact that there are different views on the nature of the main threats 
and the way Turkish intelligence services should respond to them. That there is a mutual 
ground of interaction between intelligence and democracy might be counted as the third 
common feature. Finally, each study recognizes that, as perhaps the case for all 
intelligence organizations, there are serious problems within Turkish intelligence 
organizations, despite the existence of a deep divergence of opinion on their nature. 
One may conclude that intelligence studies in Turkey are generally connected to 
public policy issues. This, first of all, has negative impact on researchers and 
academicians, discouraging them to study subjects relating to intelligence, thus directly 
contributing to the low level of academic studies on intelligence that are far from the 
standards of objectivity, certainty, and self-consistency. Secondly, it leads the literature 
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on the subject to be composed, to a great extent, by the studies of fiction thrillers, think-
tanks who have close relations with governments, and officials with extensive contacts 
with intelligence itself. Thirdly, since it is almost impossible for a researcher on Turkish 
intelligence studies to entirely distance herself/himself from the current ideological 
tendencies or existing political environment in Turkey, any dimension of intelligence 
can easily become politicized, without a proper scientific treatment. Fourthly, given the 
inattentive ideological atmosphere of Turkey, which encourages various forms of harsh 
public discussions and populist languages, daily concerns as to the ‘survival’ of Turkish 
Republic, inevitably become an integral part of the heated debates on current issues. One 
of the historical dimensions of such debates, moreover, is directly related to the military 
in general and intelligence services in politics both in the late Ottoman and early 
Republican periods. In this context, the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa, naturally becomes the core 
issue and is highly politicized, popularized, and distorted within the framework of the 
literature on Turkish intelligence studies which gives the impression of a perplexed, 
intricate, and untidy bunch of theoretical assumptions.  
  
B. Literature on the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa Revisited  
 
It is imperative, at this point, to have a closer look at the current literature on the history 
of Turkish intelligence with a particular focus on the Teşkilat. Such a brief examination 
would also help us better understand the nature of the difficulties involved in the study 
of the subject and provide a crude guide for further readings and studies. Such an 
evaluation will inevitably involve the major sources regarding the Teşkilat, basically by 
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reference to its activities nourished mainly from Sinai, Libya, and to a lesser extent, 
Sudan, in Egypt between 1914 and 1916, which constitute the subject of this study.  
To start with, Teşkilat is not usually mentioned in the standard histories of World 
War I that relate to the Ottoman Empire. Nor is it brought up in general works on the last 
century of Ottoman history.6 There are however some works which slightly and 
sometimes indirectly touch upon the subject. While discussing the Teşkilat around the 
famous Yakup Cemil case, Sina Akşin, for instance, explains the rivalry between Enver 
Pasha and Talat Bey7. Similarly, Şükrü Hanioğlu develops an interesting argument by 
pointing to the apparent intellectual background of some members of the Teşkilat. To 
him, some Unionist members of Teşkilat were affected by the ideas of Büchner, 
Nietzsche, and particularly those of Schopenhauer. What lay behind this interest were 
Schopenhauer’s ideas emphasizing the need for individuals to further interfere in civilian 
political life.8 İlhan Tekeli provides a short but a balanced definition of Teşkilat, where 
he says that the Teşkilat was no more than  a covert establishment associated with the 
state. He goes on to say that it had two important duties: firstly, to reunite the various 
internal groups by means of collecting information about the multi-segmented structure 
of the Ottoman Empire; secondly, to increase the political impact of the Empire in 
Turkish and Muslim states and those which were parts of the Ottoman Empire by 
supporting and organizing the local resistance groups against the existing political 
authorities.9 Stanford Shaw, a veteran on late Ottoman and early Republican era, does 
                                                 
6
 This includes the classic works like those written by Bernard Lewis, Niyazi Berkes, Feroz Ahmad, 
Maurice Larcher, Ulrich Trumpener and many other books on the Ottoman Empire in World War I. 
7
 Sina Akşin, 100 Soruda Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki, (İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1980), 295-297. 
8
 Şükrü Hanioğlu, Bir Siyasal Örgüt Olarak Osmanlı İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Jön Türklük (İstanbul: 
İletişim Yayınları,1986),53-54.  
9
 İlhan Tekeli, Selim İlkin, Cumhuriyetin Harcı, Birinci Kitap: Köktenci Modernitenin Doğuşu (İstanbul: 
İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2003), 96-97. 
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not directly identify the Teşkilat in his classic work. He, however, draws attention to the 
extent of its success in operations to arouse upheavals in the colonies of Entente powers 
by making use of Jihad. In this context, Shaw spots well what was primarily expected 
from the Teşkilat by Enver and his fellows.10 Such an attitude of not directly dealing 
with the Teşkilat in detail might be partially accounted for by the markable silence of the 
Ottoman officials who were responsible for keeping secret both the name of the Teşkilat, 
its activities and organization.11 
     At this point, Eric Jan Zürcher’s argument on the Teşkilat deserves particular 
attention since it constitutes a major line of argument in the literature. Zürcher discusses 
Teşkilat mainly in the context of the Armenian question.12 Characterizing the Teşkilat 
“as the Unionist shocktroops, who did the Committee’s dirty work”13, sometimes as a 
group controlling bandits, Zürcher stresses that a division of Teşkilat (not the Emniyet-i 
Umumiye İstihbarat Dairesi in the Ministry of Interior Affairs, which was Talat’s own 
intelligence organization) directly  supervised by Talat Bey under the command of 
Bahattin Şakir was made use of in order to ethnically purify the Empire by means of 
massacring the problematical minorities, especially the Armenians living in Eastern 
                                                 
10
 Stanford J. Shaw, Ezel Kural Shaw, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Modern Türkiye, Reform, Devrim ve 
Cumhuriyet: Modern Türkiye’nin Doğuşu 1808-1975 (İstanbul: E Yayınları, 1994), 383.  
11
 Philip H. Stoddard, Osmanlı Devleti ve Araplar 1911-1918: Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa Üzerine Bir Ön 
Çalışma, (İstanbul: Arma Yayınları, 2003), 53.  
12
 According to Zürcher, the Teşkilat was the official continuation of the Fedai supporters who operated 
with Enver in Tripoli and Western Thrace. See, Eric Jan Zürcher, The Unionist Factor: The Role of the 
Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish Natoinal Movement, 1905-1926 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 
1984), 59.  Zürcher, however, tells almost nothing of the operations of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa outside the 
realms of the Ottoman Empire during World War I. In this context, he puts forward only once that “The 
Teşkilat also operated outside the empire, where it tried to fan Muslim resistance to the Russian, French 
and British administrations in their respective colonies.” See, Zürcher, Turkey, 115. Also see, Unionist 
Factor, 84. 
13
 Ibid., 114.  
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parts of Turkey.14  Zürcher bases his argument almost solely on the works by Vahakn 
Dadrian15 and Taner Akçam16 who are known for their detailed studies with a pro-
genocide standing within the framework of the Armenian question.   
In fact, this approach is understandable since it seems to serve one of the critical 
arguments that modern Turkish state was established on a massive ethnic cleansing.17 
Thus, Zürcher, for the sake of his argument, obviously applies a method which is limited 
to exclusive concentration on one particular operational base of the Teşkilat, Eastern 
Anatolia. His reductionist approach, which is often derogatory, intrinsically 
oversimplifies and overgeneralizes the complex nature of the Teşkilat and its activities. 
It is clear, however, that such a definition of the Teşkilat requires further justification, 
which would inevitably involve questions like whether the alleged activities against the 
Armenian or Greek population were really the key and the only components of the 
Teşkilat. If that is the case, then it would be true by definition that such activities could 
alone characterize and define the nature of the Teşkilat. If not, one could ignore the 
interdependent parts of intelligence whose totality determine what the Teşkilat was. As 
the present study will, I hope, partially elaborate the complex nature of the Teşkilat, it 
cannot be fully understood in isolation from its administrative and operational 
experiences both within the boundaries of Anatolia and elsewhere such as Bulgaria, 
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 Erik Jan Zürcher, “Jön Türkler, Müslüman Osmanlılar ve Türk Milliyetçileri: Kimlik Politikaları, 1908-
1938”, Osmanlı Geçmişi ve Bugünün Türkiye’si, Kemal Karpat , (ed) (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi 
Yayınları, Haziran 2004), 271-273; Turkey, 115, 120-121. 
15
 Vahakn N. Dadrian, “The Naim-Andonian Documents on the World War I Destruction of Ottoman 
Armenians: The Anatomy of a Genocide” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 18, No.3 
(Aug.,1986), 311-360, also see his The history of the Armenian genocide : ethnic conflict from the Balkans 
to Anatolia to the Caucasus (Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 1995) and Ermeni Soykırımında Kurumsal 
Roller: Toplu Makaleler 1 (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 2004).   
16
 Taner Akçam, Türk Ulusal Kimliği ve Ermeni Sorunu (İstanbul: Su Yayınları, 2001); İnsan Hakları ve 
Ermeni Sorunu, İttihat ve Terakki’den Kurtuluş Savaşı’na (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1999).  
17
 Erik Jan Zürcher, “Modern Türkiye’ye Ne Oldu? Kırk Yıl Sonra Bernard Lewis’in Modern Türkiye’nin 
Doğuşu kitabı” Savaş, Devrim ve Uluslaşma,Türkiye Tarihi’nde Geçiş Dönemi 1908-1928,  93-95, 98. 
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India, Egypt, Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Tunisia, Libya, and the like. The study of the 
Teşkilat thus requires far more geographical width and historical depth in order to fully 
grasp what it really was and what it did, than the narrow approach of Zürcher.  
 Doğan Avcıoğlu’s evaluation of the Teşkilat, on the other hand, seems to have 
been profoundly affected by the political environment of Turkey during the 1960s. As 
one of the prominent figures of Yön movement, Avcıoğlu had a keen interest in 
contemporary politics. In relation to this, that he highlights Teşkilat as an Islamic 
revolutionary organization under the heading of “the world-wide mad war Turkey fought 
against English imperialism” is understandable.18 That is why Avcıoğlu exclusively 
concentrates on the activities of Teşkilat outside the realms of the Ottoman Empire.19 In 
this context, the deep divergence between Avcıoğlu and Zürcher in their approaches on 
the Teşkilat might be a good example in revealing the problematic nature of Teşkilat 
literature.  
 Tarık Zafer Tunaya’s classic, Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler, though not a general 
history of modern Turkey, constitutes one of the most valuable contributions to the 
history of the Teşkilat. Based on documentary evidence, Tunaya argues that the CUP 
was an outsized and heterogenic mass party which launched efforts, by a sort of 
organizational imperialism, to form subsidiary associations. Analyzing this as a common 
feature of the political parties which were inclined to be a single party, Tunaya maintains 
that the Teşkilat was the most important product of such an endeavor.20 Despite the fact 
that this was one of the earliest accounts, no scholar, except Stoddard to a certain extent, 
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 Doğan Avcıoğlu, “Türkiye’nin İngiliz Emperyalizmine karşı dünya çapında verdiği çılgın savaş. 
Gerillacı Türk Subaylarının yönetiminde bütün İslam Dünyasında antiemperyalist örgütler” Milli Kurtuluş 
Tarihi 1883’den 1995’e, Vol. 1 (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1998), 59-73. 
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 Ibid., 75-98. 
20
 Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasal Gelişmeler (1876-1938), Birinci Kitap: Kanun-i Esasi ve 
Meşrutiyet Dönemi (1876-1918) (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2001),153-154. 
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seems to have reached the academic depth of Tunaya’s understanding and portrayal of 
the Teşkilat. Written by a problematic-oriented historical perspective on the basis of 
nearly all the available sources, except for the records in ATASE archive, this study 
provides a reliable ground for more comprehensive and sophisticated discussions on 
issues about the Teşkilat such as the problems related to its foundation and founders, its 
administrative organization, the nature of its relation with the operations of the Ministry 
of War as well as the CUP, its budget, objectives, ideology, deployment of prisoners on 
the military fronts, the geopolitical depth of its operations, the incident of Yakup Cemil, 
and the interrogation of the survivors of the Unionist cadre following the war.21 
 Finally, it should be noted that the standard history of World War I prepared by 
Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı (hereafter ATASE), includes 
considerable amount of information on the agents of the Teşkilat; the platoon they were 
attached to as well as the quality and quantity of the soldiers the Teşkilat agents 
commanded.22 Furthermore, Askeri Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi, published by ATASE for 
quite sometime provide the researchers with archival materials directly related to the 
Teşkilat: the methods the Teşkilat carried out in psychological war, the nature of its 
relations with the tribes in certain regions, and the intelligence reports of the agents.23 It 
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 Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler, Vol.3 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2000), 339-359. 
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 For an example, see the information on Major Mümtaz Bey (İzmitli), the leader of the Teşkilat-ı 
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Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı Askeri Tarih Yayınları, 1979), 130-134, 137, 179, 197, 202, 225. Also, 
the interrogation of the survivors of the Unionist cadre following the World War I on Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa 
see; Osman Selim Kocahanoğlu, İttihat ve Terakki’nin Sorgulanması ve Yargılanması (1918-1919) 
(İstanbul: Temel Yayıları, 1998), 92-109, 166-167, 207,251, 290, 381, 393-394, 415, 428-429, 449, 488, 
495. 
23
 See, as an example, the insights into the activities of Süleyman Askeri, the first leader of the Teşkilat-ı 
Mahsusa, in Iraq, the organization of the Teşkilat there, and a couple of his correspondence with Eşref 
Kuşçubaşı Askeri Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi, no. 118 (Ankara: Genelkurmay ATASE ve Genelkurmay 
Denetleme Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2004).   
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is unfortunate to see that scholars including the historians mentioned above have made 
nearly no use of these valuable sources in their studies.       
Apart from these, there are also a number of academic works concentrating 
directly on the subject of the Teşkilat.24 Obviously, an examination of Teşkilat literature 
would be incomplete without referring to the work by Philip H. Stoddard, written as a 
PhD dissertation at Princeton University.25 This work has been acknowledged as the 
most comprehensive study on the Teşkilat since 1963 and naturally, ever since, almost 
every work on Teşkilat has made reference to it. One may even say that the current 
understanding of the Teşkilat in general in literature does not go beyond the picture 
drawn by Stoddard.  
In his work, Stoddard evaluates the role of the Teşkilat largely in terms of the 
relationship between the Unionist government and the Arabs living in different regions 
such as Syria, Iran, Iraq, Egypt, and Libya. In this context, the accomplishments and 
deficiencies of the Teşkilat activities with regard to its objectives and targets, the 
practice of its strategic and tactical skills such as propaganda and covert actions 
addressed to incite the populace to revolt against the existing political authorities, 
constitute the main themes of his study. Stoddard concludes that the Teşkilat was one of 
the most vital instruments the Unionists used in order to resist against the threats of Arab 
                                                 
24
 A number of articles stress the impact of Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa on the Republican regime. While Orhan 
Koloğlu discusses the transition from the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa to the Milli Emniyet Teşkilatı, Murat Belge 
argues that a considerable amount of the members of the CUP, which was no different than Teşkilat-ı 
Mahsusa, actually took active part in the foundation of the Republican regime. Cemil Koçak, on he other 
hand, depending largely on the interrogation of the survivors of the Unionist cadre following the World 
War I and a petition of Ruşeni Bey, a member of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa, comes to the main conclusion 
that there were two fractions in the Teşkilat, one was commanded by Enver Pasha, the other by Talat 
Pasha. See in order, Orhan Koloğlu, “Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa’dan Milli Emniyet’e geçiş”, Birikim, no.93-94, 
1997, 145-149; Murat Belge, “Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa”, Birikim, no.116, 1998, 16-20; Cemil Koçak, 
“Teşkilat-ı Mahsusayı Nasıl Bilirdiniz”, Tarih ve Toplum, no. 3, 2006, 171-214.   
25
 Philip H. Stoddard, Osmanlı Devleti ve Araplar 1911-1918: Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa üzerine Bir Ön Çalışma 
(İstanbul: Arma Yayınları, 2003). 
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separatism and Western imperialism. Despite certain successes Teşkilat achieved, in the 
main, it did not succeed in opposing and eliminating the threats that were mounted 
against the very existence of the Ottoman Empire. Its eventual failure, however, was 
only a part of the overall breakdown of the Ottoman system that took place in the first 
quarter of the twentieth century.26 
             Although Stoddard used no archival materials on the Teşkilat, the value of his 
study emanates, to a great extent, again from the sources he was able to have access to: 
first, the memoirs of some agents who were engaged in the activities of the Teşkilat and 
of those who were in a position to interpret the program of the Teşkilat; second, 
interviews and meetings with one of the few surviving members of the Teşkilat, namely 
Eşref Kuşçubaşı, whose activities were limited for the most part to the Arab provinces of 
Syria, Egypt and Libya as well as the Arabian peninsula, and with those that had first 
hand knowledge of the Teşkilat’s activities, men like Aziz el-Mısri, Zübeyde Saplı, 
Ahmet Salih Harb, Hilmi Musallimi, Satvet Lütfi Tozan, and Hamza Osman Erkan.27  
Consequently, it is possible to say that this study still has a great value as a major 
reference book in terms of the knowledge about not only the particular region Stoddard 
studied but also the conceptual explanations regarding the Teşkilat as a whole. 
Academic studies, which appear to have increased in number in Turkey, 
constitute yet another set of literature that should be noted. They, however, do not seem 
adequate to question the problematic aspects of the subject. It is also clear that regional 
studies alone cannot carry the possible expansions of such a little studied and 
complicated subject. In this context, the study by Vahdet Keleşyılmaz which 
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 Ibid., 12-13. 
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 Ibid., 206-209. 
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concentrates on the Indian-Ottoman relations during World War I by depending on 
archival materials on the Teşkilat, stands out as a good example in terms of its ability to 
demonstrate the geo-strategic and geo-political depth of the Teşkilat.28 Even though the 
study does not break away from the conceptual analysis of Stoddard, it might be 
considered a partial achievement in examining not only the intelligence, and irregular 
military activities realized in a vast geography (India, Afghanistan, and Iran), to a great 
extent, thanks to German-Ottoman alliance during World War I but also to the chaotic 
relationship between Hindus and Muslims within Indian society itself.29 Prudence, 
however, should not be flung to the wind. For, a few explanations, no doubt refutable, 
could drag the specialist into an erroneous path. For instance, Keleşyılmaz incorrectly 
evaluates Umur-i Şarkiye Dairesi (The Office for Eastern Affairs), the Teşkilat’s new 
name given around May or June of 1915, as a separate department concerned with the 
eastern services of the Teşkilat.  
 The authors of the two other academic studies on the Teşkilat, namely Mustafa 
Balcıoğlu and Atilla Çeliktepe criticize Keleşyılmaz on this point. Depending on an 
archival document, Balcıoğlu argues in his article “Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa yahut Umur-i 
Şarkiye Dairesi” that 17 November 1913 was the legal establishment date of Teşkilat-ı 
Mahsusa and the name Umur-i Şarkiye Dairesi replaced the Teşkilat at an unknown 
date.30 Çeliktepe accepts this explanation without examining its authenticity.31 
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 Vahdet Keleşyılmaz, Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa’nın Hindistan Misyonu (1914-1918) (Ankara: Atatürk 
Araştırma Merkezi, 1999). Also see his “Kafkas Harekatının Perde Arkası”, Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi 
Dergisi, no. 47, (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, June 2000), 367-394.   
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 For another regional case study dealing with the Teşkilat’s operations in Black Sea region, see; Sadık 
Sarısaman, “Trabzon Mıntıkası Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa Heyet-i İdaresinin Faaliyetleri ve Gürcü Lejyonu”, 
XIII. Türk Tarih Kongresi (Ankara: 4-8 Ekim 1999), 495-534. 
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 Mustafa Balcıoğlu, “Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa yahut Umur-i Şarkiye Dairesi” Teşkilat-ı Mahsusadan 
Cumhuriyet’e (Ankara: Asil Yayın Dağıtım, 2004), 1-8. 
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Balcıoğlu, however, makes a couple of fundamental errors which are sufficient enough 
not only to indicate the apparent backwardness of the Teşkilat literature but also to point 
to serious flaws in his understanding of an academic work. For an example, Balcıoğlu 
does not provide the ATASE classification number of the document related to the new 
name of the Teşkilat (actually the f: 1843, d: 43, I: 79/13 filed material in ATASE 
archive). He apparently did so because he intentionally altered the text of the document, 
though he did retain its general meaning.32 Examination of the remainder of this article 
as well as different parts of his book reveals that he often omitted parts of the documents 
which appeared illegible to him.33 
Disregarding the two chapters related to the German-Ottoman alliance during 
World War I and the biographies of a number of Teşkilat agents, the study by Atilla 
Çeliktepe mainly consists of two parts: “Intelligence in History”, which is exclusively 
based on the studies of Ergun Hiçyılmaz, and “Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa” which is, to a great 
extent, based on the studies by Stoddard and Hamit Pehlivanlı.34 Despite the attractive 
name of the book, The Political Mission of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa, and its sub-headings, 
a careful examination demonstrates that Çeliktepe’s work possesses more problems than 
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 Pehlivanlı, “Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa: Türk Modern İstihbaratçılığının Başlangıcımı?”, Osmanlı (Ankara: 
Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 1999). 
 16 
those of Balcıoğlu. For the main part of the book, “Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa”, which covers 
pages between 71 and 119, appears to be a complete plagiarism.35 The works of both 
Çeliktepe and Balcıoğlu, therefore, cannot be safely used for a critical and analytical 
study of the subject, Teşkilat. 
There are also a number of memoirs, which provide some information about the 
activities of the Teşkilat. These were written mainly by Turkish and German officials: 
Kress Von Kressenstein36, Eşref Kuşçubaşı37, Kazım Karabekir38, Ali İhsan Sabis39, Ali 
Fuad Erden40, Cemal Paşa41, Talat Paşa42, Galip Vardar43, Hüsamettin Ertürk44, Fuat 
Balkan45, Arif Cemil46, Celal Bayar47, Mustafa Ragıp Esatlı48. Given the shortage of 
secondary sources, these memoirs written by people engaged in the activities of Teşkilat 
in one way or another and the ones who can interpret the Teşkilat’s program and 
operations prove invaluable. Mainly written by officials involved in the events they give 
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account of, the memoirs by and large reflect the personal attitudes of their authors. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to prove the authenticity of the statements made in these 
memoirs. To assess their value is therefore connected to a number of factors, as 
Stoddard states: 
1. The extent of the author’s interference into the incidents he acquaints with. 
2. His objectivity, intelligence, personality and his comprehension about the various 
dimensions that had an impact on those incidents. 
3. The method of the author related to the collection and concealment of the 
information in hand.49 
Besides, the shallow level of our knowledge paved the way for a number of 
popular and semi-journalistic studies on the Teşkilat. Though not grounded on archival 
materials, the works of Cemal Kutay50 and Ergun Hiçyılmaz51 may well be useful if 
approached and examined carefully.52 The intelligence rivalry growing out of the 
hegemonial strategies in the Middle East as well as the endless, habitually political 
debates around the role of the Teşkilat in the Armenian question appears to have 
contributed further to Teşkilat’s becoming a profitable subject of media. In this sense, a 
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series of articles written by Abdullah Muradoğlu in the daily Yeni Şafak53, and the 
constant references to the Teşkilat in the famous TV series “Kurtlar Vadisi”54, for 
instance, might be considered good examples of such a popular use of the subject in the 
sphere of public entertainment in Turkey.55   
All in all, that they do not condescend to the methods pertaining to the usage of 
sources; that they generally consider almost every explanation in the memoirs to be 
authentic; that they convey the information which can be refuted by other sources 
directly to their writings; and that they often make use of anonymous stories, do 
constitute the major characteristics of such popular studies. It is not an exaggeration, 
therefore, to say that the Teşkilat, which became a center of attention both by its 
administration and activities during the last decade of the Ottoman Empire, has thus 
(been) turned into a mysterious subject, like Pandora’s Box. Two overriding rationales 
might explain this: 
a) Apparent lack of interest on the part of historians to the subject seems to have 
constituted the first rationale. Firstly, the fact that major strategic decisions were made 
by Enver Pasha and his colleagues, and this led to the eventual disintegration of the 
Ottoman Empire have, not surprisingly, attracted historians of the period much more 
than secondary issues such as intelligence and the Teşkilat. Secondly, there is the 
tendency to limit the study of the Teşkilat within the framework of espionage. 
Displeased by fiction-thrillers and their inspiring myths about spies, specialists have 
come to commit themselves to certain specific aspects with rather simplistic or 
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reductionist approaches. This, in return, has either made historians disregard the 
importance of espionage or impeded research on other aspects of the activities of the 
Teşkilat. A further reason for the neglect might be the perception that the history of the 
Teşkilat is first of all a subject of military history and there is no civilian academic 
institute in Turkey which provides specialization in the military, particularly in 
intelligence. This lack of interest is coupled with certain problems related to sources 
used and the mental attitude developed by researchers, including historians. The latter 
has already been referred to at the beginning. It seems that the nature of sources and 
their use constitute no less a significant problem. We will be discussing this below in the 
following section on the sources.  
b) The second rationale that further complicates matters is that the arguments on 
Teşkilat generally hover between extreme praise on the one hand and extreme 
denigration on the other. Even though a certain degree of inevitable subjectivity in 
historical studies is understandable, it brings together forms of bias in considering the 
role of the Teşkilat. On the one side, there are standardized quotations and legendary 
motives that cannot be recognized at first sight but are inherent in the texts. On the other, 
there are formulized and deprecating repetitions proposed with the pretext of objectivity. 
Accordingly, it is possible to say that despite the efforts of ATASE as an archive, 
and of Stoddard and Tunaya as individual scholars, the literature is still quite far from 
satisfactorily presenting the Teşkilat at administrative and operational levels. The 
attempts, which by and large embroidered with unscholarly concerns and are far from 
exhausting the archival and secondary materials available, do not always bring a 
reasonably critical and methodological depth to the study of late Ottoman and early 
Republican era. It is also not easy to say that the works commonly tiding between two 
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extremely opposite views, mainly due to certain ideological and political concerns, does 
positively contribute to our current understanding of the Teşkilat. The shortcomings of 
the literature become more visible and get further complicated when this problematic 
and largely biased nature of the literature combined with the lack of linguistic and 
methodological equipments on the part of historians. The Teşkilat, therefore, crosses our 
path with its complicated inadequacies as one of the biggest black holes in Ottoman 
historiography.  
Hence, to further the debate in this area, more case studies in a more analytical 
manner are needed. This study, in this context, is an attempt, through the Teşkilat 
concentration, nourished mainly from Sinai, Libya, and to a lesser extent Sudan, in 
Egypt between 1914 and 1916 to further our understanding of not only the details of the 
Teşkilat’s activities in these regions but also its administrative and operational 
characteristics, at a time when a series of drastic changes led the Empire into eventual 
collapse. 
As for the literature on its mission and activities in the region in question, it is 
generally known that the Teşkilat was included in the Ottoman plan which was to invade 
Egypt simultaneously from three directions: from the east (Sinai), west (Libya), and 
south (Sudan). As far as this plan is concerned, the period between mid-1914 and late 
1916 in particular is crucial. While the former marked the launch of the Ottoman project, 
the latter witnessed not only the retreat of the Ottomans in the Sinai-Palestine front and 
the initiation of the British counter attacks, but also the withdrawal of the forces in Libya 
from Bingazi to Trablusgarp and the disappearance of the civil strife in Sudan, which 
totally meant that the Ottoman project of rolling back the invading British army of Egypt 
came to an end. Nevertheless, the present level of knowledge about the plans and 
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operations of the Teşkilat forces against and in Egypt during World War I is very poor in 
terms of the analysis of this phenomenon at a micro level in different localities.  
It is so primarily because of the fact that the role of the Teşkilat in the first 
Ottoman attack on the Suez Canal comes up only in a few studies. It is usually 
mentioned briefly, and as a failure incompetently mounted and carried out. The second 
attack, on the other hand, appears to have never taken place because of the authors’ 
summary of events in a few sentences. The state of the literature on the concentration in 
Libya and to a much lesser extent in Sudan is no different. Similarly, the memoirs 
written typically by active politicians and soldiers of the time do not appear to be 
sufficient for a better understanding of the Teşkilat in that region either. That the 
operations were rarely, and often unsatisfactorily studied generally by making use of the 
same sources were taken into account, the fact that we have rather limited knowledge on 
the activities of the Teşkilat in this region, representing the naturally secret part of both 
the military campaigns, breaks out to be confusing.  
At this point, it is possible to say that one of the major sources on the role of the 
Teşkilat in the region in question is again the work by Stoddard. In his abovementioned 
work, Stoddard focuses as case studies on the concentration of the Teşkilat in Libya and 
Egypt, including Sinai.56 Nevertheless, it appears obvious that his analysis of some 
administrative characteristics of the Teşkilat at both central and regional level is 
misleading simply because most of the time he took it for granted what Eşref Kuşçubaşı 
told him. The same flaws can be encountered in the work by Rachel Simon, which no 
doubt provides one of the best accounts in terms of the operations such as covert actions 
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carried out by the Teşkilat in Libya.57 Moreover, both studies provide almost no 
information about either the cells of the organization located in different parts of the 
region or the Teşkilat’s mission to the Sultanate of Darfur in Sudan. Besides, Stoddard 
does not highlight the role of the organization during the second attack against the Canal 
and provide only little insight into the minor operations carried out by the Teşkilat. The 
other major source for the study of the region seems to be the standard history by 
Turkish General Staff. Based on archival materials, they include brief but significant 
information on the commanders of the Teşkilat; the platoon they were attached to, and 
the quality and quantity of the soldiers they commanded.58 These works however do not 
always indicate the agents as members of the Teşkilat, but army commanders. Thus, one 
has to know the names of the agents in advance in order to fully benefit from these 
valuable sources. In this context, though written in a similar fashion, the work by Cemil 
Çelik, based on archival materials, might be useful with additional information on the 
agents and the minor operations of the Teşkilat during the first Canal campaign.59 
Moreover, one can use the memoirs referred to above and some other works as 
complimentary studies like the one by Hamit Pehlivanlı where he provides detailed 
information, based on archival materials, about the structure of the Teşkilat forces in 
Libya during World War I.60 It seems also obvious that the authors working on the 
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cooperation between the Sanusi and Ali Darfur of Sudan have not realized the vital role 
of the Teşkilat. Despite similar loopholes, the works by Evans-Pritchard and Jay 
Spaulding are indispensable in this context.61  
 
C. Sources 
 
Before presenting the main sources of this study in some detail, let us remember my 
critical evaluation of the ways the historians of the subject approached their sources.  I 
have already referred to the problematic use of sources by the historians, while 
examining their works on the Teşkilat as a whole. Part of this problem is the fact that 
there is a firm belief on their part that the entire archives on Turkish intelligence services 
remained closed to public use. Furthermore, this in itself has become, or presented as, an 
excuse for the low quality of the studies produced.   
It is clear, at least now, that the shelves of the Yıldız Palace archive from the 
reign of Abdulhamid II provide a considerable amount of materials relating to the earlier 
examples of intelligence activities, which eventually was incorporated into the very 
foundations of the Teşkilat. In this context, particularly the large-scale espionage 
network, which was established during his reign, to consolidate the authority of the 
palace over regular branches of government and administration as well as over certain 
political groups of opposition should be taken into consideration since this seems, to a 
great extent, to have been the Sultan’s policy that triggered the CUP to set up its own 
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underground network. One might safely suggest that examining Abdulhamid II’s 
intelligence organization, known as Yıldız Hafiye Teşkilatı, would provide fruitful 
insights into the inner world of the principal factors that lay behind the Teşkilat and its 
organizational culture. It is apparent, however, that the sources in Yıldız Palace, 
particularly the reports, called jurnals, to the Sultan by agents who spied on officials as 
well as civilians have not been sufficiently exploited. Although most of the reports were 
burnt by Tedkîk-i Evrak Komisyonu (Examination of Records Commission), established 
under the chairmanship of Ali Galip Bey, after the coup d’etat of 1909, those that 
survived, whose value cannot be underestimated, have long been accessible to public 
through Yıldız Maruzat Defterleri and Yıldız Tasnifi Defterleri at the Başbakanlık 
Osmanlı Arşivi in İstanbul. 
Ostensibly enough, documents relating to the Ministry of Interior Affairs 
(Dahiliye) have not been used effectively in examining the Teşkilat, which seems to 
have benefited from the experiences of the intelligence units of Emniyet-i Umumiye 
İstihbarat Dairesi of that ministry. Also, the materials associated with the directorate of 
Kalem-i Mahsusa in the same Ministry, consisting of documents between 1913 and 
1922, are highly significant for the researcher. Similarly, archival sources with guerilla 
units and operations, the appointment and dismissal of state officials as well as awarding 
medals, might well supply the conscious specialists with constructive ideas on the 
interaction between these diverse intelligence organizations both at administrative and 
operational levels as well as the relationships between the Ministry of Interior and of the 
Army. It should however be noted that the materials here are only partially catalogued 
and the system of classification makes it sometimes difficult to trace related documents 
in the Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi. In this regard, it is noteworthy to mention that 
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Başbakanlık Arşivi put almost all of its detailed catalogues onto the internet where they 
can be searched by subject, which surely encourages the researcher at the beginning of 
her/his study.  
The role of some of the leading personalities of the Teşkilat particularly during 
the Tripolitanian and Balkan Wars have been overlooked as well despite these 
campaigns became subjects of a number of studies. That the groups who organized the 
resistance in those campaigns joined the Teşkilat shortly before World War I, no doubt, 
marks the unambiguous significance of original documents coupled with those wars. 
When this particular context combined with the fact that the Ottoman government 
benefited from the Teşkilat fundamentally during World War I, the indispensable 
significance of the archive of the Turkish General Staff, ATASE, on Teşkilat studies 
might be better appreciated. There is no doubt that a modern archive with its catalogues 
and qualified staff, the ATASE collections include 41,591 documents on the 
Tripolitanian War of 1911, 902,800 on the Balkan War of 1912-1913, and 3,671,470 on 
World War I,62 all of which have a substantial amount of files on military intelligence, in 
particular on the Teşkilat agents and its organization. World War I catalogues where a 
large number of Teşkilat’s official documents can be found (about 40,000) are arranged 
according to their departmental files and each file is shortly explained according to their 
subject.  In this context, ATASE archive remains as the most significant source of 
information for those studying the Teşkilat.63  
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It is, at this point, imperative to have a closer look at the archival sources housed 
at ATASE. Since, despite the use of a few records found in Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, 
this study is mainly based on the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa records which are found under the 
category of Şube-i Mahsusa (Special Branch) in Birinci Dünya Harbi Koleksiyonu 
(World War I collection) at the ATASE archive, in Ankara. As mentioned earlier, a 
limited number of studies on the Teşkilat made use of this material. Nevertheless, they 
appear, without any exception, to be far behind being analytic and question driven. What 
has generally been achieved in the existing literature is in fact the alleged discovery of 
one operational base of the Teşkilat in a descriptive manner on the basis of very limited 
archival documents. Nonetheless, this does not necessarily mean that these studies have 
no value. On the contrary, they are of vital importance in making use of the basic source 
materials, thus directly contributing to the efforts at bringing the subject to a state of 
maturity.  
By exploiting a considerable amount of archival records, this study, on the other 
hand, firstly aims to better document the developments in this region, most of which 
were utilized for the first time, thus providing not only new insight into regional aspects 
of a crucial organization but also valuable information which might provide a ground for 
future comparative studies on different operational bases of the Teşkilat. Although a 
comparative analysis among various bases of the Teşkilat is outside the scope of this 
                                                                                                                                                
month before his/her research project gets started since the access permission to ATASE is subjected to a 
security investigation which takes one to two months. For all Turkish and foreign researchers, access 
permission to ATASE archive is subjected to the Cabinet decision dated 31 January 2002. It might also be 
noteworthy to mention at this point that according to Erik Jan Zürcher, who has presumably not obtained 
permission to work in the archive in the early years of his career, ATASE is closed to almost all foreign 
and most Turkish researchers. See, Erik Jan Zürcher, “Ölümle Firar Arasında: Birinci Dünya Savaşı’nda 
Osmanlı Askerinin Deneyimleri” Savaş, Devrim ve Uluslaşma , 176. As a researcher who does not know 
much about the earlier policies of ATASE, I can only point out a much more liberal attitude of the present 
ATASE administration in giving permission to researchers.            
 27 
study, it is possible to examine various dimensions of the Teşkilat and measure the 
extent of its role in the Ottoman Empire during World War I only after studying in a 
comparative perspective the general relationships among different bases of the Teşkilat 
by cross checking the similarities and dissimilarities. Despite the fact that this study, at 
times, presents the cases in rather a descriptive way, it tries to analyze the subject with 
certain questions, developed to see the Teşkilat in its entirety. By doing this, I tried to 
keep away from the shortcomings of the literature highlighted earlier, while making it 
possible to answer a number of questions concerning the administrative and operational 
characteristics of the Teşkilat, which have long been subjects of discussion among a 
limited number of historians. This, of course, requires a critical re-evaluation of not only 
the archival material but also the secondary sources used for this study. Therefore, it 
might be useful to have a closer look at the Şube-i Mahsusa registers in ATASE archive 
in terms of their significance and formats which may prove significant in both 
understanding the nature of the main source of this study and providing a preliminary 
guide for further studies on the Teşkilat.  
Şube-i Mahsusa records that comprise a fabulous wealth of history in many 
respects, holds one of the most significant places among the series housed in the ATASE 
archive. They are a kind of registers of the Teşkilat, which are formed by the 
compilation of the correspondences between the head organization of the Teşkilat and 
the Ministry of War, as well as those between these headquarters and its sub-divisions 
and the Teşkilat’s field agents. The series also contain originals of the letters exchanged 
between the Ministry of War and Berlin that were related to the Teşkilat as well as the 
reports concerning the internal structure of the Teşkilat. These records (reports, 
orders…etc) which constitute the main themes of the Şube-i Mahsusa registers give not 
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only fruitful insights into the distinct areas of activities concerned but also provide, all in 
one, a solid base for a better understanding of multifaceted structure of the Teşkilat.  
In this context, the records in Şube-i Mahsusa registers are of extremely 
significant. First of all, they provide the historians with the important strategic and 
tactical decisions taken by the Ottoman government. They also supply the historians 
with the knowledge of the application of these decisions onto the field. Accordingly, 
they shed important light on the plans of the head organization of the Teşkilat.  In 
addition, they contain military and political intelligence reports of the Teşkilat’s agents, 
which give profound insight into the factual developments in the field. Moreover, they 
are extremely valuable in examining the demands and the requests of the agents. Finally, 
all in all, they supply documentary evidence for the administrative machinery of the 
Teşkilat in operation. 
Şube-i Mahsusa registers are kept roughly from November 1913 up to the end of 
November 1918 and the number of records in these registers is estimated to amount to 
about 40.000.64  The records in Şube-i Mahsusa registers are composed of files where 
each file is composed of dossiers, which compile individual documents. In the registers, 
the summary of each file is typewritten with a single sentence and the documents were 
placed into the dossier chronologically. The filing of the record into the registers seems 
to have meant its approval, and the enforcement or the annulment of the records of any 
decisions in the dossiers was under the prerogative and authority of the Teşkilat’s chief, 
who was directly connected to Enver Pasha, vice-commander in chief. 
In respect to their format, the documents found in this category are different in 
size and number of lines. No decoration can be traced on the documents and they were 
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typically written by rika script. The documents, with some exceptions, have a follow up 
number on the upper right corner of the paper. This is typically followed by the place the 
letter was forwarded to such as “Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa Riyaset-i Alisine” (To the Sublime 
Presidency of the Special Organization) or “Harbiye Nezareti Umur-i Şarkiye 
Müdüriyet-i Alisine” (To the Sublime Directorate of Eastern Affairs). Then comes, as to 
the importance of the letter/correspondence, the phrases like “gayet mahremane ve 
müstaceldir” (extremely confidential and urgent) or “bizzat hal olunacaktır” (to be 
personally dealt with). The letters have dates at the end. In cases of encrypted 
letter/correspondence, as it was the case in most instances, it is also mentioned that the 
record is decrypted: “Baş Kumandanlık Vekalet-i Celilesi’ne Roma Sefaret-i 
Seniyyesi’nden mevrud 11 Mayıs 915 tarihli şifrenin hallidir” (Decryption of the cipher 
dispatched to the Supreme Command by the Sublime Embassy of Rome on 11 May 
1915). One might sometimes come across copies of authentic records and the documents 
repeated (mükerrer) in different files. Letter/correspondence usually make it clear why 
and for what reasons they are written; this is generally ended with a phrase of request or 
notification such as “müsterhimdir” (requested) and “maruzdur” (presented). Such 
phrases generally indicate that the letter is written to a superior echelon; writings to the 
lower echelons include rather direct orders. They eventually end with the name and the 
signature of its author. Nevertheless, in times, it is possible to come across documents 
bearing no name and signs or no name and illegible signs.  If the letter is forwarded to 
another department, it is also noted subsequently as “ilmi haberlerinin kıtalarından celbi 
levazımata yazılacaktır” (summon of certificates from their detachments will be written 
to the quartermaster section) or “2. Şube’ye yazıldı” (written to the 2nd Department). The 
following intelligence record might represent a good example in this sense. In the report, 
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Nabi Bey, the ambassador to Rome, on the basis of information received from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a man coming from Cairo, reports to the Ministry of 
War that the British forces in Egypt amounted to 100.000 and the British authorities 
began to exile suspicious Turks to Malta: 
“Numero:720 
Harbiye Nezaret-i Celilesine, 
 
Roma Sefiri Nabi Bey’den mevrud 12 Kanun-i Evvel 1914 tarihli şifrenin 
hallidir. 
 
29.9.1330 
 
Burada dolayısıyla Hariciye Nezareti’nden icra edilen tahkikatdan ve dün 
Kahire’den Roma’ya gelen bir zatın ifadesinden Mısır’daki İngiliz 
kuvvasının yüzbine baliğ olduğu anlaşılıyor. Mukaddema arz olunduğu 
üzere işbu kuvvetin kısm-ı azamı Hintli, Avusturalyalı ve Yeni Zelandalı 
ve Kanadalılardan mürekkebtir. Mısır’da İngilizler Türk anasırına karşı icra 
etmekte oldukları muamelatı son derecede teşdid ve birçok kimseleri 
Malta’ya sevke başladıkları işitilmiştir.  
 
2. Şube’ye 20.9.1330 
1. Şube’de sureti vardır. 
 
1330 Kanun-i Evvel 1”65 
 
In respect to the region in question, there are also translated records, which were 
generally sent from North Africa, in particular from the Senusis. The language of such 
correspondences is flowery when compared to the simple and lucidly written records of 
the Teşkilat’s agents. In these records, it is possible to find out the trace of diplomatic 
courtesy between the Libyan religous leaders and Ottoman administration. These 
records, consist mostly of letters, usually starting with “selam” (salutation), “ihtiram” 
(veneration), “dua” (invocation) and ends with a short invocation. The letter is translated 
by leaving out this first part and instead a note of abbreviation is made like “selam, 
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ihtiram, dua” or “bade’l elkab ve’d dua”. The authenticity of these translations were 
checked by another person since every letter at the end bears the phrase “aslına 
mutabıktır” (ad idem with the original). The letter by Seyyid İdris to Enver Pasha, for 
instance, might prove crucial in elucidating the physical features of such a translation of 
reports. In the letter, Seyyid İdris tells Enver Pasha that he sent one of the closest men of 
Seyyid Ahmed, named Ali el-Abidin Efendi, to him in order to inform Istanbul about the 
details of the resistance in Libya:   
“Harbiye Nazır-ı Celili Enver Paşa Hazretlerine Muhammed İdris el-Mehdi 
es-Senusi hazretleri tarafından 27 ? 1333 tarihiyle varid olan Arapça 
mektubun tercümesi: 
569 
9 Kanun-i Sani 1915 
26.10.1330 
 
Elkab, Halife-i Müslimine ve zat-ı sami-i fehimanelerine muzafferiyet 
duasından sonra:  
 
Nezd-i devletlerine vasıl olan Ecedabiye kaymakamı ihvanımız ve 
dostumuz Ali el-Abidin Efendi’yi es-Seyyid Ahmet Şerif hazretleri 
göndermiştir. Mumaileyh bize Arafat’a tevakkufumuzdan iki gün evvel ve 
Avrupa harbinin ilanından sonra gelmiştir. Kendisi tarik üzerinde kağıt 
üzerine yazamadığı ve zat-ı devletlerine arz için bizzat hıfz eylediği birçok 
vesayayı hamildir. Beraberinde Şeyh-i Ekber’den [Seyyid Ahmed] acize 
varid olan mektubu da takdim ediyorum. Dafian bu mektubda dahi 
meseleye dair bir sarahat mevcud değilse de bunu ancak bu adamın 
nezdimizde ne derece şayan-ı itimad olduğunu ve umur-i harbde ne 
mertebe himmet bulunduğunu şayan eder. Bir vesika olmak üzere takdim 
ediyorum...Cenab-ı Hak hayatınızı münevver ve said ve sizi salim olarak 
daim eylesin amin... 
 
Tercüme aslına mutabıktır. 
27 Kanun-i Sani 330...”66    
 
It should finally be noted that the reports from the field are sometimes illegible. 
This is primarily because of the fact that the field agents of the region in question drafted 
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reports in a very bad way, especially those concerning the Teşkilat’s concentration in 
Yafa. Besides, the reports were scratched out time and again on a number of occasions 
which might discourage the specialist from reading them. Finally, during the early 
classification process, the reports were filed by punching two holes from their left side 
and this sometimes poses an obstacle in reading words which might be extremely 
important.     
As is already understood, the present study is primarily a contribution to the 
growing literature of the Teşkilat. It, therefore, aims to provide a reliable ground for 
further studies in the historiography often dominated by opposite views, and to offer 
authentically an Ottoman account of the historical experience in the region concerned by 
largely making use of archival documents, housed at ATASE. Though an analysis of a 
small part of a much larger experience of the Teşkilat, what is offered in this thesis is a 
critical analysis of its activities in the region in question, which, I hope, will point to an 
urgent need for a through revision of the entire literature on the Teşkilat.  
Accordingly, in the first chapter of the study, an overview of the concentration of 
the Teşkilat forces in Sinai will be provided. In this context, the main characteristics of 
the role of the Teşkilat during the first and second Canal campaigns will be analyzed. 
Accordingly, its position in the 4th Army and emergence in different localities of the 
region will be dealt with. Moreover, this chapter will cover how the Teşkilat was 
involved in the activities against the British forces following the Ottoman entry into 
World War I. The acitivities of the Teşkilat, especially those related to the field of 
propaganda in Egypt, are also included in the analysis. This introductory part, 
furthermore, will attempt to analyze the mission and reorganization of the Teşkilat forces 
as well as its mine-laying attempts during the second campaign. All these will, 
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hopefully, be a contribution to the examination and evaluation of the force of the 
Teşkilat in Sinai, and of the ways the Ottoman army benefited from this.  
Chapter Two is devoted to the analysis of various dimensions of the Teşkilat’s 
involvement in Libya. First of all, the Ottoman military missions to Libya led first by 
Süleyman el-Baruni and then by Nuri Pasha and Cafer el-Askeri will be discussed. 
These missions make it necessary to point to the British efforts to mediate with Seyyid 
Ahmed, the chief of the Senusi religious order, and the Teşkilat’s main means of 
pressure to counter the British efforts. In this context, Cafer el-Askeri’s mission to get 
military equipment and money becomes important in indicating not only the main 
difficulties of the Teşkilat in getting the necessary means to drive the Senusis into war 
against the British on the western frontier of Egypt, but also how these limited means 
were used to organize the irregular Senusi forces. The Teşkilat’s efforts for a fait 
accompli for the invasion of Egypt, on the other hand, will partially reveal its 
operational features. The role of the Teşkilat in the cooperation of Senusis with the 
Sultanate of Darfur for the synchronized invasion of Egypt will also be discussed in this 
chapter. Nevertheless, the invasion of Egypt from the western frontier would result in 
the British counter attack, which induced the Teşkilat-Senusi forces to retreat to 
Trablusgarb.    
On the basis of the research carried out in the first two chapters, some of the 
administrative and operational characteristics of the Teşkilat, which have long been 
subjects of discussions, will be assessed in Chapter Three. Accordingly, a number of 
questions concerning the most basic elements of the Teşkilat will be answered. The 
chiefs, details of the central and regional structure, and the operational mission of the 
Teşkilat will constitue the main themes of this chapter. Furthremore, based on the major 
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points and findings of the study, the role and impact of Eşref Kuşçubaşı on the Teşkilat 
will be revisited. This will be followed by a short conclusion part where the details of 
the thesis are outlined and the final assessments on the success of the Teşkilat in the 
region in question are made.  
Finally, it should be noted that it is not the intention of this study to include all 
aspects of the Teşkilat that one could study on the basis of the existing sources. In this 
regard, throughout the study, maximum attention will be paid to the aspects on how the 
Ottoman army benefited from the Teşkilat in this region as a military power and a source 
of intelligence. Nonetheless, the propaganda and political intelligence activities of the 
Teşkilat, although briefly touched upon in passing at different parts of the present thesis, 
remain a subject for further study.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 35 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
 TEŞKİLAT-I MAHSUSA FORCES IN SYRIA 
 
 
Since this is a study of the Ottoman special organization and its activities against the 
British authorities in Egypt, not of Great Britain, there is no need to provide a detailed 
account of domestic and international circumstances just prior to World War I. It is, 
however, appropriate to start with a known-fact of the British occupation of Egypt67 and 
declaration of her protectorate over Egypt following the Ottoman’s entrance into war.68 
The reasons for both Ottomans’ declaration of war on the side of Germany69 and their 
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attack on Egypt are also well known. Disregarding the significant developments of the 
period between 1882 and 1914, it is easy to point to the British objectives regarding 
Egypt. They declared protectorate in December 1914, deposed Khedive Abbas Hilmi, 
and installed Hüseyin Kamil as sultan simply due to their fear of the Egyptian Muslims 
(also Muslims elsewhere living in their colonial empire) who were expected to provide 
support to the Ottoman Sultan’s call to cihad. Under the pretext of a step towards self-
government, protectorate status was indeed “…a wartime improvisation to cut Egypt 
adrift from the Ottoman Empire without inciting Egyptians with the prospect of 
tightened British control”.70 However, there is more to add. The course of the war and 
continued occupation clarified the main intentions of Britain: firstly, she aimed to secure 
the land and sea routes passing through or near Egypt which was the last base of British 
attacks against the Ottomans in Arabia, Syria, and the Turkish straits. Britain also 
needed this base to maintain its far-flung imperial interests especially in India which was 
vital for British presence in the East. Secondly, she intended to keep a tight rein on 
Egypt itself for the creation of a possible ‘Afro-Asian imperial constellation’ following 
the anticipated collapse of the Ottoman Empire.71  
Egypt was no Aden for the Ottomans either. Dr. P. Rohrbach, a prominent 
advocate of German imperialism, in the beginning of the 20th century wrote that:  
“England can be attacked … on land in one place only… in Egypt. With 
the loss of Egypt, England would lose not only the mastery over the Suez 
Canal and the link with India and Asia, but presumably also her 
possessions in Central and East Africa. The conquest of Egypt by an 
Islamic Power like Turkey, moreover, could have dangerous repercussions 
on England’s sixty million Moslem subjects in India, and also on 
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Afghanistan and Persia … if the need arose … would be direct instrument 
…for pressure upon England in the direction of Egypt.”72  
 
The need arose with the outbreak of war in 1914 and the Ottomans seem to have 
decided to put pressure on Egypt upon the German Supreme Command’s instruction 
intent of which was left uncertain.73 Thus, the initiative against Egypt was an instruction 
merely expressing the general intention whose details were left to the 8th Corps in 
Syria.74 Neither the German nor Ottoman correspondences concerning the attack against 
Egypt at the beginning and during the war did mention ‘the conquest of Egypt’. Given 
the width and the way of operations were carried out, this appears rather an imaginary 
propaganda or the other side of the medallion seen by the public; the very expected 
result was to detain as many British troops as possible in Egypt, the station where troops 
of Asian and Australian colonials were dispatched to Çanakkale and the Western 
frontier, simply in order to relieve the pressure on the straits and the European theatre. 
The Ottomans also felt compelled to deter the possibility of a British attack against Syria 
and Arabian Peninsula.75 This general aim was expressed by Enver Pasha, Minister of 
War and Chief of the General Staff, just before he appointed Cemal Pasha, Minister of 
the Navy, as Commander of the 4th Army:  
“Azizim Cemal Paşa, Süveyş Kanalı üzerine taarruzi bir hareket tertibi 
suretiyle İngilizleri Mısır’da meşgul etmek ve bu sayede garp cephesine 
sevk etmekte oldukları bir çok Hint fırkasını Mısır’da alıkoymaya mecbur 
etmekle beraber Çanakkale’ye bir çıkartma kuvveti sevklerine mani olmak 
istiyordum. Bunun için iki aydan beri Suriye’de bazı hazırlıklarda 
bulunuyordum...”76 
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On the other hand, it was not a shoestring campaign for the Ottomans, who 
looked forward to a conquest if Egypt could be invaded simultaneously from three 
directions; Syria from the east, Libya from the west, and Sudan from the south. They 
believed that an invasion would be possible if the Ottoman march against the Canal; this 
would, in turn, trigger an anti-British Islamic revolution in Egypt, might be synchronized 
with the attack of Seyyid Ahmed in Libya and to a much lesser extent that of Ali Darfur 
in Sudan.77 In the worst-case scenario, the Canal traffic could be cut off by sinking 
British ships on the sailing line and the camping force would have to turn back. If the 
traffic could be cut off for a long time, then the ships coming from Asia and Australia 
would have to rove Cape of the Good Hope, and in turn it would be too late to reach the 
battlefield in Europe. 
This strategy constituted the framework Teşkilat was incorporated into. First of 
all, the Ottomans had not foreseen a multi-front war, in which Great Britain was an 
adversary. “However, with the Sinai front projected as the launching point for a major 
offensive, there now existed a requirement for a controlling army-level headquarters and 
additional troops with which to conduct the attack.”78 Despite the deployment of fresh 
troops in Syria under the newly-established 4th Army, the Ottomans were well aware of 
the fact that they were still numerically disadvantageous against the British. It would be 
inconceivable at any rate for the Ottoman messengers and agents in Egypt to overlook 
the rapidly increasing number of Australian and New Zealand Corps (Anzac), and the 
brigades of the regular Indian army there. In this context, the Teşkilat agents, especially 
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the CUP inspectors sent directly from Istanbul, were to recruit auxiliary and additional 
troops for the army. No doubt, the recruitment of a considerable number of Syrians 
would not only be fine for the Fourth Army but also a meaningful message to the British 
who controlled Egypt and were instigating an Arab uprising. Volunteers recruited by the 
Teşkilat were also to be charged with military intelligence and the reconnaissance 
facilities of all sorts in Sinai. By this, the army would mediate the hardness of the Sinai 
which was not encouraging for either prolonged operations or movement of large forces 
due to the poor condition of the terrain in terms of water and nourishment supplies. 
Besides, they were to leak out into Egypt to raise a revolt in support of the Turks there 
so that the synchronized attack on Egypt from three directions would end up with the 
invasion of the region. Egypt, therefore, became a target area for the special 
organization, the Teşkilat, which was greatly utilized by the Ottomans during their 
containment policy against Egypt.  
  
A. The Mission of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa during the 1st Canal Campaign  
 
1. Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa in the Turkish Plan of Attack  
 
The idea of rollbacking the occupying British army of the Canal and Egypt turned out as 
a result of the propositions of the General Headquarters of Germany.79 According to Ali 
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Fuad Erden, this proposition was communicated to Enver Pasha by General von Moltke, 
the Chief of the German General Staff80, on the 10th of August 1914:  
“Osmanlı müttefikinin vazifesi mümkün olduğu kadar çok Rus ve İngiliz 
kuvvetlerini bağlamak ve sıkı bir faaliyetle İslam ihtilalini gerçekleştirmek 
olduğunu ve bu maksatla Kafkasya’ya karşı bir hareket yapılması ve 
bilhassa Mısır’a karşı bir teşebbüse girişilmesi arzu edildiğini ve 
Avusturya’nın yükünü hafifletmek için Osmanlı savaş bölgelerinde 
harekata olabildiğince erken başlanılmasının lüzumlu olduğunu...”81 
 
The plan of attack had been prepared before Cemal Pasha came to Syria as the 
Commander of the 4th Army and the Governor of Syria (18 November 1914).82 The plan 
was to be enforced by the 8th Corps under the dual command of Lieutenant Colonel 
Kress von Kressenstein, the Chief of the Staff (27 September 1914), and Mersinli Cemal 
Pasha attached to the 4th Army.83 There were two important issues in the operation 
against the forces in the Canal and Egypt: first, the preparation of the forces needed for 
the operation and continuous support of those forces, and second, the security of both 
Syria and Palestine.84  
According to the plans, the campaign force and its preparations were as follows: 
Initially, the entire 8th Corps (consisted of 4 infantry regiments, 2 separate battalions, 3 
machine-gun companies, 7 batteries, 1 fifteen cm. howitzer battery, 1 engineer battalion; 
5 brigades, 1 telegraph, 1 heliograph, and 1 telephone platoons; 3 portable hospital) was 
to gather in Jerusalem and its vicinity and the major division was to track the direction 
of Birüssebi-Biri Hasana-İsmailiye under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Ali Fuad 
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(Cebesoy).85 Subsequently, the diversionary columns of the major division was to drive 
the mobile tribal and voluntary units towards the directions of both Gazze-Elariş-
Elkantara (consisted of 1 infantry battalion, 1 mount and 1 field batteries, 1 telegraph 
platoon, half medical company, and 1000 mounted voluntary Bedouins under the 
command of the Teşkilat agent Major Mümtaz Bey, the Commander of the Voluntary 
Detachment of the 4th Army, also an orderly officer of Enver Pasha) and Akabe-
Kalatünnahl-Suez (consisted of 1 infantry battalion, 1 camel-mounted company, 1 
mount battery, 1 engineer company, and 600 mounted voluntary Bedouins under the 
command of Captain Eşref Kuşçubaşı, (for his role in the Teşkilat, see Chapter Four) in 
order to provide the flank security and disguise the direction of the major division.86  
The campaign was to begin with the guerilla-type attack of the forward echelons 
of the diversionary columns (the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa forces), in order to take hold of the 
key points on the advance line of the army. Following this, the regular army would 
advance by degrees from Şam to Beerşeba, then to İsmailiye. Finally, the campaign 
force was to cross the Canal by a surprise attack and establish a bridgehead across. In 
accord with this strategy, reinforced infantry troops were to be left in Akabe for security; 
the 25th Division to be employed in the first echelon with two flank forces; the 10th 
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Division to form the second echelon; the 27th Division to be reserved in the vicinity of 
Jerusalem; and the 23rd Division (except some units) to be allowed to stay in Syria..87 
Thus, “Jamal [Cemal Pasha] had staked everything on a surprise attack, hoping that he 
could hold a stretch of the canal on its bank south of Ismailiya with five or six thousand 
men ‘at the first rush’. He would then bring up the 10th Division, giving him a force of 
ten thousand rifles with which to dig on the far bank. Ismailiya would be taken and 
occupied for four or five days, while the 8th Division, held back at Beerşeba, was rushed 
across the Desert.”88  
 
2. Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa Forces in the Region  
 
Seized with the notion of an Egypt campaign, General Headquarters put not only the 8th 
Corps but also the Gendarme as well as the tribes loyal to the government under the 
General Commandership of the Army of the Syria and its vicinity on 19 August 1914 in 
order to both defend Syria and attack Egypt when required. In the second half of August 
1914, General Commandership of Syria began to launch efforts to complete the 
mobilization of Seyyar Jandarma Teşkilatı (mobile gendarme organization) and take 
preventive measures to provide the interior region with security. Concurrently, by the 
assistance of the civilian authorities, the local Arab clans and tribes were tapped and the 
type of the organization they would get attached to was explored.89  
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In the meantime, Major Mümtaz Bey, an aide-de-camp of Enver Pasha, 
appointed directly by the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa Office in Istanbul, was sent to Syria. 
Mümtaz Bey, the Commander of the Teşkilat units of the 4th Army90 brought his men to 
the region to assist him such as Captain İhsan (Mudanyalı), Captain Hacı Emin, and 
Gendarme Second Lieutenant Saib:  
“Başkumandanlık Vekalet-i Celilesine 
 
...Taleb ettiği [Mümtaz Bey’in] vesait kendisine verilecek ve şimdilik 
Amman’ı karargah ittihaz edecektir. Maiyyetinde bulunmak üzere 
mukaddema Derne’de olup şimdi 6. Kolorduda bulunan Yüzbaşı Hacı 
Emin ve...Yüzbaşı İhsan [Mudanyalı] ve Beyrut Jandarma alayından 
jandarma ile irtibatı baki kalmak üzere mülazım Saib efendileri istiyor. 
Tevziflerine müsade buyurulması... 
 
Zeki Paşa.”91  
 
Equipped with necessary means like certain amount of money and men 
influential in the region, Mümtaz Bey was ordered to form voluntary and mercenary 
camel and cavalry platoons from the tribes and Bedouins of Birüssebi and Gazze:  
“Baş Kumandanlık Vekalet-i Celilesine 
 
Şam’da 4. Ordu Kumandanı Zeki Paşa’dan mevrud 14 Eylül 330 tarihli 
şifrenin hallidir. 
 
Birüssebi ve Gazze civarındaki aşair ve urbandan hecinsüvar ve süvariler 
teşkili memuriyetiyle binbaşı Mümtaz Bey, bir katip, üç zabit, bir doktorla 
ma’an Hakkı Bey’le beraber bugün hareket etmiştir. Kendisine bu husus 
için şimdilik bin lira verildiği maruzdur...”92 
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Along with Mümtaz Bey, a number of army and civil officers appointed to the 
inspectorships of CUP were sent to the region as well, such as Infantry officer Sapancalı 
Hakkı, Çorumlu Aziz, Çerkez Ziya, Abdurrahman Pasha93, Şeyh Esat Şukayr Efendi94, 
and Eşref Bey (Kuşçubaşı).95 In this context, Hilmi Müsellemi, Emir Şekip Arslan, and 
Nurettin Bey might be counted as the other important agents in the region. Those agents 
were charged with the duty of getting the support of the tribal chiefs for the attack 
against Egypt. They would also gain the support of the masses and recruit auxiliary 
forces from Bedouins and Arabs by delivering jihad declarations and gifts of Padisah-
Khaliph.96 In the headquarters of the 4th Army, there were also Şeyh Esad Şukayr Efendi 
for the affairs of Arabs; Fuad Selim Bey, Dr. Ahmed Fuad Bey, and Abdülhamid Bey 
for the affairs of Egypt.97 
Establishment of the 4th Army on 6 September 191498 under the command of 
Zeki Pasha was followed by the appoinment of Mümtaz Bey as the Urban (Arabs) 
Commander on 9 September.99 He would organize the volunteers recruited by the 
inspectors as guerilla units in the Damascus region and also enlist urban for the regular 
army. Some of those units would stay in Syria for a possible enemy attack, while others 
were going to help in keeping the Ottoman advance line against Egypt secure.100 Having 
established his headquarters in Amman101, Mümtaz Bey and Abdurrahman Pasha, an 
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ayan (notable) member, embarked on negotiations with the tribes and Bedouins so as to 
provide the army by the required amount of camels to traverse the Sinai.102 There was 
also Şeyh Esad Şekiri beside Abdurrahman Pasha as his counselor.103 Most of those 
camels were provided from Ibnu’s Suud, Sherif Huseyin, and Ibnu’r Resid.104 For 
instance, the urban Şeyhs gathered in the subdistrict of Beyt-i Hayrin by Mümtaz Bey 
committed their loyalty to the Ottoman Empire and promised to prepare 3000 camels, 
2000 cavalryman, and 250 infantry.105  
Mümtaz Bey and Abdurrahman Pasha also distributed gifts and military medals 
to the urban and Şeyhs of Maan, Dera, and Dürzi, and delivered speeches in order to 
consolidate their loyalty. Mümtaz and Hakkı Beys made similar propaganda in Kudüs 
and gave gifts to the urban and Şeyhs who confirmed their loyalty whereas 
Abdurrahman Pasha negotiated with the urban of Hama and Humus. The first act of 
aggression was realized on 23rd September just before von Kressenstein came to Syria; a 
small body of armed Bedouin crossed the frontier near Rafah. The British reply was to 
the dispatch of a small Egyptian Coastguard column to destroy the wells at 
Kalatünnahl.106 
Subsequently, Lieutenant Colonel Kress von Kressenstein came to Damascus on 
27 September as Chief of Staff of the 8th Corps and settled down to the campaign 
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preparations without delay.107 No doubt, the intelligence gathering and occupation of the 
Sinai desert until the Canal as well as the reconnaissance of all sorts did constitute one 
of the most imperative elements of those preparations. Hence, an order of high rank 
status by the Commandership of the 8th Corps was given to Mümtaz Bey, whose 
detachment formed the vanguard of the northernly flank, on 7 October. 
 
3. Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa’s missions across the frontier: Military Activities and 
Intelligence  
 
According to the order given to Mümtaz and his attendants, the frontier (although the 
Sinai Desert was Egyptian territory it was not occupied by the British) was to be crossed 
after declaration of war. Subsequently, all the wells on the way of Telelrefah-Elariş-
Elkantara, Hafirülavce-Biri Hasana-İsmailiye, and Akabe-Kalatünnahl-Süveyş were 
immediately to be occupied and protected. In conformity with this purpose, British 
forces in Sinai, which had already evacuated except a few gendarmes in Elariş and 
Kalatünnahl, were to be cleared away by surprise attacks. Pro-British Arabs were also to 
be compelled to take side with Turks and the transportation and communication facilities 
with Egypt over Sinai were to be cut off.108 
Reconnaissance facilities constituted the other part of the order given to the 
Teşkilat units under Mümtaz Bey. The mission of the reconnaissance patrols charged on 
the lines of Mediterranean coast-Port Said, Elkantara-Elferdan-İsmailiye (Serapyum)-
Şulufa station, and Madame-Ummüşşart were to gather information about the following 
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issues: the location, forces, and condition of the British forces, fortified points on both 
sides of the Canal and the forces stationed there, types and numbers of the machine-
guns, survey of the impediments such as wire fence and artificial water flood, the 
number of British and French battleships in the Canal, the situation of the middle course 
of the Canal, whether it was convenient for the crossing of field machine-guns and 
wheeled vehicles, and parts in need of repair; the location of the wells and their water 
condition, the quality and quantity of fuel and aliment resources in the desert if there 
was any. Finally, the British were to be staved off getting information about the 
movement of the Ottoman detachments in the desert. Accordingly, Bedouins and tourists 
seen in Sinai were to be apprehended.109  
The Commandership, in addition, ordered Mümtaz Bey to spy especially on the 
shores of the Suez Canal between Ummüşşart and Birüleba. British access to 
information via the sea route was subsequently expected to be cut off. Multitude 
attempts were to be made in order to enable urban to cross from the East to the West 
side of the Canal by sail boats. Once they successfully crossed the Canal, the 
detachments were to station in İsmailiye, in order to attack under the tail of the British 
army at the same time as the 8th Corps launched an attack from the East. These urban 
detachments were also expected to destroy the telegraph and railroad lines bound to 
İsmailiye as well as taking prisoners from British army officers.110 But, none of the 
Teşkilat forces under the command of Mümtaz Bey were able to make their way across 
the Canal during the first campaign. 
                                                 
109
 Ibid., 123-124. It is obvious from the diaries of Parker Pasha that the British were aware of the 
Ottoman reconnaissance units functioning in Sinai. See, Winstone, Parker Pasha, 58.    
110
 Ibid., 123-124. 
 48 
The most important issue for the Commandership however was to cut off the sea 
access in the Canal. The best way for that was to sink the dredgers vertical to the 
navigation route in the middle of the Canal. Another way was to shoot the shipmaster 
and the maritime pilot or the steersman of the British vessels in the twisted places of the 
Canal so that the ship would strike aground or directly crash into the land immediately. 
This mission was also communicated to Mümtaz Bey and his attendants.111 All along the 
Canal, the rest of the voluntary detachments under Mümtaz Bey would also annoy and 
cause casualties to the British forces charged with the defense of the Canal by surprise 
and demonstration attacks. Mümtaz Bey was, moreover, charged with the duty of 
admonishing the urban on how to coerce the Muslim-British soldiers to make them 
capitulate or come over to the Turkish side.112 Upon this detailed order, Major Mümtaz 
Bey with a regular and a fortified voluntary detachment, began his reconnaissance 
facilities on the line of Tellelrefah-Elariş-Elkantara at the same time as Captain Eşref 
Bey, an officer working under the command of Mümtaz Bey, launched the same 
facilities on the line of Akabe-Kalatünnahl-Suez as soon as he received a likely order 
from the Commandership.113  
On the British side, all intelligence sources in the early stages dismissed the 
prospect of an Ottoman attack on Egypt. They preferred to regard the information to that 
effect as being planted for diversionary or disinformation reasons. They surmised the 
Ottoman military preparations as contingency plans for a military option against Russia 
or more likely Greece or the Balkan states. This optimistic approach, considering the 
Ottoman troop movements from Mesopotamia to Syria, reinforcements, and logistic 
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preparations, a defensive response, occupied the British minds from August to mid-
October when the Ottoman irregulars began their restricted passage into Sinai.114 Led by 
Mümtaz and Eşref Beys, such passages increased suspicion on the British side of the 
possibility of a raid by Bedouin irregulars without any formal declaration of war.115 It is 
actually after that date British began to perceive the efforts of the Teşkilat to recruit the 
tribesmen as a tangible threat. 
At this point, it should be noted that all Anglo-Egyptian forces evacuated the 
Sinai at the end of October and withdrew to the Suez Canal defense line, leaving only a 
few forces as stay-behind agents, in accordance with the order given on 22 October by 
Lord Kitchener, secretary of state for war.116 Nevertheless, “Cairo correctly judged that 
the irregulars would be the first to take action, yet was mistaken regarding the nature of 
their activity, perceiving it only as a detached means of harassment rather than the initial 
phase of a broad attack. It was an assessment limited by a focus on local findings and a 
disregard for the overall context, accurately discerning ‘trees’ at the tactical level, but 
blind to the ‘forest’ at the operational-strategic level.”117 Such an erroneous perception 
came out, to a certain extent, as a result of the activities of Ottoman counter-intelligence, 
which partly rooted paucity in British intelligence. The control was to such an extent that 
“the Ottomans arresting a large number of Arabs on suspicion of spying” prompted 
“Maxwell to complain that ‘the frontier is guarded jealously by the Turks. As they have 
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seized all our agents east of the frontier it is difficult to get positive news.”118 However, 
the British air reconnaissance as a means for intelligence gathering and early warning 
were still a vantage point for them, although the British administration in Cairo did not 
realize the real advantage of using aircraft for intelligence purposes during the early days 
of World War I.119 Nevertheless, General Maxwell had access to information from 
within Egypt and Sinai through the spy network established by Colonel Parker120 and 
Jennings Bramly who had remained in Cairo. As H. V. F. Winstone puts forward:  
“They had already enrolled into Britain’s service several sheikhs of proven 
reliability as well as the two most successful agents of the war in the area 
east of Suez, the scholarly Dominicans Father Jaussen and Father Savignac. 
For seven years they had wandered in Sinai, Palestine and Hijaz, recording 
the ancient history and rock inscriptions of those regions, and much else. 
They operated from the Convent of St Catherine on Mount Sinai, and had 
already mobilized many of the monks in Britain’s service.”121   
 
   
4. Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa’s Involvement in Local Conflicts  
 
While the Teşkilat units were engaged in the activities referred to above, Britain 
bombarded Akabe on 1 November 1914, as a war action in advance of the declaration of 
war, which came 4 days later.122 This incident led to the invalidation of the order dated 7 
October, and a new one was issued by the Commandership of the 8th Corps to Mümtaz 
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Bey, now in Birüssebi, on 2 November.123 According to the new order, Elariş was to be 
occupied by the forces under the direct command of Mümtaz Bey, and Kalatünnahl by 
Eşref Bey. Subsequently, these forces were to begin marching toward the Canal as soon 
as the main detachments of the right and left flanks set themselves up at these points. 
Then, they were to exhaust the forces protecting the Canal by not only organizing 
demonstration and surprise attacks (preferably at nights) against the cannons but also 
shooting the sentries stationed across the Canal. They were also expected to cut the 
Canal traffic off by sinking vessels or another way.124  
The Commandership thought that it was easier to destroy the railroad line 
between Port-Said and Elkantara so that Mümtaz Bey was ordered to organize some 
courageous men to cross the Canal by swimming under the protection of sharpshooters 
on the Eastern side, and to lead some trains astray; if that was not possible, at least to 
destroy a bridge or an establishment. Also, the telegraph and telephone lines (most 
probably buried underground) between the fortification zones and the Canal were to be 
cut off. The reconnaissance patrols were expected, similar to the previous order, to 
acquire information on the location, forces, and condition of the British forces on the 
Canal. The Commandership considered the establishment of relations with the urban on 
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the West side of the Canal vitally essential. Therefore, Mümtaz Bey was supposed to 
employ spies and informers, initially from those connected to British forces, by either 
propagating the interests of Islam or simply by paying money to them. These spies and 
informers were to be used both to collect and receive news from Egypt, and to create 
antagonism and hostility among the urban by all means. An instruction sheet was also 
sent to Mümtaz Bey with regard to the means spies could take advantage of. However, it 
was especially required that the instructions were not be handed to spies in writing but 
have them memorized.125  
An order was also sent to the Commandership of Hanyunus Detachment, the 
foundation column of the right flank, such that Mümtaz Bey was not under their 
command but directly bound to the 8th Corps. However, an intense coordination was 
recommended between Mümtaz Bey and Rıfat Bey, the commander of the Hanyunus 
Detachment.126 Eşref Bey was left under the command of the Maan Detachment, the 
foundation column of the left flank. On 4 November, Mümtaz and Eşref were ordered to 
cross the frontier and begin their missions.127  
Hereupon, a thousand men under the command of Mümtaz Bey began to raid the 
line of Elariş on 7 November and as a result of a surprise attack on 8 November, the 
town of Elariş was seized.128 Likewise, almost six hundred volunteers under the 
command of Captain Eşref Bey (Kuşçubaşı) took hold of the town, Kalatünnahl, on 18 
November.129 Meanwhile, a regular infantry detachment reinforced by volunteers was 
dispatched to Akabe so as to defend it against a possible British attack, which could 
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threaten the southern flank of the Ottoman forces headed for the Canal.130 Another clash 
took place between Katya and Kantara on 20 November. Composed of 20 men, the 
British Bikanir Camel Corps under the command of A. J. H. Chope was attacked at Bir 
en Nuss, 20 miles east of Elkantara, by 200 Bedouin. The party had casualties 
amounting to more than half of its total. According to British authorities, “…this affair 
proved that the loyalty of the camel troopers of the Egyptian Coastguard, several of 
whom accompanied the Bikanirs as guides, was extremely doubtful, since they allowed 
themselves to be made prisoners in a manner virtually amounting to desertion.”131 
Moreover, 30 soldiers under the command of Captain Wilson were killed and 3 of them 
were taken prisoners in another clash.132 There occurred no contact with the enemy and 
for the rest of the year the Canal Defenses had time to prepare and organize the troops.  
 
5. Formation of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa Units in the Districts 
  
Meanwhile, Cemal Pasha was appointed as governor of Syria/Damascus and the 
Commander of the 4th Army on 18 November133 and moved to Syria on 21 November 
with a number of competent officials like Colonel Von Frankenberg, the Chief of the 
Staff of the 2nd Army, Staff Lieutenant Colonel Ali Fuad (Erden), and Staff Major Refet 
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(Bele).134 Having arrived in Syria on 6 December, Cemal Pasha ordered Colonel Vehip 
Bey, the Commander of the Hicaz Division, to engage in the campaign against Egypt. 
From that date on, the Sherif of Mecca, Hüseyin was expected to command the Hicaz 
Campaign Force with urban mücahids. Upon the request of Cemal Pasha, the Sherif sent 
his son, Seyyid Ali, alongside with a number of mucahids to Medina from where they 
would be transported to Maan to unite with the Ottoman forces. Yet, the attempts turned 
out to be useless and Seyyid Ali did not move any further from Medina and provided no 
support for the campaign.135  
Apart from this, Cemal Pasha asked the district commands to form voluntary 
detachments by cooperating with the notables or şeyhs of urban, whereupon a number of 
militia and voluntary forces were established by the Teşkilat agents in the region.136 
Cemal Pasha was likely not only to benefit from the religious and political impact of 
those forces but also to enlarge the Campaign Force. At the same time, the recruitment 
of a considerable number of Syrians would send a meaningful message to the British 
who controlled Egypt and were instigating an Arab uprising.  As a result, the following 
voluntary units came into existence: the Caucasian Cavalry Regiment picked from Syria 
with a total number of 270 men; the Kurdish Cavalry Company with 100 men137, formed 
by Abdurrahman Pasha and commanded by the personal clerk of Said Halim Pasha, 
Colonel Hilmi Musallimi; Trablusgarb Voluntary Detachment with 200 men, settled in 
Syria after the Italian-Ottoman War in Trablusgarb (1910-1911); Druze Voluntary 
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Detachment under the command of Şekip Arslan Bey with 110 men138, picked 
particularly from Lebanon (Cebel-i Lübnan); and the Muslim-Bulgarian Detachment 
under the command of Nureddin Bey (later deputy of Maraş).139 Among those units, the 
Trablusgarb Voluntary Detachment was included into the unit of Eşref Bey whereas the 
detachments of Hilmi Musallimi, Emir Şekip Arslan, and Nureddin Bey were 
incorporated into the Hicaz Campaign Force.140 Apart from those, the Teşkilat recruited 
137 volunteers to dig wells, 30 to adjust pumps, and 90 to cook bread.141    
 
6. Concentration in Yafa 
  
Another Teşkilat unit was stationed in Yafa most probably during the second half of 
September 1914. Composed by a headquarter (merkez-i umumi) of three officers- 
namely Gendarme Commander Major Hasan Efendi, Lieutenant Colonel Bahaeddin Bey 
(Manastırlı), and an officer whose name that cannot be specified-142 the organization 
directly received orders from Süleyman Askeri, the first chief of the Teşkilat, who was 
then in Istanbul, and was subject to the supervision of Ministry of War in terms of its 
actions, administration, and disposition of troops.143 The Teşkilat office along with its 
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various departments was meanwhile located in Cağaloğlu (Nuruosmaniye), Istanbul.144 
Commanded by Hasan Efendi, the main duty of this unit was to bring about an Egyptian 
revolution by forming guerilla bands in order to incite the populace against the British 
authorities. The bands initially were to be formed outside of Egypt. Once they were 
successfully imported into Egypt and began incitement, the native population was to be 
used in order to form those bands since the General Staff thought that the more the 
Egyptians employed in the bands, the higher the possibility of a revolution was, although 
the Teşkilat also authorized to dispatch bands from outside: 
“İngilizlerin mümkün mertebe nazar-ı dikkati celb olunmayacak ve 
herhalde buradan tahrikat yapıldığı anlaşılmamak lazımdır.  
 
-Yafa’da Hasan Efendiye 18 Eylül 330  
 
Bu esas daima nazarda bulundurularak müsait eşhasın celbleri tertib ve 
bunların sur-ı münasib ile Mısır’a idhali dirayetinize bırakılmıştır. Oraya 
kaymakam vekaletiyle Manastırlı Bahaeddin Bey gönderiliyor. Siz ayrıca 
oradan mutemed bir zat da intihab ederek Bahaeddin Bey’le birlikte üç 
kişilik bir heyet teşkil ediniz. Mısır’da yapmak istediğiniz işler hakkındaki 
nizamname Bahaeddin beyle gönderiliyor... Binaenaleyh siz de oradan işe 
yarar adamlar ihzar ve münasib vesaitle mahallerine gönderiniz. Bilirsiniz, 
birkaç çete maksadı temin eder… Esasen buradan çete gönderilmesine, 
Mısırlıları teşci ve teşvik maksadına muktediriz. Gönderdiğiniz çeteler 
Mısır dahilindeki teşkilatı tahrike ve oradan çeteler teşkil ve istihdamına 
muvaffak olunca artık buradan eşhas sevkiyatına lüzum kalmaz… 
 
Süleyman Askeri”145  
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Thence, 300 liras were sent to Hasan Efendi for various expenses until the end of 
September by Süleyman Askeri.146 Nevertheless, Hasan Efendi demanded at least 2000 
or 3000 more liras for the measures to be taken. He also wanted bayonets, bombs, 
dynamites including 15 or 20 time bombs, riffles, wire fence cutters, 100 revolvers, 60 
Arab swords, and instruments for the demolition of railroad lines.147 Nevertheless, only 
one third of the weaponry and ammunition was sent.148 Meanwhile, the reinforcement 
and supply facilities were launched in Yafa in utmost secrecy. Since the action was to be 
taken according to the regulations Bahaeddin Bey would bring from Süleyman Askeri, 
Hasan Efendi suffıced to fınd out reliable men who could infiltrate into Egypt to form 
revolutionary bands. These men were to be registered not to the Teşkilat but to the 
General Commandership of Gendarme: 
“Yafa’da Jandarma Kumandanı Binbaşı Hasan Efendi’den 1 Teşrin-i Evvel 
330 tarihli mevrud şifresinin hallidir. 
 
Gayet mühim ve müstaceldir 
…Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa ikmalinde ol hiçbir vechile İngilizlerin nazar-ı 
dikkatlerinin celb olunmaması için son derece hafi olarak çalışılacağından 
merak buyurmayınız. Şimdiden mutemed bir zat intihab edilecektir. 
Bahaeddin bey ile vurudunda yedindeki nizamname mucibince hareket 
edilecektir. Mısırlıları teşvik ve teşci etmek üzere burada gayet emniyetli 
ve mutemed eşhasdan Mısır’a idhalleri [için] ancak şimdiden çetelerin 
tertibine başladım. Bunlar sizden gönderilecek çetelerden maadadır. Mısıra 
idhal mekasıdına mebni şimdi gayet mutemed ellerinden iş gelir mevaki-i 
muhtelifelerde bulunmakta [olan] birkaç zabit buldum...Ancak şimdiden 
tertibatlarıyla uğraşmakda olan balada maruz tedabirin husus bulması içün 
herhalde külliyetli para göndermekte mütevakkıfdır. Binaenaleyh 
gönderdiğiniz üç yüz liralık meblağdan maada şimdilik iki üç bin liranın 
kemal-i süratle ve telgrafinen havalelerinin irsali mercudur. Ayrıca ekall? 
süngüsüyle iki bin mavzer tüfengi, külliyetli bomba ve dinamit ve bunların 
meyanında on beş ile yirmi saatli dinamit, tel örgülerini kesmek için 
kuvvetli makaslar, yüz kadar revolver, altmış kadar arap kılıncı ve suret-i 
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mahsusada şimendifer raylarının halkına mahsus alat lazımdır. Ve bunların 
gayet az ve malum bir müddet zarfında irsalleri lazımdır. 
 
Binbaşı Hasan”149  
 
Bahaeddin Bey, however, came to Yafa very late, on 20 October, only ten days 
before the bombardment of Akabe by British forces, with a man, pharmacist Vedad 
Efendi, who was charged with the duty of liaison between Yafa and Egypt.150  
On 27 September, having been equipped with local dresses and certificates of 
birth, Ahmet Rıfat Efendi and his friend İbrahim Efendi were sent to Yafa by Süleyman 
Askeri to penetrate into Egypt. The intelligence of Ahmet Rıfat was transmitted by 
İbrahim Efendi to Süleyman Askeri via Hasan Efendi,151 who arranged and paid the man 
establishing the liasion between him and İbrahim Efendi.152 On the other hand, the 
communication and liaison between Hasan Efendi and Ahmet Rıfat was provided by 
hirelings.153 Ahmet Rıfat was expected both to provide an intelligence service in Egypt 
and instigate the populace by forming bands.154 After a short period of time Ahmet Rıfat 
arrived at Egypt, he dispatched a telegraph to Süleyman Askeri on 12 November, in 
which the location, condition, and fortified points of British forces both in Egypt and on 
the west side of Canal were detailed. According to Rıfat, inhabitants of Egypt were 
ready for an insurrection and the time was right to launch the campaign.155 Besides, he 
                                                 
149
 ATASE Archive: f: 1836, d: 35, I: 2/4. 
150
 ATASE Archive: f: 1836, d: 35, I: 12. 
151
 ATASE Archive: f: 1836, d: 35, I: 5. 
152
 ATASE Archive: f: 1836, d: 35, I: 12. 
153
 ATASE Archive: f: 1836, d: 35, I: 6/4. 
154
 “Yafa’da Jandarma Kumandanı Binbaşı Hasan Efendi [29 Eylül 330] / 1- Ahmet Rıfat Efendi 
tarafından teşkilat yapıldıkça peyderpey para gönderilecektir. Şimdilik avdet idecek olan refiki ibrahim 
efendiye nezdinizde mevcud mebaliğden 100 lira teslim ediniz. 2- Matlub zabitanın tarafınızdan bilintihab 
esamisinin ittibası. 3- Ahmet Rıfat efendinin taleb eylediği mühimmat ve malzeme-i saire derdest-i irsaldir 
mumaileyh ile vesait-i muhabere temin ediniz. / Süleyman Askeri” See, ATASE Archive: f: 1836, d: 35, I: 
5/3. 
155
 ATASE Archive: f: 1836, d: 35, I: 6. 
 59 
requested 2000 liras, 500 rifles, two men for the provisions and supplies, 4 officers,156 
50 revolvers, 50 swords, wire fence cutters, ammunition, iron crowbars for the 
demolition of railroad lines, and dynamites to blow up the bridges.157 In response to the 
telegraph, 100 martin and amended riffles, 300 ammunition per rifle, dynamites, iron 
crowbars, and a carbine were transported to Ahmet Rıfat Efendi.158 Besides, instead of 
the four officers demanded, only one was sent directly by Süleyman Askeri while the 
other three were to be picked up from Damascus and Beirut by Hasan Efendi.159 
Nevertheless, only 100 liras were sent via İbrahim Efendi.160 
These ordnances were to be transported into Egypt in the following way: Ahmet 
Rıfat Efendi was to organize some men from the townspeople of Matraya? and Deha 
tribe, who lived in the region between Port-Said and Dimyat. Two of these men were to 
be given instructions by Hasan Efendi and introduced to the captain and crew of the 
sailing boat which was fully laden with various fruits, particularly oranges which 
covered up the ordnances underneath. Also, a man who had many relatives in Dimyat 
and infiltrated into Egypt with İbrahim Efendi was to be arranged so as to organize the 
townspeople of Dimyat. Subsequently, they were to travel to Dimyat by sea and a green 
lantern was to be signaled when the ship approached the coast. When the boat reached 
the port, the hidden ordnances were to be loaded on camels and urgently exported to the 
hinterland in utmost secrecy.161 This plan was authorized by Süleyman Askeri on 14 
November.162  
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In the meantime, Eşref Bey was ordered to go under the command of Hasan 
Efendi at Yafa to arrange the disposition and take command of a band163, composed of 
13 Afghanis164 under the command of Miri? İbrahim and 20 Circassian cavalryman.165 
Two liras per man were also deposited with Eşref Bey to meet the expenses.166 
Nevertheless, that Eşref Bey never made his way to Yafa was obvious in the telegram 
dispatched to Süleyman Askeri by Hasan Efendi.167 From the telegraph Eşref Bey 
dispatched to Süleyman Askeri, it is understood that Eşref Bey was deficient in terms of 
means pertaining to both finance and ammunition as the entire Teşkilat units were. 
However, Eşref mentioned that he would not need any financial support if he could 
infiltrate into Egypt with his bands. That the Teşkilat units of Eşref Bey were supported 
in terms of ammunition and men by the Commander of the Damascus Gendarme 
Company, Captain Halil Tahir Efendi, and a man named Suavi Bey, seems evident in the 
telegram. It is also understood that an officer named Muhsin (Kireçburunlu) was a close 
associate of Eşref Bey since he requested from Süleyman Askeri both to grant a regular 
salary to the mother of Muhsin in Kireçburun and send an acquaintance of Muhsin, Ali 
(Kireçburunlu), to work under his command.168 
Meanwhile, Süleyman Askeri along with his staff was busy with the evaluation 
of the intelligence gathered in his office at Nur-i Osmaniye. Reports were flowing both 
from agents in Egypt, and from the consulate of Bombay and Sami Bey (brother of Eşref 
Kuşçubaşı)169 indicating that Britain began to mobilize troops of Indian and Australian 
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origin in Egypt and reinforce its forces on the Canal.170 Nonetheless, that Süleyman 
Askeri was puzzled with the differences in the details of the reports must have been the 
reason why he ordered Hasan Efendi to draft the reports in three ways, “personally 
seen”, “reported by a secondary person”, or “wreckoned”.171  
Fixed torpedoes were also agreed to be sent to Hasan Efendi on 3 October to be 
fired at the Canal.172 These torpedoes were to be transported into Egypt and fired from 
the western side of the Canal in order to cut off the sea traffic. Correspondences were 
made on whether the torpedoes were to be fired from the land or sea.173 Nevertheless, 
although it was suggested by Hasan Efendi that the mission was consigned to Eşref Bey, 
the idea of torpedoing the ships at the Canal was dropped due to the transportation and 
time trouble.174 On 16 October, Captain Almas was ordered to go under the command of 
Hasan Efendi who would send him alongside with a band into Egypt or Sudan to incite 
the populace.175 Finally, on 25 October 1914, Hasan Efendi was ordered to enter Sinai 
with his bands initially and import them as soon as possible into Egypt:  
“Yafa Jandarma Kumandanı Binbaşı Hasan Efendi’ye 
 
12 Teşrin-i Evvel 330 
 
Çeteleriniz Tur-i Sina’ya girerek faaliyet yapacaklardır. İngilizlerin... 
(nazar-ı dikkatini celb etmemek şartıyla tarafınızdan tertib olunan birkaç 
çetenin irsaliyle hemen Sina’ya idhaline çalışınız.) Çetelerinizin Mısır 
dahiline meccaran? sevkini tacil ve temin ediniz. 
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Süleyman Askeri”176 
 
 
7. The Situation in Egypt  
 
The activities in Egypt were under the responsibility of the Teşkilat agents who had been 
trained generally in Istanbul, and sent to Egypt before the War. Şeyh Abdulaziz Çaviş 
was the director of the cell in Egypt, located in Cairo. Çaviş was in Istanbul as early as 
1912, publishing for propaganda the daily newspaper el-Hilalü’l-Osmani, in Arabic. 
When this newspaper was forbidden to have circulation in Egypt, he published another 
newspaper, el-Hakku ya’lu. This was also forbidden and this time he began to publish a 
religious periodical, el-Hidaye, while he went to Egypt to organize the resistance 
there.177 Along with Çaviş, Teşkilat agents like Ferit Bey, Dr. Fuat, Dr. Nasır, and Dr. 
Tabit Maheab, together with some 600 people employed as agents and agitators were 
also present in the region.178 The sources on Teşkilat provide very limited information 
about the actions and participators of this group. However, there is no doubt that this 
group was especially made use of in both military intelligence and propaganda activities. 
In the sphere of military intelligence, the Teşkilat was charged with a duty similar to the 
one they carried out in Sinai. In this context, the Teşkilat provided the commanders and 
the planning staff in Istanbul, Syria, and Libya with the intelligence they required about 
the British, her armed forces and equipment in Egypt.179 The following telegraph by the 
director of the intelligence department dispatched to one of the Teşkilat’s agent in Egypt, 
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whose name cannot be specified, but most probably the head of the organization there, 
might represent an explanatory example in this sense: 
“1- Mısır’da elyevm ne kadar İngiliz kuvveti vardır? Ne kadarı Avustralyalı 
ve Hintlidir? Kanadalı asker var mıdır? Portekiz’den asker gelmiş midir? 
Ne kadar? 
2- Kanal boyunca ceman ne kadar kuvvet var? Port-Said, Elkantara, 
İsmailiye, Süveyş’de ayrı ayrı ne kadar kuvvet vardır? Bu kasabalar 
civarında ve alelumum kanalın şark ve garp tarafında ve nerelerinde 
tahkimat yapılmıştır? Cinsi ve ebadı, tel örgüleri vesair gibi mevani-i 
karine varsa nerelerde ve ne kadar ebadta oldukları. Bu tahkimatta ne kadar 
top ve mitralyöz bulunduğu... 
3- Kanal boyunca tevzi ve taksim edilen İngiliz kuvva-yı askeriyyesinin 
hangi milletlere mensup olduğu. Ne kadarının Hintli ve yerli Mısırlı 
olduğu. 
4- Dahilde yani İskenderiye, Kahire, Marput, Dimyat, Zegazig, Salihiye, 
Feyyum...daki kuvvetin mikdarı; ne kadar topçu, süvari, mitralyöz vesaire 
bulunduğu. Dahilde nerelerde tahkimat var? Cinsi, topların adedi. 
5- Telsiz, telgraf ve tayyara hangarları nerelerdedir? 
6- Mısır’ın yerli asker ve zabitanı Sudan’a mı götürülmüştür? Yoksa 
Mısır’da mı kalmıştır? Ne kadarının silahı alınmış, ne kadarı elyevm İngiliz 
zabitanı kumandası altında ve hangi mevkilerde müstahdemdir? 
...Sudanlılar dahilde mi yoksa kanal boyunda mı istihdam ediliyor? 
7- Mısır’da evvlece mevcud İngiliz kuvve-i istilaliyesi? ki... 7000 kişi idi... 
Mısır’da mı kalmış yoksa Avrupa saha-i harbiyesine mi gönderilmiştir? 
8- Mısır’dan İnigiliz askerleri Hindistan veyahud Bahr-ı Ahmer tarikiyle 
başka bir yere gönderilmiş midir? 
9- Gerek Mısır’dan harice ve gerekse haricden Mısır’a en son olmak üzere 
yapılan sevkiyat-ı askeriyye hangi tarihte vukubulmuştur? 
10- Salihiye’den Elkantara’ya bir şimendifer hattı yapılmış mıdır? 
11- Kanalın dahilinde şimal ve cenubunda hangi sefine-i harbiye vardır? 
12- Mısır’dan ...ya asker gönderilmiş midir? ...da ne kadar İngiliz kuvveti 
vardır? 
13- Muhtelif milletlerden Mısır’a gönüllü asker gelmişmidir? 
14- Mısır’dan Sudan’a asker götürülmüşmüdür? Sudan’daki İngiliz askeri 
Mısır’a celb olunmuş mudur? 
15- Feyyum ve ... muhitlerinde vesair yerlerde kıyam vukua gelmiş midir? 
16- ..... 
17- Müstakil hükümetlerde olduğu gibi Mısır’da da büyük mikyasda ordu 
teşkilatına başlanmış mıdır? Ahali bu teşkilatı nasıl telakki ediyor? Ordu 
teşkil edildikten sonra Avrupa saha-i harbiyesine gönderilecek mi ve 
oradan İngiliz askeri getirileceği rivayeti var mı? 
18- Sahil muhafazaları. ...mekatatı? tezyid edilmiş midir? İslamlardanmı 
yoksa sair milletlerden mi? 
19- İslamlarda gizli silah var mı? Ne kadar? Bedevilerde ne kadar var? 
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20- Suriyeli Hristiyan Araplara silah tevzi edilmiş veyahud İngiliz 
hizmetine alınmış mı? Mısır’daki ecnebiler gönüllü olarak İngiliz hizmetine 
alınmışlar mı? Ne kadar? 
21- Mısır ahalisinin al-i Osmanlılar hakkındaki fikirleri, İngiliz kuvva-yı 
askeriyyesinin ahvali... 
22- Senusi ve Sudan ne halde? Senusilerin Mısır’a yürümek istedikleri ve 
bunun için toplandıkları ne derece doğru? 
 
Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa’ya 
Mısır’dan anlaşılması matlub mevad bunlardır. 
İstihbarat Şube Müdürü”180   
 
The preparation of jihad-focused manifestos, on the other hand, was aimed at 
encouraging Muslim soldiers within the boundaries of the entente powers both to revolt 
and to support the Ottoman-German pact. Such manifestos were distributed by the 
Teşkilat and German agents not only in Egypt, but in all Muslim provinces. In this 
context, the Ottoman administration benefited greatly during World War I from the 
periodical, el-Alemü’l-İslami, where the liberty of the Islamic world was heavily 
propagated. The expenses of the periodical were directly met by the Umur-i Şarkiye 
Office, the continuation of the Teşkilat, in İstanbul.181   
It should be noted, however, that Abdülaziz Çaviş left Egypt when the war 
started and went to Europe. Subsequently, he carried on to issue periodicals and 
newspapers, like Islamische Welt published in Germany and coordinated intelligence 
especially on the activities of the nationalist party of Egypt, Hizb al-Vatani.182 He also 
coordinated the political dimension of Indo-Egyptian Pan-Islam movement. In this 
context, a British Secret Service report submitted to Wingate by Philippides Bey, the 
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Chief of Secret Police in Cairo, provides valuable insight into the fate of Çaviş following 
the outbreak of the war:  
“The report showed that at the time of the Tripoli war Indian Red Crescent 
parties sent to provide medical aid were fertile sources of recruitment and 
conspiracy. Several well-known nationalists and anti-British personalities 
joined forces with Shawish [Çaviş], including the editor of the Delhi 
Comrade, Muhammad Ali. A number of meetings between Indian and 
Egyptian student nationalists and Pan-Islamites had been held in Cairo at 
the Club des Ecoles Supérieures, and in Constantinople there were Indian 
schools under the direction of Shawish, while in Switzerland and Germany, 
Egyptian Societies known as the ‘Sphinx’, supplied with money by von 
Opponheim’s Eastern Bureau, offered a warm welcome to Moslems of all 
nationalities and the opportunity to undermine the Allied cause. The Sheikh 
al Islam and the Director of Public Security were among the leading 
members of the Pan-Islam Party in Constantinople, and two newspapers 
subsidized by the Government and the CUP, Turc Pourdi and Al Hedayat 
circulated widely in Europe, North Africa, Syria, Afghanistan and India. 
Soldiers in the Egyptian and Indian armies were offered attractive terms to 
desert to the Turks. In Geneva, La patrie Egyptienne carried the appeals of 
Shawish and the Constantinople leaders, and of Abdurrahman al Riadh 
their leader in Jerusalem, to Indians who might be tempted by the offer of 
eventual freedom from ‘imperialist yoke’ in return for support for Germany 
and Turkey.”183  
 
Who did replace Abdülaziz Çaviş in Egypt is hard to determine in the absence of 
documentary evidence. It is known, however, that Dr. Fuat became the director of India, 
Egypt, Afghan, and Arabia Department of the Umur-i Şarkiye Office and the Cavalry 
first lieutenant Yusuf Efendi was the director of the Egypt section in this department.184 
Therefore, it might be plausible to assert that the chair in Egypt was filled by one of the 
following three agents: Ferid Bey, Dr. Nasır and Dr. Tabit Maheab.    
Whoever the chief might have been, as a result of propaganda and agitation 
activities, it was expected on the Ottoman part that the inhabitants of Egypt would 
immediately rebel, as soon as the Ottoman troops were seen on the Canal. Accordingly, 
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the British forces would be attacked by not only the Egyptians, but also the Turks and 
Libyans on eastern and western fronts. In this context, a gossip was spread in Egypt such 
that an Ottoman force of 150.000 or 300.000 was about to penetrate from Elariş into 
Egypt. 
“Ordu-yi Hümayun Başkumandanlık Vekalet-i Celilesine, 
 
Mısır’a ait suret-i hususiyede istihsal edilen...malumat bervech-i arz olunur. 
 
1-Yemen ve Hicaz’a memur olup Mısır’dan geçen zabitan pek ziyade calib-
i nazar-ı dikkat görülmektedir. Halk arasında üçyüzbin kişilik bir Osmanlı 
kuvvetinin ElAriş’ten Mısır’a geçmek üzere bulunduğu söylenmektedir.  
2- Suriye ve Filistin sevahilinde mütehaşşid Osmanlı askerinden ve 
buradan [Mısır] murur eden Osmanlı zabitanından İngilizler pek ziyade 
telaş etmektedir. İskenderiye’deki Türklerin kaffesi sayfi bir tarassud ve 
nezaret altında bulunmaktadırlar...”185 
 
 During September, the signs of excitement began to appear; almost 60.000 
people were crowded in the streets of Cairo to protest against the British, as well as to 
plunder, especially, the shops of Christians. These protests lasted at least a few days.186 
As expected on the Ottoman side, such disturbances in Egypt led the Italians in Bingazi 
to take preventive measures against the Muslims as well: 
“Dahiliye Nezaret-i Celilesine  
 
10 Teşrin-i Sani 330 tarihli ve 1696/57605 numerolu tezkere-i senaveriyye 
zeylidir. 
 
Devletlü efendim hazretleri 
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Mısır'daki ingilizler aleyhine vukuu melhut olan isyanın Bingazi ve 
havalisine sirayeti ihtimaline mebni Bingazi kumandanı cezal Ameliyo’nun 
taleb etdiği tedabir cümlesinden olmak üzere otuz sekiz bin muhasara topu 
mermisinin kanun-ı evvel efrenciyesinin yirmisine doğru Bingazi'ye 
irsaliyle beraber Tobruk ve Bingazi'deki kuvva-i askeriyye tezyid ve 
Napoli'deki Trablusgarb ve Bingazi'ye mahsus askeri deposu nevakısının 
dahi ikmal kılınacağının istihbar olunduğu Roma sefiri Nabi Bey efendi 
hazretlerinden alınan 28 teşrin-i sani 914 tarihli telgrafnamede 
bildirilmişdir. İşbu telgrafnamenin bir sureti harbiye nezaret-i celilesine 
gönderildi efendim. 
 
17 Teşrin-i Sani 330  
 
Hariciye Nazırı namına müsteşar”187 
 
The British reports, too, drew attention to the increase in the activities of the 
Teşkilat during this period. The Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa Company, formed in Istanbul and 
led by Süleyman Elbaruni, the Ottoman senator of Jebel Gharbi, stopped by Egypt 
before going into Libya and struggled to form a pan-Islamic revolutionary movement 
there against the British during August of 1914.188 “Thanks to Baruni’s status as an 
Ottoman senator, the group was not detained by the British but was kept under constant 
surveillance. The British ambassador to Istanbul protested over Baruni’s activities. 
Baruni, aware of British opposition to his subversive activities in Egypt, hastened to 
wind up his affairs there before moving on to Cyrenaica at the beginning of September 
1914.”189 Moreover, the British authorities, who considered the presence of Turkish 
officers in Egypt as a great threat, seized a letter. The letter written by one of the Turkish 
officers had been directed to the crew of four ships, which were to be used to transport 
the British soldiers, to go on strike. He also added that he would attempt to sink the ship 
when the soldiers went on board. Subsequently, the strike really took place. 
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Furthermore, at the end of September, some armed Egyptians in Cairo provoked by 
Turkish officers infringed the Egyptian border.190  
Signs of excitement in Egypt grew further during October as the relations 
between Great Britain and Ottoman Empire deteriorated. Nevertheless, the British could 
not understand that these agents and agitators were coordinated by one organization, the 
Teşkilat. As Colonel Walther Nikolay, the chief of the German Secret Service, III-B, 
points out, Egypt was included in the workspace of the Teşkilat and the German agents 
there were auxuiliary.191 In this context, the following semi-official correspondence 
between Sir J. Maxwell and Lord Kitchener might prove explanatory. On 16th October 
General Maxwell wrote: 
“There is rather more nervousness in Egypt, but everything is quiet. It is 
part of the German propaganda that a revolution in Egypt is imminent, 
and that there are agents all over the country fomenting the natives 
against the British. We can find little evidence in support of this. There 
are, however, far too many able-bodied reservists, German and Austrian, 
all over Egypt. I have just finished a general registration and, though I 
have not yet the exact figures, there must be at least 600, and there must 
be another 200 from the crews of captured ships. This is a danger. I have 
wired you asking to have them all interned at Malta. They can do no harm 
there. On Monday I am trying before a military court an undoubted spy of 
Enver’s. He is a German and an officer of the Alexandria Police, and he 
had on him when arrested a secret code, maps of the Suez Canal, and two 
boxes of detonators…As we are not going to hold our Sinai frontier and 
will destroy as many as possible, I expect all the Bedouin will join the 
Turks if they come over. As I cannot send out patrols I do not know much 
about what is going on on the frontier lines. I expect there will be raids 
before long. The Turks seem to be doing a lot of work in road-making, 
building forts, etc., all over Palestine and Syria, which looks as if they 
expected attack from us, but their tendency is to move south, and this can 
only mean attack upon Egypt. With the eight battalions from India, two 
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mountain batteries, the Bikanir Camel Corps and the Coastguard, the 
Canal ought to be safe.”192 
 
 Up to the end of October, unrest grew more and with the bombardment of Akabe 
on 1 November, the British began to arrest and intern prominent and dangerous Turkish 
subjects. There was however no way to imprison the thousands of Turkish nationals in 
Egypt.193 So, the Turkish Command had comparatively easy facilities for the collection 
of information and spread of propaganda. During October, “Sir John Maxwell had 
deported a large number of German agents and Austro-German Reservists, while, later, 
he obtained information of a plot organized by Baron Oppenheim, the German explorer, 
for a rising in Cairo and the murder of Europeans to synchronize with the attack on the 
Canal.”194  Besides, within the context of martial law, it was outlawed to gather in the 
streets, to keep shops open and go outside after eight o’clock in the evening. The British 
also appointed intelligence officers all over Cairo. The Ottoman telegraph clerks and 
three other clerks working in the Ottoman Commissariat of Cairo were banished. 
Moreover, the leader of the tribes located near the Canal, Hamid Bey, was exiled to 
Sudan and sixty Egyptian officers who did not want to fight against the Muslims were 
executed by shooting.195 A further decisive step was taken during December; the 
Protectorate over Egypt was proclaimed and Hüseyin Kamil, a pro-British, uncle of 
Abbas Hilmi, was made Khedive.196 Twenty prominent people like princes Mehmed Ali 
and Aziz Pashas who did not accept the installation of the new Khedive were arrested 
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and taken out of the country.197  Such measures taken by the British no doubt supressed 
the Egyptian society and in turn limited the effectiveness of the propaganda activities 
carried out by the Teşkilat.  
             
8. The Attack on the Suez Canal  
 
After that date, the Teşkilat forces leading 2000 irregulars completed their passage into 
Sinai towards the end of October. This was followed by the advance in the desert and the 
towns of Kalatünnahl and El-Ariş were transformed into the headquarters of the 
communication and supply organizations established by Lieutenant Colonel Behçet Bey, 
Commander of the 23rd Division. The Teşkilat forces under the command of Mümtaz 
and Eşref Beys would provide the flank security while the main force began marching 
from Beerşeba to İsmailiye. The object of these was simply to keep the enemy in doubt 
as to the point at which the main attack was to be made.  
It is known that Eşref Bey engaged in the demonstration attack of Mümtaz Bey 
against Kantara.198 Available documentation, however, does not give any account of 
whereabouts of Hasan Efendi and his forces were dispatched. Nevertheless, if the fact 
that Hasan Efendi did not engage in the Teşkilat operations to take hold of the key points 
in the desert and his passage into Sinai took place a little later than that of Mümtaz and 
Eşref beys were taken into account, then it was more likely that Hasan Efendi engaged 
the Bedouin forces of the main campaign force, which consisted of almost 1500 
irregulars. 
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During the first half of January 1915, Cemal Pasha ordered Mümtaz Bey to cross 
the Canal secretly with a few bands, reconnoitre the Port-Said line and demolish its 
railroad. Following this, the major part of the bands would make their way into Egypt by 
the Salihiye-Zegazig line and having demolished not only the railroad but also 
everything the British possessed, they would instigate the masses by propagandizing the 
Turkish army near the Canal as savior of the Muslims. He was also ordered to launch 
with the majority of his troops demonstration attacks against Kantara, lie in ambush and 
open fire against the British vessels, and demolish lantern and signal points of the Canal, 
and in turn detain as many British forces as possible along Kantara.199 Eşref Bey, on the 
other hand, was charged to destroy the enemy positions deployed along the Great Bitter 
Lake, to the south of Ismailiye and to hinder the navigation of vessels from Suez to 
Ismailiye and cut off the telegraph and telephone lines. If he could cross the Canal, he 
would also demolish the Ismailiye-Zegazig line and instigate the population against the 
British.200 Moreover, in both of the orders, Cemal Pasha admonished them to create such 
an atmosphere among their forces that each one of the soldiers should feel responsible to 
fight to death.201     
Gradual advance in the Sinai Peninsula began in mid-January of 1915, after a 
month the 8th Corps departed from Damascus and the attack on the Suez Canal began on 
the night of 2-3 February 1915.202 The success of the attack was strictly bound to the 
                                                 
199
 ATASE Archive: f: 3221, d: H4, I: 1/5.  
200
 Stoddard, Osmanlı Devleti ve Araplar, 104-105. 
201
 See Appendix C for the disposition of the troops connected to 4th Army between 11 January and 1 
February 1915. 
202
 The British defense of the Canal had been organized by December and the force there consisted of the 
10th and 11th Indian Divisions and the Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade. Three mountain batteries 
composed the artillery of these troops. Then, two field artillery brigades of the East Lancashire Division 
and a pack-gun battery of the Egyptian Army ere added to the defense. Three sectors for defense were 
prepared: Suez to the Bitter Lake, north of the Great Bitter Lake to Elferdan, and Elferdan to Port-Said. 
 72 
confusion of the British forces deployed on Ismailiye and the establishment of a fortified 
bridgehead across the Canal, which was to be protected until the following forces 
reached Ismailiye. However, from the information of reconnaissance flights and of 
agents’ reports, the British were nearly sure by the second week of January that the main 
attack would come through Central Sinai. The central sector attacked against the 
Tussum-Serapeum area between Lake Timsah and the Great Bitter Lake while the 
diversionary forces were aimed at the vicinity of Firdan and Kantara.203 The attempts to 
cross the Canal, however, were detected and most of the pontoons were destroyed. 
Although a few soldiers could make their way to the west bank, that was not enough to 
hinder the retreat of the army the following day.204 Besides, not only the Muslims across 
the Canal did not revolt but the Sanusi forces in Libya also did not attack the British 
from the western border as expected, which totally marked the failure of the original 
Ottoman plan to invade Egypt. Obviously enough, Cemal Pasha overestimated Egyptian 
sympathy for the Turks because he had expected that his appearance on the Canal would 
be followed by a rising of Egyptian nationalist: “O sırada Mısır vatanperverleri de bu 
Osmanlı Ordusunun İsmailiye’yi zaptetmiş olmasından cesaret alarak umumi ihtilallere 
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teşebbüs edecek olurlarsa, işte hiç ümit edilmeyen bir zamanda, en ibtidai ve pek az bir 
kuvvetle Mısır’ın kurtarılması müyesser olmuş olurdu.”205 The first Canal campaign 
however had a strategic value. The movement of large Ottoman forces through the 
central route of the desert and their subsequent attack astonished the British and 
compelled them for a long time to expect a renewal of the attack. This led to detaining of 
large British forces in Egypt, which, in turn, became an advantage for both the Ottomans 
preparing for the battle at Çanakkale and their partners in the European theatre of 
operations: 
“The advance against Egypt must have disappointed Turkey and the 
Central Powers by the futility of expecting any important results from the 
proclamation of a ‘Jihad’…, but, whatever the true intention, the German 
higher Command may well have been satisfied. In their perspective the 
operation amounted to a very efficiently planned raid which undoubtedly 
had the effect of playing upon the nerves of the British Government to the 
point of inducing it to retain a disproportionate number of troops on the 
Egyptian front for the future. The corresponding dislocation of resources 
has already been shown to limit the original conception of the Dardanelles 
operations, upon which the British Government had by now decided to 
embark.”206   
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B. The Mission of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa during the 2nd Canal Campaign  
 
1. The Reorganization of the 4th Army and the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa Forces  
 
After the failure of the first Canal campaign, a new phase started in Syria-Palestine. 
Between 15 March and 31 December 1915, the 4th Army was occupied with giving 
assistance to other fronts (Gallipoli, Caucasia, and Iraq), fortification and reconstruction 
facilities (railroads, lines, etc.), reorganization of the army, and protection of the security 
and public order of the interior region. In addition, preparations for the second Canal 
campaign were carried on and effective attempts of raids and mining were made in order 
to cut the Canal traffic off and prevent the British forces in Egypt from moving to other 
fronts.207 Thereby, the 4th Army was reorganized during the first half of March 1915 as 
follows: the 8th Corps, (mürettep) Corps, Desert Commandership, Hicaz Campaign 
Force, Domestic Gendarme and Depository troops.208 Voluntary detachments under the 
command of the Teşkilat detachments were likely reorganized as small moving columns 
since having seen the Turkish forces near the Canal in the first campaign, the British 
reinforced forces along the Canal which hindered the Turks from approaching it.209 
In this context, Desert Commandership was formed under the command of the 
Colonel Kress Von Kressenstein, former chief of the staff of the 8th Corps.210 The 
detachments left in the desert were given under the direct order of this commandership, 
whose central headquarters was in Al-Ibin. Its mission was to direct the attempts of 
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harassment against the Canal and both to protect and conceal the preparations for the 
second campaign against Egypt.211 The telegraph dispatched to the 4th Army by Enver 
Pasha supports this point:  
“4. Ordu Kumandanlığına  
 
26 Kanun-i Sani 
 
Dördüncü Ordunun gösterdiği gayret ve faaliyeti fevkalade takdir ederim. 
Bununla ordunun biavnillahi teala atiyen Kanal’ın müruruna muvaffak 
olacağına kanaatim daha ziyadeleşmiş ve muhakkak olmuştur. Bu hususta 
mümkün olan bütün vesait-i muavine ihzar olunacaktır. Su ve erzak 
esbabından dolayı ordunun beyan buyurulan hututa kadar çekilmesi zaruri 
bile olsa gene mümkün olan vesaitle Kanal’ın mütemadiyen tehdidine 
çalışılması lazımdır. Harekatın sükunet devresi esnasında topçu ile beraber 
ufak müfrezeleri Kanal’a kadar göndererek seyrüseferi menetmeye 
muvaffak olacağınızdan eminim. Bu kabil teşebbüsler fevkalade mühimdir.  
 
Enver”212 
 
The cadre of the commandership was divided into three flanks: the right flank 
detachment under the command of Musa Kazım Bey (the volunteers of Selami Bey and 
Nurettin Bey were involved here), left flank detachment under the command of 
lieutenant Lauffer, and center flank detachment to which the volunteers of Eşref Bey 
(composed of men from Trablusgarp and Circassian cavalry regiment) were bound213. 
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Eşref Bey, however, stayed in the desert up to the end of 1915 and then was sent to 
Arabia in order to cope with the British influence in Hicaz.214  
The sources mention neither Mümtaz Bey, the commander of the Teşkilat-ı 
Mahsusa units and of the Voluntary Detachment of the 4th Army, nor the Voluntary 
Detachment under his command, during the second campaign. It is, however, known 
that von Kress even before the first campaign thought that Mümtaz was not qualified 
enough for such an important post.215 Therefore, it seems probable that Mümtaz Bey and 
his forces were incorporated into the Desert Commandership as regular forces. 
Otherwise, he should have left a part of his forces in the desert under the command of 
Desert Commandership and been appointed to the commandership of the National 
Voluntary Battalion in Damascus formed between 15 June and 15 July 1915. Later on, 
Mümtaz Bey at an unspecified date, most probably at the beginning of 1916, under an 
unknown assignment, went to Izmit. From there, he went to Istanbul at the beginning of 
summer 1916 without the knowledge of Enver Pasha in order to take Yakup Cemil away 
from Istanbul, who was about to attempt to overthrow the government.216 That the 
attempt was to happen on 26 July and Mümtaz was forced to stay at Izmit after Yakup 
Cemil had been tried and executed points to the fact that Mümtaz Bey did not engage in 
the battles of Katya (April 1916) and Romani (August 1916).  
What happened to the Gendarme Commander Major Hasan Efendi is not clear 
either. Had he been substituted or died in one way or another, the sources, which 
sometimes stated even the names of the foot soldiers, would have not refrained to 
mention a man holding such an important post. Besides, there is no clue in respect to 
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whether the bands under his command were transported to another region. It seems 
therefore reasonable to presume in the very absence of information about Hasan Efendi 
that he was charged with a duty, similar to one he was given during the first campaign, 
in the “Mücahidin” organization formed along the coast of Syria-Palestine on 15 
March.217 Forasmuch as the fact that the “Mücahidin” organizations were composed 
merely of volunteers and that all the volunteers were under the direction of the Teşkilat 
commanders during the first campaign, were taken into account, this possibility becomes 
more likely to have happened.  
Whatever happened, it is obvious that a part of the Teşkilat agents and 
detachments stayed in the desert. This is understood from both the statements of Eşref 
Kuşçubaşı and the quality and quantity of the operations launched during 1915. Only 
three days after the first campaign, Enver Pasha, aware of the forthcoming Gallipoli 
campaign, ordered Cemal Pasha, who would have to dispatch a considerable number of 
his forces to Gallipoli, to prepare portable columns to be seen near the Canal and Cemal 
wanted Von Kress to launch the operations immediately.218 
 
2. Minor Operations against the Canal  
 
The first of those raids was the attempt of reserve Captain Gondos, a Hungarian 
volunteer, against the Canal. Alongside 50 volunteers from the detachment of Eşref Bey 
and 10 regular soldiers, Gondos was expected to destroy the oil wells at Cemza where he 
formerly served as an engineer. He would first traverse the Mount Sinai and arrive at 
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Tur on the southwest coast of the peninsula; then make his way to Cemza located on the 
African coast of the Suez Gulf by boat.219 He departed from Kalatünnahl on 9 January 
and encountered the British detachment at Tur on 19 January. Having retreated, Gondos 
moved into the town and blew up the governmental mansion. On 4 February, he 
destroyed water pumps and wells, into which he threw anisole pigment to make people 
believe that the water was poisoned, at Karantine. Having destroyed three oil wells and 
mines at Cemza he returned to Kalatünnahl on 10 February.220  
After this first effective attack, attempts of raids and sabotages by small units of 
mounted movement capability increased because the British naval forces had 
disappeared from the Suez Canal due to the launch of Gallipoli Campaign.221 So, the 
Canal was to be constantly harassed in order to prevent Britain from dispatching forces 
easily from Egypt to Gallipoli. Thereby, Von Kress alongside with Teşkilat forces as 
well as other forms of regular units decided to attack the Canal through Kalatünnahl on 
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15 March. This day also marked the weakening of the British defense against mine-
laying because it witnessed the withdrawal of the torpedo boats. Another column under 
the command of Major Lauffer was to attack Elkantara at the same time. Captain 
Gondos, Major Vels, and Lieutenant Ahmed Mithat, alongside volunteers were used for 
the reconnaissance facilities and the attack began on 22 March.222 A British patrol of 
nine men while following to seize two Turks at north of Elkubri, was fired upon by a 
number of others. Then, the British saw that there had been four or five hundred more in 
the vicinity. Therefore, the patrol under the command of Havildar Subar Singh fell back 
but two of his men were killed. Subsequently, British detachments were sent from the 
Gurkha Post, which was two miles away.223 The British panicked because 
“It was known that there were some 4,000 Turkish troops with guns at 
Nekhl [Kalatünnahl], and the force seen might well be the advanced guard 
of a much stronger one, about to attack Canal. The provision of adequate 
floating defense was difficult; the only battleship, the old French Henri IV, 
having just been dispatched to the Dardenelles to replace the lost Bouvet, 
and all the torpedo boats being gone. Requin, the cruiser Bacchante from 
Suez and the light cruiser Philomel took station in the Canal. The royal 
Indian Marine ship Dufferin  was already near Shallufa.”224  
 
On that night, one troopship and cargo vessel came under fire, however, the alarmed 
British forces achieved to drive back the Ottoman army, which could barely harass the 
Canal, on 23 March.225 
On the night of 7-8 April, another voluntary detachment under the command of 
Major Lauffer managed to lay a torpedo on the line of Elkantara. Nevertheless, because 
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it was wrongly bolted, the torpedo rose up to the surface and the British demolished it.226 
A successful attempt against the Canal was made on the night of 27-28. Volunteers 
under the command of Major Fischer and Captain Gondos laid two mines on the Acıgöl 
part of the Canal. Second Lieutenant Aziz, Third Lieutenant Hadi, and 6 volunteers were 
sent for reconnaissance along Ismailiye. The unit, under the command of Major Hungar, 
was composed of regular soldiers, and a considerable number of Bedouins and 
volunteers lead by Şeyh Atıyye, attacked on the same day from Elferdan and drove back 
a British camel and two speared cavalryman companies. Consequently, the British had 
to cut the canal traffic off the entire day on 28 March.227  
Another voluntary detachment under the command of a Turkish second 
lieutenant engrossed a British ship which included 15 soldiers, on the night of 28-29 
May. The ship was lapsed having had its furnace dynamited.228 Likewise, first lieutenant 
Sırrı with a mobile detachment of 50 volunteers laid mine on the line of Birekidi on the 
night of 27-28 June, which resulted in sinking a British ship.229 The ship swung round 
across the channel and blocked it completely, but the British were able to reopen it the 
day after. Towards the end of July, another sabotage unit crossed the Canal by 
swimming and demolished a train by laying mines on the railroad lying to the north of 
Elkantara. Similarly, a portable reconnaissance patrol demolished Elkantara-Port Said 
railroad and a train on 12 August.230 Such attacks were carried out until the beginning of 
November when British began to form reconnaissance and safety curtain on the east side 
of the Canal. That is why the Ottoman forces could no longer approach the Canal until 
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the reconnaissance expedition of Katya in 1916. However such raids and attacks with 
small portable detachments and reconnaissance patrols as well as the mining attempts 
compelled the Canal defense forces to stand constantly wearisome on alert. At the same 
time, those operations invigorated the feeling of quite a few British in Egypt that they 
were encircled with spies, saboteurs, and commandoes. Even so, such attacks no doubt 
had a demoralizing effect on the volunteers since all of these attacks resulted in retreat of 
the Ottoman forces.231  
The preparations for the second Canal campaign were initiated on 26 November. 
The first expeditionary force was formed under the command of von Kress on 26 
December and Major Kadri was appointed as chief of the staff. Ali Fuad (Erden) became 
the chief of the operation department. In the meantime, news was coming from the 
Supreme Command that the British began to reduce their forces in Egypt because they 
did not believe a further Ottoman attack. Accordingly, it was ordered to make the British 
suppose that an attack was about to be launched in the near future. However, the 
detachments could not manage to approach the Canal between February and March 
1916. The British began to construct a railroad and waterway on the east side of the 
Canal, starting from Elkantara. Also, the aeroplanes found out military encampments on 
the line of Muhammediye-Romani-Katya and the only way to get information about 
them was a reconnaissance attack by land. To this end, successful Katya reconnaissance 
expedition was launched in April 1916. After this battle, priorities came with the Hicaz 
uprising (6 June 1916) and the re-attack against the Canal. Not disregarding the impact 
of the first issue, the Ottoman army made an attack to Romani on 4 August and the clash 
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resulted in the retreat of the Ottomans the day after.232 It was this battle after which the 
Ottoman army began to retreat on Sinai-Palestine front and the British counter attacks 
were initiated. Meanwhile, the civic turmoil in Sudan had disappeared and the 
Sanusiyyas had already taken the way of Trablusgarb, which totally meant that the 
Ottoman project of rolling back the British army of Egypt has come to an end.    
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CHAPTER THREE 
 TEŞKİLAT-I MAHSUSA INVOLVEMENT IN LIBYA 
 
The responsibilities of the Teşkilat were not confined to create trouble only in Egypt and 
Sinai. Agents were also at work in Libya, seeking out weak points against the British on 
Egypt’s western border.233 This time, however, they had to cope with the Italians too, 
since Italy had certain historic claims to a sphere of influence in Libya. Besides, “her 
strategic interests in the coast of Africa opposite her shores are obvious. It is easy to 
understand Italian feelings about Libya…they occupied it ‘simply in order to be able to 
breathe freely in the Mediterranean- to avoid being stifled amidst the possessions and 
naval bases of France and Great Britiain.”234 On the other hand, “…European 
states…were interested in Libya as a transit region and border district…Libya’s border 
to the east was shared with Egypt, which was defended at that time by Britain, and in the 
west with Tunisia and Algeria, which were under French rule. In the south were African 
kingdoms (Wadai, Bornu, and Kanem) into which France was penetrating. The 
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paramount British and French interest was connected with protecting the countries they 
governed.”235  
In order to protect the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, Fedai Zabitan, 
the group accepted as the antecedent of the Teşkilat, had already been involved in Libya 
during the Ottoman-Italian war of 1911-1912. Not surprisingly, in accordance with the 
Uşi treaty signed following the war, the Turkish forces began to evacuate the region, 
leaving only a number of stay-behind soldiers ın case of a return the Ottoman rule once 
again in Libya. During the inter-war period, between the Tripoli and World War I, 
however “the local population grew more and more accustomed to independently 
conducting its own civil and military affairs, its readiness to re-subjugate itself to foreign 
sovereignty diminished, although it was prepared to receive Ottoman aid and 
cooperation.”236 In the third phase of the struggle, during World War I, the Ottoman 
policy was to subject the local elements especially the Senusis, to the Ottoman authority 
mostly by supplying them with military equipment and financial resources so that not 
only the struggle against the Italians would be intensified, but also the attack against the 
western border of Egypt would be guaranteed. During this period, it is possible to 
consider the Teşkilat concentration here in two regions; Bingazi in the east, and Tripoli 
in the west. In this chapter, as it is directly related to the Ottoman containment policy, 
the organization and establishment of the local resistance forces against the British on 
the western border of Egypt will be scrutinized, leaving out the struggle against the 
Italians on the western part of Libya.  
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A. The Mission of Süleyman el-Baruni to Libya  
 
Notwithstanding that some Turkish officers organized resistance movements against the 
Italians in the interior region, the fight led by the Teşkilat against the British was 
essentially set off after a few officers of generally Tripoli and Bingazi origin had been 
sent to Seyyid Ahmed. The first Teşkilat Company for Libya was formed in Istanbul 
during August 1914 under the command of Süleyman Elbaruni, the Ottoman senator of 
Jebel Gharbi and the leader of the Ibadi tribes.237 Known as the hero of the insurrection 
in Jebel Gharbi in 1911-1913, Süleyman Elbaruni was experienced in the area during the 
Ottoman-Italian war and inter-war period. Therefore, he was sent there by the Minister 
of War, Enver Pasha, to support the Arab fighters in Libya and in turn to strengthen the 
position of the Ottomans under his leadership.  This company included men like retired 
Infantry Major Vasfi, retired Artillery Officer Ahmet Baba, Doctor Captain Osman, and 
Staff Captain Tarık.238 Having left Istanbul on 13 August, the company arrived in Egypt 
where they struggled to form a pan-Islamic revolutionary movement against the 
British239. The appointment of a senior Ottoman representative of Libyan origin to lead 
the struggle was expected to improve Ottoman standing among internal power struggles 
in Libya. Nevertheless, the appointment of Baruni, who also had strong ties with the 
Ottoman regime, began to cause problems when he arrived in Libya on 16 September.240  
Baruni, however, not only lacked an independent power base in Libya but also 
had to deal with Senusis, who had been well-established there during the inter-war 
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period. Secondly, his activities to agitate the masses and train them against both the 
Italians and British was not met favorably especially by the Senusi leadership, whose 
position had considerably been strengthened after the evacuation of the Ottoman forces 
in 1913. Besides, “he was hardly known there…The strong backing he received from the 
Ottomans further increased his isolation: he was seen as an Ottoman and not as a local 
representative.”241 Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, pursuit of an anti-British 
policy did not suit the Senusi’s purpose at that time since the survival of Senusis was 
based on free trade with Egypt for foodstuff, to which the British condoned to a great 
extent to ensure the neutrality of the Senusis.242 It is also possible to say that any 
outbreak of hostility between the Senusis and the British was prevented during 1914 and 
early 1915 by the presence of large British forces in Egypt. However, as the British 
forces moved to other bases of war and as the battles against the Ottomans did not bring 
in decivise success, there began some excitement in Libya.243  
Such handicaps no doubt limited the effectiveness of the Teşkilat but did not 
prevent the increase in their local followers mostly due to the financial and military help 
provided to them by the Ottoman government. Yet, this interdependence was not enough 
to hinder the conflicts which would rise after Muhammed al-Abid, the Senusi leader of 
Fezzan, ordered the detention of Baruni in November because of his activities to 
provoke the Tripolitanian and Fezzani population. Nevertheless, the enforcement of the 
order was not carried out until Seyyid Ahmed got on bad terms with the Teşkilat agents 
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like Süleyman Elbaruni, doctor Nihad, lieutenant Tarık, and Mehmet Ali Efendi244 who 
were accused of not only struggling to ruin the prudent policy of Seyyid Ahmed towards 
the British by attacking them, but also embezzling 10000 liras.245 That was why Baruni 
was imprisoned in the Senusi camp of Sellum for a few months and was not allowed to 
leave the camp until the accusations were examined by Istanbul and he was found 
innocent. Baruni left Libya with a German submarine in December 1915: 
“Atina Sefaret-i Seniyyesine şifre 
 
Nuri Bey’e: 
 
Trablusgarp mıntıkasının istiklali...üzere Baruni Efendi gönderilmişti. 
Mumaileyh hakkında bazı mekatib vurud etti. Tedkik olundu. Mumaileyhin 
bu meselede su-i niyeti olmadığı ve mıntıka-i mezkureye...Şeyh Senusi’nin 
hareket edeceği anlaşılmış olduğundan mumaileyh Baruni Efendi’yi ilk 
vasıta ile Dersaadet’e iade ediniz. 
 
5 Kanun-i Evvel 331”246  
 
B. The Mission of Nuri (Kıllıgil) and Cafer el-Askeri to Libya  
 
Up to the arrival of infantry machine gun officer Captain Nuri (Kıllıgil), the younger 
brother of Enver Pasha, the forces under the command of the Teşkilat units in Libya 
fought particularly against the Italian forces led by General Ameglio.247 Nuri Bey was 
highly-esteemed in Libya due to his relationship to Enver Pasha and was acquaintanted 
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with the region from his service within the Teşkilat (known as Fedai Zabitan at that 
time) in Misurata in 1912 as its commander. That was why he was chosen for this 
mission.248  In order to re-establish the Ottoman authority in Libya and bring the Libyan 
factor into play to divert and detain the Allied forces in Egypt as much as possible, Nuri 
Bey and Cafer Askeri were sent to Libya. That was, however, an extremely dangerous 
journey due to the strict control of Allies on sea and the British forces at the Canal that 
blocked the overland contact through Egypt. Having left Istanbul on 6 January 1915, 
they set out to Greece, which was then neutral,249 under the guise of diplomatic couriers 
to the Ottoman embassy there.250 Having met in Athens by Galib Bey, an Ottoman 
Minister, they hired a Greek rumrunner, by the contact of the Ottoman consul in Piraeus, 
from a Beirutian named Muhyiddin Shatila, brother of Saadeddin Shatila, who would 
deliver Nuri and Cafer to Libya.251 After loading the armaments and ammunition 
purchased in Greece, Nuri and Cafer first stopped by Crete then went ashore in Defne, 
between Tobruk and Sellum, in Bingazi on 21 February 1915.252 They were 
accompanied during the voyage by Muhammad Bey Al-Jabani253 and Hajji Kamil 
Efendi al-Bunduqi254 and received as guests of the Manfah tribe when they reached the 
coast of Defne.255  
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Their first mission was to organize the Senusi forces to attack Egypt from the 
west whilst the 4th Army launched the second campaign against Egypt from the east. For 
this purpose, Nuri Bey also brought 10000 golden pieces.256 He immediately began 
negotiations in Sellum with Seyyid Ahmed, the leader of the Senusis. Seyyid Ahmed 
told Nuri Bey that he could not attack Egypt during the first Canal campaign due to lack 
of ammunition and provisions. He also mentioned that he had to provide forces against 
both the menacing Italians and French which attempted to occupy Kufra.257 Apart from 
those, having listened to his complaints, Nuri Bey insisted on Seyyid Ahmed engage in 
the attack against Egypt. Seyyid Ahmed, however, did not look favorably upon the offer. 
Although he was ready to recognize the Padisah-Caliph as the head of all Muslims, he 
did not want the Senusi brotherhood and local elements to be subordinated to any 
authority in regional affairs, which was actually planned as the Ottoman concept of 
relations with Senusis.258   
 
C. British Mediation  
 
According to Turkish sources, on the other hand, the British promised to help him in 
every possible way and approve his independence: 
“Gayet mahremane ve müstaceldir. Bizzat hal olunacaktır. 
 
25/12/1330 
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Senusi hazretleri evamir-i devletlerini büyük bir süratle telakki ve 
İskenderiye havalisine kadar garp kısmı kamilen Senusiler tarafından işgal 
edilmiş ise de İngilizler buna muhanaat? etmemişler ve bilakis mahtuniyet? 
göstermişlerdir ve hatta Senusi hazretlerine Afrika halifeliği de uhdesinde 
olmak üzere Mısır Sultanlığı teklif edilmiş fakat muhakkarane red 
eylemişdir...”259 
 
Colonel Snow and Major Royle, the British officers serving as coastguard officers in 
Egypt and the Egyptian officer Adib Efendi paid frequent visits to Seyyid to achieve 
these aims and persuade him to have the Turkish officers excluded from his 
entourage.260  
Seyyid Idris, the cousin of Seyyid Ahmed, seems to have played the major role 
in getting British assistance. As early as the beginning of March 1915, Teşkilat agents 
like Yusuf Şetvan261 suspected that Seyyid Idris, who was in Mecca now, had concluded 
an agreement with the British for financial and military assistance:  
“Osmaniye’den Başkumandanlık Vekalet-i Celilesine mevrud şifredir. 
 
Gayet müstaceldir. 
 
Abdüsselam, Şeyh ....’nın biraderi Muhammed Sadik ile beraber bugün 
hareket etdi. Kendisi Seyyid İdris’i getireceğine dair Seyyid Ahmed eş-
Şerif’ten aldığı vesika ile Sahra’dan İskenderiye’ye ve oradan vapurla 
Beyrut’a gelmişdir. İfadesine nazaran Seyyid İdris İngilizlerle muhabere 
etmesi için Seyyid Ahmed eş-Şerif’e mektup yazmış ve bu mektubun 
vusülünden sonra Mısır’dan bir İngiliz binbaşısı Seyyid Ahmed eş-Şerif’e 
gelip kendileriyle muharebe vuku bulmayacağına dair teminat alarak avdet 
etmiş ve İtalyanlarla harbe devam edilmesi için teşvikan bulunduğu gibi 
Türklerin İngilizler nazarında Almanlardan farkı bulunmadığını beyan 
etmiştir… Abdüsselam’a ve gerekse Muhammed Sadik’a esrar tevdii caiz 
değildir. Bunlarla beraber kendileriyle harbe devam için İngilizlerin Seyyid 
                                                 
259
 ATASE Archive: f: 1863, d: 153, I: 1-1. 
260
 Al-Askari, 58. “At Sollum Lieut.-Colonel C. L. Snow, of the Egyptian Coastguard, was in charge of the 
Western Frontier. Upon this officer, intimately acquainted with the local Bedouin, fell the hard task of 
negotiating with the Senussi, preventing, so far as possible, intrigues in Egypt through the channel of his 
followers in the country, and at the same time preserving the Moslem leader’s indubitable respect for 
British authority and god faith.” See, History of the Great War, 104.  
261
 Yusuf Şetvan, an important Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa agent in North Africa, was the former deputy of 
Trablusgarb in the Ottoman Parliament.  
 91 
Ahmed eş-Şerif’e vaki olan teşvikatını ve Seyyid İdris’i bu maksatla davet 
eylediğini işar ederek İtalyanları İngilizler aleyhine… tahrik mümkündür. 
 
Yusuf Şetvan”262 
 
Those two Senusi members who were accused of mediating between the British and 
Seyyid Idris, namely Abdüsselam Efendi and Muhammed Sadik, were therefore 
interrogated by Hulusi Bey, the governor of Syria.263 According to their statements, 
upon the declaration of Jihad, Seyyid Ahmed called back Idris who was influential 
among the Arabs around Sellum and was now based in Mecca.  
The letter in which Seyyid Ahmed called Seyyid Idris back to Sellum was 
handed to Idris by the kaymakam of Ecedabiye, Ali Efendi al-Abidin, who was presented 
in the letter as the closest man of Seyyid Ahmed. Seyyid Ahmed also requested Idris to 
send Ali Efendi al-Abidin directly to Enver Pasha264 to whom he was going to tell the 
details of the resistance in Libya and present the needs of the Senusis: 
“Ahmed ibn-i es-Seyyid eş-Şerif es-Senusi hazretleri tarafından es-Seyyid 
Muhammed İdris el-Mehdi es-Senusi hazretlerine.... yazılan mektubun 
tercümesi: 
 
Bade’l elkab ve’d-dua: 
 
Devlet-i Aliyye’ye karşı memnun ve minnettar olduğunuzu müşir 
mektubunuz vasıl oldu...Ecdadımız Ecedabiye Kaymakamı Ali Efendi el-
Abidin sizce meçhul olmayan esbabdan dolayı bildiremediğim umur-i 
hurüriyeyi bildirmek için tarafınıza gelmiştir. Biz, muma leyhi ancak 
sırrımızda pek ketum olduğu için zatımız vekil olarak gönderdik. Zira 
himmet ve hizmeti emr-i İslama sarf edeceği hakkında kendisine pek büyük 
emniyetimiz vardır. Siz de bu adamı meşhur dostumuza [Enver Pasha] 
gönderirseniz kendilerine efkarımızı ariz ve amik arz eder... Aman 
gecikmeyesin! Siz de bade’l hacc asla tehir etmeden süratle ve herhangi 
hile ile olursa olsun buraya geliniz. Zira vücudunuza mütevakkıf işler pek 
çoktur ve bana sizin kadar elverişli de pek azdır... 
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Tercüme aslına mutabıktır...265  
 
Although the letter by Seyyid Ahmed was dated 16 September, Idris sent Ali Efendi to 
Enver Pasha on 8 January 1915 and the reason behind this delay was alleged by Idris to 
be the illness of Ali Efendi.266  
Having received Seyyid Ahmed’s letter, Idris who did not want to be stopped by 
the British during his journey wrote a letter back to Seyyid Ahmed, which he believed 
was going to be opened by the British. In the letter, Idris recommended Seyyid Ahmed 
not to get involved in a war against the British.267 However, this assertion made by the 
men of Seyyid Idris was not enough to make Teşkilat agents believe that Idris was not 
pro-British. Since, the agents not only have known the correspondence between Seyyid 
Ahmed and Idris as explained above, but they also got the letter of Ali al-Abidin, a 
Senusi Şeyh who seems to have worked for the Ottomans, addressed to Enver Pasha 
through the governor of Halep, Celal Bey, in which it was told that Idris met someone, 
most probably a British officer, while he was in Mecca.268 When this suspicion 
combined with the illness of Ali Efendi al-Abidin, which appears to have been a pretext, 
the trustworthiness of the aides of Seyyid Idris was overshadowed.  
Again, according to Ottoman sources, having received Seyyid Idris’ letter, which 
was alleged to be written for the sake of safe journey from Mekke to Sellum, Seyyid 
Ahmed was visited by a British major, most probably by Major Royle, who offered to 
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help Seyyid in every possible way.269 Seyyid Ahmed who wanted to make sure if this 
offer was real or not demanded a great deal of ammunition, money, and armaments. 
Although the demands were not met, the British closed their eyes to the provision 
coming from İskenderiye to Sellum and conducted themselves well with Senusi soldiers, 
upon which Seyyid carried on to be neutral.270  
Meanwhile, a German spy Mannesmann was trying to persuade Seyyid Ahmed 
to attack Egypt while the German Consul in Morocco, Propester, at a meeting with 
Seyyid Ahmed in December 1915 agreed to provide him with every kind of assistance 
available.271 Upon the increasing German influence,272 Enver Pasha who did not like the 
prospect of an independent state of Senusis, ordered Nuri to cut off the communication 
between the Germans and Senusis.273 Enver Pasha also mentioned that all the German 
and Austrian officers were under the command of Nuri Pasha who was given the power 
to expel the officers who do not act in accordance with the instructions they were given 
by Nuri Pasha.274 Discomfort on the Ottoman side was so much that Eric Von 
Falkenhein, German Chief of Staff, informed the Ottoman Chief of Staff on 11 
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November 1915 that they had no political intentions in Libya and the spy 
Mannesmann275 would never be anywhere near Seyyid Ahmed: 
“Cezal Fon Falkenhayn’ın Pless’den 11 Teşrin-i Sani 1915 tarihli telgrafı: 
 
Enver Paşa hazretlerine, 
Miralay Fon Losso vasıtasıyla bana bildirilen Trablus’daki 
muvaffakiyetlere çok sevindim. Almanya’nın Trablus’da siyasi hiç bir 
alakası yoktur...Mannessmann Senusi’nin yanından ayrılmıştır. Oraya avdet 
etmeyecektir...276  
 
 
D. Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa’s Means of Pressure  
 
Control over the inflow and distribution of money, armaments, and equipment were the 
Teşkilat’s main means of pressure. Nuri had strict control over all the supplies provided 
by the Ottomans from his camp in Bir-i Vaar. It should be worth noting here that the 
logistical support against the British was initially provided with sail ships and boats 
coming from the shores of Syria, Aegean, and Mediterranean. Afterwards, the shipments 
were made by German submarines. The first supply campaign was made from the Kiel 
port. Then, the shipments were carried from the Pola port near the Adriatic shores of 
Austria. According to Turkish sources, these shipments reveal the close cooperation 
between the German Naval attaché and the Umur-i Şarkiye Dairesi.277  
The Senusi encampment on the other hand was in el-Masaid.278 Under the 
supervision of Muhammad Bashir al-Tunisi, there was also a munitions store here where 
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arms and ammunitions were repaired.279  The existence of separate camps was a sign of 
worsening mutual relations between the Ottomans and Senusis. Furthermore, Seyyid 
Ahmed took some measures to weaken Ottoman influence, for instance, by dispatching 
Ottoman officers to the hinterland so as to isolate them. A slight improvement on the 
part of Ottomans realized when 35 men, most of whom were sons of local notables, 
returned to the region from Istanbul where they had been sent by Enver Pasha in 1912 to 
get an education in the military academy. He also benefited from the internal conflicts 
within the Senusi leadership by inciting Seyyid Hilal, one of the brothers of Seyyid, to 
recruit an army of his own from Egypt.280 Although the force was small, it constituted a 
threat to his brother’s position. Thus, Nuri’s measures coupled with the better military 
knowledge of Ottomans as well as the flow of Ottoman officers to Libya in increasing 
numbers during 1915, paved the ground for Seyyid’s further dependency on the 
Ottomans.281  
Upon the constant insistence of Nuri, Seyyid Ahmed brought forward some 
conditions for the Ottomans as well.282 That was expected by the Ottoman side because 
“he was active on Wadai front and had been fighting the Italians all along the coast of 
North Africa from Sellum to the Tunisian border. He could not be expected to place his 
army and supplies at risk before he was certain of the amount of assistance the Ottoman 
government was prepared to give him…”283 Nuri informed him that there was no way 
both to get the great amount of cannons and to make the Italians retreat by the 
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intermediation of the Ottomans. However, Nuri guaranteed to supply cannons, 
ammunition, and provision once enough combatants were provided: 
“Başkumandanlık Vekalet-i Celilesi’ne 
  
20 Mayıs? 331 
Bizzat açılacaktır. 
 
Seyyid Hazretleriyle müteaddid defalar görüştüm. İngilizlere karşı hareket 
için İtalyanların taarruz itmemesi ve mümkün ise Bingazi’den çıkmalarının 
tavassut edilmesini ve bundan maada top, tüfenk, cephane ve erzağın temin 
edilmesini taleb ediyor. İtalyanların Bingazi’den çıkmalarının tavassut ile 
mümkün olmayacağını ve top meselesinin kabil olmadığını söyledim. 
Hükümet ancak erzak ve tüfenk ve cephane meselesini temin eder 
dedim...Bendeniz ve sair zabıtan Sellum’de Seyyid hazretlerinin nezdinde 
bulunuyorum. Emrinize göre hareket edileceği arz olunur. 
 
Nuri”284 
  
Senusi’s demand of financial and military assistance had to immediately be 
relayed to Enver Pasha partly because some of the Tripolitanian officers like Dr. Abdul 
Salam were about to hand over Turkish officers to the British and partly this aid was 
needed by the Teşkilat offıcers in order to arrange the military structure of the Senusi 
army which was based on tribal lines.285 No appropriate person however could be found 
for this perilous mission and finally Cafer Askeri volunteered for it.286 
 
E. Cafer el-Askeri’s Mission to Get Military Equipment and Money  
 
Actually such a mission was undertaken by Gazzeli Cemal Efendi during early March. 
To get the necessary equipments for the campaign against the western frontier of Egypt, 
Cemal Efendi was sent to Anatolia by Nuri Pasha and Seyyid Ahmed. Having landed at 
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Fethiye on 9 March 1915, he settled down to work for gathering ammunitions to be 
transported to Libya in ten days. This is understood from the letter by Menteşe 
Mutasarrıfı, Müştak?, sent to the Supreme Command: 
“Dün akşam Şeyh Senusi hazretleri nezdinden Gazzeli Cemal Bey bir 
yelkenli ile Fethiye’ye gelmiş, Mısır Ordusu Kumandanı Cemal Paşa’ya 
söylemek üzere, kaymakamın şifresiyle atideki ifadatı vermiştir. Muma 
ileyhin Muğla’ya, buradan da İstanbul’a geleceği ve binaenaleyh paraya 
ihtiyacı olduğunu kaymakam yazıyor. Cevaben, Fethiye’den buraya 
müreffehen gönderilmesini, buradan da İstanbul’a kadar mesarıf-ı 
lazımenin temin ve ihzar olunacağını bildiririm: 
Bugün Senusi hazretleri canibinden tekrar avdet etdim...Garp 
cihetinden hareket için verilen emr-i devletlerine gelince, cephanenin 
müthiş bir derecede fikdanı hasebiyle bendelerini bir yelkenli kayığıyla 
mahalle-i Osmaniye’ye gönderdiler. Fethiye’ye çıktım. Harbiye nezareti 
vasıtasıyla bi’l muhabere mümkün olduğu kadar cephane kaçıracağım. 
Memurlarınızdan bitait? görmezsem, on güne kadar mühimmatı irsal 
edeceğim. Taarruz için oraca lazımgelen herşey ihzar edilmiştir. İngilizler 
Senusi hazretlerinden fevkalade korkmaktadırlar. Geçen gün Arap 
askerlerinin de Mısır ve İngiliz askerlerini harp ve tahkir etmeleri üzerine 
İngiliz ordu kumandanı... müracaat etmiş ve bazı taarruz hazırlıkları 
müşahade etdiğini söylemiştir. Senusi hazretleri ‘benim efendim vardır, 
ondan emir aldıktan sonra ben size hücumda tereddüd etmem’ cevabını 
vermiştir. Burada ‘efendim’ tabirinin Hükümet-i Osmaniye’ye olduğunu 
İngilizler idrak etmişdir. Katiyyen bir sebep ihdas etmemek için bütün 
kuvvetlerini sarf etmekte olduklarını, fakat, meselenin cephaneye muallak 
bulunduğunu arz eylerim... 
 
Gazzeli Cemal287  
 
In the meantime, however, he was ordered to travel to the headquarters of Supreme 
Command in Istanbul via Muğla288 for an unspecified reason289 and the expected 
equipments were not sent to Libya.  
Having provided a document certifying that he was one of the Senusi Brethren in 
Kufrah going to pilgrimage with two other Senusis, namely Seyyid Muhammad and 
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Seyyid Mustafa al-Madani, Cafer el-Askeri made his way to the headquarters of Cemal 
Pasha, the commander of the 4th Army.290 They were received in İskenderiye by one of 
the Senusi agents, Seyyid Muhammad al-Hani and stayed there for ten days. Having 
reached Yafa by an Italian steamer, they arrived at Jerusalem where Cafer al-Askeri left 
his companions and set out to meet with Cemal Pasha in Syria.291 Cemal Pasha, though 
highly busy suppressing Arab nationalists in Syria and did not have means and time to 
invade Egypt, promised to meet some of the needs and provide a sailing ship for their 
return.292 He also sent Cafer’s detailed report about the Senusis and their demands after 
which Enver Pasha mentioned in a telegram that the supplies would begin to be sent by 
submarines and by all other means from time to time.293 He then went to Halep to meet 
the governor, Celal Bey, who was ordered by Cemal Pasha to give all logistical support 
Cafer demanded. There he also managed to obtain a certain amount of money order from 
Ali Efendi, a tradesman, to be withdrawn on his associates in İskenderiye, namely 
Ebubekir Trablusi and Semakiyezade Abdurrahman Efendi: 
“Başkumandanlık Vekalet-i Celilesine 
 
23 Mayıs 331 
 
Cemal Paşa Hazretleri bir mikdar erzak ve cephane verecekdir. Bendeniz 
Yafa veyahud Hayfa civarından müşarun ileyh vasıtasıyla tedarik edilecek 
bir yelkenli veyahud küçük bir vapur ile tekrar avdet edeceğim. Nuri Bey’e 
arz buyurulan iki bin kadar muaddel martin tüfengin verilmesini istirham 
ediyorum. Erzak için İskenderiye’de Ebubekir Trablusi ile görüşdüm. 
Haleb’de bulunan şeriki Semakıyezade Abdurrahman ve Ali Efendilere 
verilecek para mukabilinde Nuri Bey’in isteyeceği erzak ve parayı 
verecekdir... 
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Cafer”294  
 
Following this, he met Bekir Sami Bey, the governor of Beyrut, where he 
obtained material support and was helped by Ali Saib Bey295 with the official 
formalities.296 There he purchased a sailing ship through Ahmad Pasha Sharqawi and 
Khalil Pasha Abdul Aal and loaded it with armaments and munitions as well as the dry 
foodstuffs that were sent from Şam. Then Cafer, along with his friends Prince Adil 
Arslan and Naji Bey al-Asil set sail to Alanya from where they reached the Port-
Süleyman of North African coast in a week.297  
Cafer, however, had been through much trouble in providing the needed 
materials. For instance, he once asked the Chief of Staff about the situation of the 
transportation vessel on which he expected to bring 600 riffles and 500 boxes of 
ammunition.298 He found out however that the ship which departed from Piraeus, laden 
with armaments and ammunition met a British vessel on its way and had to unload its 
burdens into the sea.299 Furthermore, his correspondence with Istanbul300 generally 
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turned out to be useless. For instance, he mentioned in a telegram addressed to the Chief 
of Staff, dated 12 June 1915 that the supplies he received were not what he demanded, 
so he wanted at least half of the supplies he ordered to be sent within the shortest 
possible time.301   
  
F. Organization of the Forces in Libya  
 
Nuri Pasha received an order from the Supreme Command on 9 August 1915, upon 
which the Teşkilat established a military and political intelligence bureau in Sellum. Its 
duty was to reconnoiter, incite the populace on the eve of the invasion attempt, to make 
Egyptian soldiers to change sides, and presumably to get intelligence on the Egyptian 
Nationalist Party, Hizb al- Vatani, though not specified in that order. The bureau would 
be run, similar to the merkez-i umumi in Yafa, by three people, namely Captain Hasan 
Fehmi302, first Lieutenant Mısırlı Ahmed ebu Ali303, and first Lieutenant Mısırlı Lütfi 
Efendi304; they would also be promoted in rank. Lieutenant Muhammed Zeki Şükrü 
Efendi and Lieutenant Doctor Desuki (?) were also employed later in the bureau: 
“…Enver Paşa’ya yazılan 27 Temmuz 331 tarihli tahriratın müsveddesi 
suretidir. 
 
Sellum’de riyaset-i aliyeniz tahtında bir istihbarat-ı askeriye ve siyasiyye 
şubesi vücuda getirilip, ana göre istidlaata tevessül edilmek ve Mısır 
dahilinde lazım gelen tedabiri istihsal ile Ordu-yı Hümayun [4. Ordu] 
hareket etdiği vakit hizmet ve muavenet için Mısır’da şimdiden bir kuvvet 
temini teşebbüsatında bulunmak üzere bu yolda şimdiden icab eden tedabir 
ve tertibatın icrası lazımeden bulunduğundan bu maksad için maiyyet-i 
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seniyye bölüğünde yüzbaşı Mısırlı Muhammed Hasan Fehmi ve baş 
kumandanlık karagahında müstahdem olan 1. alayın müretteb 1. taburu iaşe 
zabiti mülazım-ı evvel Mısırlı Ahmed Ebu Ali ve Maltepe? Endaht 
mektebinde 4. bölükte ihtiyat zabit namzedi Mısırlı Lütfi Efendiler orada 
bulundukları müddetçe birer derece...rütbe mahsusatı verilmek ve 
Muhammed Zeki Şükrü ve ed-doktor Desuki? Efendiler itibari olarak 
mülazım-ı sani mahsusatıyla istihdam olunmak üzere oraya 
gönderilmişlerdir. Mumaileyhümadan Muhammed Hasan ve Lütfi 
Efendilerin mahsusat-ı ilm ü haberleri yerlerine tevdi edilmiş ve Ahmet 
Efendi’nin ilm ü haberi ise orada ihraz edeceği rütbesinin mahsusatı buraca 
ailesine tesviye olunmak üzere talebi vechile burada alıkonulmuştur. Diğer 
üç zatın yedlerinde ilm ü haber olmayıp tahsisatları vusüllerinden itibaren 
oraca tesviye olunacaktır. Maksada göre icraat-ı fiiliye etmeniz 
menutdur?.”305  
 
Also, a battalion called nümune was formed under the command of Captain Emir 
with the armaments and equipments Cafer Bey brought.306 In the meantime, an infantry 
battalion (3 infantry companies, 123 soldiers each; a heavy machine gun unit; an 
engineering unit) was formed under the command of the Teşkilat in İstanbul and arrived 
at Bodrum via Milas and Göcek on 16 October 1915. From there, they travelled to Libya 
by two sailing ships accompanied by a German submarine (U-35). In a couple of days, 
they went ashore on the west of Sellum and joined the Senusi headquarters at Bir-i 
Vaar.307 According to the information of Hüsameddin Bey, one of the Teşkilat agents, 
the organization of this regular battalion was as follows: 
1. “Senior Captain İsmail Hakkı Efendi, the commander of the battalion 
2. Captain Cafer Ulvi, the commander of the 1st company; Captain Nail Efendi, 
the medical officer; Captain Veli Efendi, aide-de-camp; Mehmed Nuri 
Efendi, paymaster and clerk assistant; lieutenant Salih Zeki, documentalist; 
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lieutenant Nazif Efendi, supply and procurement officer; assignee officer 
Ahmet Hulusi, quartermaster. 
3. Captain Ömer Fevzi, the commander of the 1st company; assignee officers 
Hüsnü Efendi and Emre Efendi, assignees of the 1st unit of the 1st company. 
4. Lieutenant Rüştü Efendi, officer of the 1st unit of the 2nd company; Mehmet 
Nuri and Muharrem Efendi, assignees. 
5. Assignee officer Hüseyin Hüsnü, officer of the 1st unit of the 3rd company; 
assignee Hulusi Efendi. 
6. Assignee officer Hasan Efendi, officer of the 1st unit of 4th company; 
assignee officers Mehmet Ali and Talat Efendi. 
7. First lieutenant Cafer Efendi, engineer commander; assignee officer Mehmet 
Fahri Efendi, the commander of the 1st unit of machine gun; lieutenant 
Mevlüd Efendi, the commander of the 3rd unit.”308      
This Teşkilat battalion sent to North Africa however had to contend with its 
existing cadre and could not reinforce its losses during the time they spent in Libya.309 
The military forces in Libya were not properly organized until the Ottoman-Senusi 
invasion of Egypt that began in late November. Even though the tribes were encamped 
and trained separately under the command of a local officer, there was no supreme 
command to enhance the inter-unit coordination. From that date on, however, Senusi and 
the Teşkilat units and officers began to be organized under a general command.  As a 
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result, Afrika Grupları Komutanlığı (Command of Africa Groups) came into existence, 
an establishment composed of 9 infantry battalions and a quarter’s commandership: 
• “Full General: Fahri Ferik Nuri (Kıllıgil) Pasha 
• Second in command: Cafer el-Askeri Pasha (Bağdatlı)  
• The commander of the hassa battalion: Defdefi (Senusi) 
• The commander of the numune battalion: Captain Emin  
• The commander of the 2nd nümune battalion: lieutenant Teğmen Muhtar 
(Trablusgarplı) 
• The commander of the Bir-i Vaar battalion: Giritli Nedim 
• The commander of the 1st battalion: Abdullah Timsik  
• The commander of the 2nd battalion: Captain Galip  
• The commander of the 3rd battalion: unspecified 
• The commander of the münif battalion: unspecified 
• The commander of the artillery battalion: Captain Ziya  
• The commander of the quarters formation: staff captain Tarık”310  
This commandership with the exception of a few Turkish men was almost 
entirely made up of local Senusi forces. Their training was conducted in accordance with 
the Ottoman army traditions and the orders were given in Turkish. Seyyid Ahmed was 
theoretically the supreme commander in accordance with the orders of the Sultan who 
granted him the supreme political, military, and administrative authority in the region. 
Nevertheless, Nuri Pasha in fact served as the supreme commander, with Cafer as his 
deputy. By the approval of Seyyid Ahmed, Nuri Pasha appointed Cafer el-Askeri as the 
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commander of the regular forces and the tribes with the exception of the battalion called 
Muhafiziyyah311 and another battalion composed of 1,000 men at Bir-i Vaar under the 
command of Turkish officers.312 According to Cafer el-Askeri, the Senusi forces were 
composed of a regular battalion and battalions named after the tribes. Some of them 
were under the direct command of Turkish officers while some others were commanded 
by Seyyid. It was organized as follows:313 
Headquarters 
The Regular battalion 
The Bara’isa Battalion 
The Manfah Battalion 
The ‘Awaqir Battalion 
The Guards and School Battalions 
The Tuareg (Tawariq) and Tabu Battalion 
Machine Gun Unit 
Artillery Unit 
Cavalry Unit 
Transport  
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G. Searching for a Fait Accompli  
 
Nuri Pasha’s preference was to move against Egypt as soon as possible, an idea which 
Seyyid Ahmed and his cousin Muhammed Idris did not share.314 This point was made 
clear by Ahmed Cemal Pasha, in his telegram addressed to Enver Pasha, where he 
alludes that Seyyid Ahmed would not attack Egypt from the western frontier: 
“…Abdüsselam Efendi ile beraber gelen iki Senusi şeyhi zat-ı devletlerine 
ve zat-ı hazret-i padişahiye hitaben Ahmed eş-Şerif’in bir arizasını da hamil 
etmişler. Senusi hazretleri bazı arabanıyla beraber el-yevm Sellum’de 
bulunurlarmış. Şimdiye kadar İngilizler aleyhine hiç bir hareket-i 
tecavüziyede bulunmamış. Şimdi müşarunileyh bizden para istiyormuş. Bir 
buçuk ay evvel biraderiniz Nuri Bey 6000 lirayı hamilen buradan bir 
kaçakçı vasıtasıyla...hareket etmişdi. Henüz vasıl olub olmadığını 
bilmiyorum. Bu defa işbu Abdüsselam Efeniyle beraber para göndermek 
münasib olup olmayacağını kestiremiyorum. Şayet bunlara para verip 
göndermek münasip ise Beyrut Osmanlı bankası vasıtasıyla kendilerine 
nisbet edeceğiniz mikdarda para gönderiniz. Ben buradan bunları Beyrut’a 
izam ederim. Oradan dahi bir münasip vapurla Sellum’e giderler veyahud 
size ve zat-ı padişahiye ait mektupları hamilen İstanbul’a götürdeyim. 
Oraca meseleyi güzelce tetkik ettikten sonra icabını ifa buyurunuz. 
Herhalde Şeyh Senusi’nin 6 aydan beri hiç bir hareketde bulunmamış 
olmasını calib-i nazar-ı dikkat görüyorum. Bu adamların ahval-i 
umumiyesini bilmediğimden keyfiyeti takdir-i samilerine tevdi ederim. 
 
4. Ordu Kumandanı 
Cemal” 
   
The British increased their contact with the Senusi from the time when Nuri 
came to the region315; they were insomuch tolerance as that they did not do anything 
when a British submarine and a boat were fired and a soldier was killed. Neither did the 
British act against Seyyid Ahmed when they found out about the jihad declarations sent 
to the Muslim-Arabs and Indians. Since, the British did not want to antagonize the Arabs 
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while they were negotiating with the Sherif of Mekke to begin what became the Arab 
Revolt starting in the spring of 1916.  
“Then there came accidentally into General Maxwell’s hands a packet of 
letters addressed by the Senussi to Moslem potentates and journalists all 
over Arabia and India, inciting them to a Jihad and informing them that he 
was the representative of the Khalif in Northern Africa. Despite all this, the 
High Commissioner and Sir J. Maxwell were directed to persevere in a 
friendly policy. Britain had no desire, especially at a moment when she was 
engaged in the negotiations with the Sherif of Mecca, …to earn the enmity 
of any section of the Arab world. Moreover, Colonel Snow was still 
convinced that the Senussi himself was not really hostile.”316 
   
On the other hand, the only aim of the Teşkilat in the region was to make Seyyid 
Ahmed to attack Egypt either by persuading or compelling him. For this purpose, Nuri 
Pasha contemplated the formation of small guerilla units; composed of 15 to 20 local 
soldiers, led by Teşkilat agents to attack Egyptian posts. These units were constantly 
cutting British wire communications in Sellum with the east.317  
The idea behind this was simple: to incite the Senusis and other tribes to attack 
Egypt’s western frontier so that the British had to sustain a considerable number of 
troops along the front which extended from the Mediterranean to the south of Darfur. To 
this end, Germans were used in operations as well. On 4 November 1915, a German 
submarine (U-35) accompanied by Jamal al-Ghazzi that brought 10 officers, money, and 
250 boxes of ammunition to Bardiya, sank a British armed steamer, named Tara, near 
Sellum and the ship’s crew were taken to Biri’l Hekim as prisoners of war.318 The same 
day also witnessed the torpedoing of the British transport Moorina.319 On 6 November, 
another German submarine bombarded Sellum and sank a British gunboat named Abbas, 
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which belonged to the fleet of Egypt’s coastal defense. This was followed next day by 
sinking of a British transportation vessel.320  
As the preparations for the war were afoot, Teşkilat agents began to recruit men 
from the south and west. Especially contacts with the Awlad Ali tribes which spread 
along the coastline between İskenderiye and Sellum was fruitful321 and they were 
effectively used in bringing the tribes inside the Egyptian territory during the invasion 
process thanks to the efforts of Seyyid Harun, a prominent Senusi who lived among the 
Awlad Ali tribes, and Muhammed Bey Jibril.322  However, as both sides were taking 
measures and getting prepared for a possible clash, more important events took place. 
Actually, Nuri Pasha had planned to attack Fort Sellum in June 1915 in order to 
cause hostility between the British and Senusis by a fait accompli. However, due to the 
proximity of Seyyid to the region, the attack was not carried out.323 This incident is 
verified by the British sources as well: “For example, a raid on Sollum was secretly 
planned for the night of the 15th June. Fortunately the Senussi heard a bugle-call and 
demanded its meaning. Finding out what was afoot, he sent the men back to their 
quarters and had the leaders flogged the next day. Nuri himself denied complicity in this 
affair.”324 
A similar plan was made during November and a detachment of 50 volunteers 
was charged by Cafer el-Askeri with scouring Sidi Barani, lying 77 km. east to Sellum. 
“The Tripolitanian officer liuetenant Ahmad Mukhtar and Sayyid Abu al-Qasim – son of 
Sayyid ‘Isayi, who was the head of the Senusi zawiyah in Bingazi and one of the 
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Senusi’s closest advisers and most influential ministers”325 were the ones ordered to 
undertake the mission.  
The order was given on 22 November, and a successful raid was made, resulting 
in the British withdrawal of their forces and the Egyptian Coastguard on the western 
border of Egypt to a point which was closer to İskenderiye, Mersa Matruh. Upon this, 
Major Royle was sent to Seyyid Ahmed and asked the reason for such a raid. Ahmed got 
so angry with this raid launched that was beyond his cognizance that he scolded Nuri 
and Cafer. Following this, Seyyid Ahmed alarmed the quarters by trumpets in order to 
gather all of them and give an end to such incidents. The British agents supposing that it 
was a gathering for a general march against Sellum immediately turned to Sellum to 
inform their commanders. Having already suspected such an attack, the British began to 
evacuate Sellum, which they had fortified during the first half of November for a 
possible clash.326 Seyyid however sent men to the British commanders to explain. 
Meanwhile, Arabs hearing about the evacuation plundered Sellum during the time 
elapsed. After that, Seyyid charged a detachment under the command of Cafer el-Askeri 
so as to stop the raid of Sidi Barani at the end of which lieutenant Ahmed Muhtar was 
killed.327 However, this was of no use for Seyyid and the flow of events compelled him 
to oppose the British. 
“Maruz-ı bendeleridir 
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...Seyyid Hilal Paşa hazretlerinin...hidemat-ı vatanperveranesiyle din 
düşmanımız olan İngiltere devlet-i aduvanesiyle hesabı görmek üzere 
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Mısır’a taarruza istirdad olunmuştur. Bugün Nuri Paşa Matruh 
havalisindedir. Bilahare Seyyid Ahmed eş-Şerif bu harekat-ı taarruziyeye... 
iştiraka mecbur olmuştur. Bu harekatın pişdarı olan kahraman 
zabitanımızdan mülazım Muhtar Efendi idam etdirilmiştir... 
 
Seyyid Hilal Paşa”328 
 
H. Invasion of Egypt and British Counter-attack  
 
Finally, as a result of Nuri Bey’s fait accompli, the attack on the western desert started at 
the end of November.329  The timing of the invasion was largely determined by the 
beginning of the German submarine service to Libya which to a great extent increased 
the inflow of supplies.330 Rachel Simon, on the basis of the British intelligence and other 
military reports, states that:  
“the invasion took place along two main axes which were divided into four 
sub-axes: the northern axis took in the coastal sub-axis from Solum 
[Sellum] to Matruh which was under the command of Nuri, and included a 
German chief-to-staff and Sidi Rida’ al-Senusi. The second northern axis 
passed south of Suwani towards Daba’ and Buhayrah and was commanded 
by Ja’far and his deputy Sidi Hilal. The southern axes included one that 
advanced towards Wadi Harun and another that advanced towards Siwa 
and Fayum, both under the command of Musa Bey. Ahmad al-Sharif was at 
first with the northern forces of Nuri and Ja’far and afterwards moved to 
the southern route.”331  
 
The Teşkilat-Senusi units were successful at the beginning and took hold of 
Sellum in November. Following this, Nuri Bey advanced to further east, to Sidi Barani, 
and then to Mersa Matruh and captured it. The oasis of Siwa was also taken in mid-
                                                 
328
 Libya Harekatı, 646-648. 
329
 ATASE Archive: f: 1863, d: 153, I: 30; Cela Tevfik Karasapan, Libya: Trablusgarp, Bingazı ve Fizan, 
(Ankara: Resimli Posta Matbaası, 1960), 223-224. 
330
 Simon, 163. 
331
 Ibid., 163-164. 
 110 
December.332 In the meanwhile, the Command of Africa Groups was reinforced by a 
significant number of deserters from the Egyptian Coast guard as well as local 
population.333 Having seen both that such military support, combined with the growing 
Egyptian nationalism against the British invaders could end up with a large-scale 
religious rebellion in Egypt that might spread to other regions like Sudan and that they 
were threatened both from behind (Darfur) and flanks, the British under the command of 
General Payton began to attach serious forces to the western desert. During January 
1916 the British launched their counter-attack and after a number of clashes, the Teşkilat 
and Senusi forces were defeated in February at Elakakir, lying west of Matruh. Nuri Bey 
managed to withdraw but Cafer Askeri and his men were taken prisoner. On 24 March, 
the British took back the control of Sellum, forcing Seyyid Ahmed to retreat to the 
south, to the oasis of Farfara where loyal Senusi tribes lived.334 With the loss of Sellum, 
there was no hope for the Ottomans and Germans to threaten Egypt from its western 
borders. Nevertheless, the British invaders had to concentrate troops of 40.000 soldiers 
in the western desert towards the end of the war,335 whose absence was largely felt on 
the European fronts. 
 
I. Cooperation with the Sultanate of Darfur in Sudan  
 
The final operational base of the Teşkilat, though very limited, in conjunction with the 
attacks against Egypt was the Sultanate of Darfur that laid to the west of the Kordofan 
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Province of the Sudan. Annexed to Egyptian Sudan in 1874, the autonomous Sultanate 
of Darfur was established following the Mahdi Rebellion (1881) by Ali Dinar. Having 
deserted the Dervish Army, the army of Mahdi (1881-1898), with his followers before 
the battle of Omdurman (1898), Ali Dinar fled to Darfur where he established his 
authority in the capital, El Fasher. From then, he paid to the Sudanese Government a 
nominal tribute, which he refused to continue after the outbreak of World War I.  
This change in Ali Dinar’s attitude against the British is comprehensible. First of 
all, he increasingly felt the French pressure of expansion to the West, upon which he 
expected the assistance from the Sudanese Government. Nevertheless, he would never 
be provided with the help he anticipated. The British turned a deaf ear to Darfur upon 
the occupation of the Sultanate of Wadai in 1909 and a part of Dar Masalit in 1911 by 
French forces.336 “These annexations worried Khartoum [the capital of Anglo-Egyptian 
Sudan] because no delimitation of borders between French and British controlled 
territories had been agreed, nor was any possible so long as Ali Dinar maintained his 
independence.”337 The Anglo-French alliance in World War I, on the other hand, paved 
the way for Ali Dinar to be more explicit in his attitudes and the Ottoman entry into the 
war, combined with the subsequent deposition of the Egyptian Khedive stiffened his 
belligerent stand against British rule. Having already been ill-disposed towards British 
rule, Ali Dinar was further instigated through the propaganda of the Teşkilat mission to 
both the Senusis and himself personally. Thus, the origins of Ali Dinar’s claim of Jihad 
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against the British Government should be sought not only in the deteriorating relations 
between the Darfur and Sudan Government, to a great extent, due to the Anglo-French 
rivalry in the region, but also in the capacity of the Teşkilat, being aware of the reasons 
grounded the aggressive posture of Ali Dinar towards the British, in taking the 
advantage of the circumstances.   
In fact, Senusi influence extended through the desert down into Darfur and the 
documentary evidence proves that there was co-operation in their actions. This strategic 
co-operation, more explicitly, the struggle for the coincidence of the attack of Senusi 
against Egypt along the coast and from Siwa through the oases with an attack by the 
Sultan of Darfur was nevertheless not the work of Seyyid Ahmed or Ali Dinar, but of the 
Teşkilat. Although Seyyid Ahmed might have desired the creation of a Libyan state by 
being troublesome on the Western front with Ali Darfur, it is an undeniable fact that this 
was merely a part of the Ottoman-German plan to secure the retention of as much British 
troops as possible in Egypt. It is also true that the co-operated invasion of Egypt by 
Senusis from the West and Darfur from the South was originally planned to synchronize 
with an attack from the east, Sinai. Nonetheless, this plan could not be executed due to 
the campaign in Gallipoli (1915-1916), which brought further military and 
organizational difficulties for the Ottomans. As a result, the Ottomans had to decide on a 
much limited plan and the forces in Sinai would carry on threatening the Canal by 
guerilla attacks to give the British the impression that a large-scale attack was on the 
way.  
 “It is often said by writers, and the view seems to have been held by British 
intelligence, though I do not know on what evidence, that he [Seyyid Ahmed] intended 
to link up a revolt (November 1915) of Ali Dinar, the Sultan of Darfur in the Egyptian 
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Sudan, though the Sultan had never been friendly towards the Senusiya. It is quite 
possible that the Turks or the Sayyid, or both, had some such crazy plan.”338 says Evans-
Pritchard. One should free himself/herself from this dominant viewpoint of 
historiography which holds that the cooperation between Ali Darfur and the Senusis was 
just a short-lived dream of 1915-1916 since 30 correspondences exchanged between 
them, spanning a time interval of 16 years (1900-1916), published by Jay Spaulding and 
Lidwien Kapteijns indicate that “there existed a real, passionately felt alliance, balanced 
in reciprocity according to changing historical vicissitudes.”339   
 As the war clouds drew on, Ali Dinar was concerned with the fate of the arms 
and ammunition he purchased from Kufra, which were never been delivered to 
Darfur.340 Most of the documents embracing 1914-1915 focus upon the collection of this 
debt and Muhammed Abid was held responsible for the protracted delay in this delivery. 
Ali Dinar was in great need of arms due to deteriorating relations with Anglo-Egyptian 
authorities in Khartoum. In order to establish contact with the Senusis and to collect the 
10000 rounds of ammunition Muhammed Abid owed for the last three years, Ali Dinar 
sent Ghayt Abu Karim, a Senusi trader, to Kufra in November 1914. Nevertheless, Abu 
Karim was put off with excuses and Ali Dinar sent another caravan headed by Wadaian 
nobleman Ahmad to Kufra in July 1915. This royal committee made some purchases of 
ammunition and turned back to al-Fashir on 24 December. According to Ali Dinar 2500 
Mauser rifles and 400 boxes of ammunition were delivered while the British spies 
predicted that it was just around 400 weapons.  
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 The permanence of this cooperation between Ali Dinar and Seyyid Ahmed might 
have been supported and consolidated by the efforts of the Teşkilat forces. Otherwise, 
merely the anticipated support of the Senusis against the British in a possible war and 
the expectation of the collection of arms purchased from Kufra would not possibly urge 
Ali Dinar to revolt against the British authorities and renounce his tributary relationship 
to Khartoum. It is clear that the Teşkilat had plans as early as September 1914 to 
provoke the masses in Sudan. Agent Davud Bin Mahmud, for instance, informed the 
Supreme Command that the situation in Sudan was convenient for the provocations.341 It 
must have been such intelligence reports which led Süleyman Askeri to take action 
towards Sudan. On 16 October 1914, he ordered Captain Almas to go under the 
command of Hasan Efendi (the commander of the Teşkilat forces in Yafa) who was 
ordered to send him alongside with a band into Egypt or Sudan to incite tumult: 
“Yafa Jandarma Kumandanı Binbaşı Hasan Efendi’ye şifre 
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Yüzbaşı Almas efendinin Yafa’ya hareketle sizi görmesi luzum yazıldı. 
Hin-i müracatında münasib vazifede istihdamı tavsiye olunur. Bir çete ile 
Mısır’a izamı veya orada ihtilal ika’ etmek üzere Sudan’a gönderilmesi 
suretlerinden hangisi faideli ve mumaileyh hangisine daha ziyade elverişli 
ise oralarda istihdam ediniz. 
 
Süleyman Askeri342  
 
Although it does not seem possible to learn about the fate of Captain Almas in the light 
of the extant documentary evidence, one might argue that the Ottomans at least planned 
to secure the retention of British troops in the south of Egypt by provoking the Sudanese 
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masses. Other official documents seem to be satisfactory enough to authenticate the 
existence of such a plan.  
 For example, Nuri Pasha dispatched a special committee during January 1915 to 
Darfur so as to establish contact with al-Fashir and to provide Ali Dinar’s support for the 
campaign against Egypt. This committee consisted of three people, namely Major Tarık, 
Captain Ebu Şari (?), and Beşir Fuad Bey, along with 20 regular soldiers.343 They were 
to present gifts to Ali Dinar and during their residence there, they were to receive the 
arms and ammunitions Nuri Pasha would dispatch.344 That the ammunitions however 
were not sent could be understood from Nuri Pasha’s reply to the decree of the Supreme 
Command on the attack against Egypt. In his telegraph, Nuri Pasha reported that he was 
still trying to dispatch the aforementioned ammunitions due to the perilous way to 
Darfur, which was 60 days away from Cidabiye.345 Up to the eve of the operation, the 
vital importance of Sudan against the British was apparently specified in a telegraph sent 
from the Supreme Command to Nuri Pasha on 1 July 1915. Therefore, Nuri Pasha was 
recommended to cooperate with Ali Dinar during the attack against Egypt: “...Bu 
fırsattan istifade Sudan’ın zaptı pek olaydır. Seyyid hazretlerinin tensibiyle es-Seyyid 
İdris veyahud diğer sadatının birden bir kaç zabit ve bir mikdar mücahidin-i sultan-ı 
Dinar ile müştereken hareket edilirse o havalinin yed-i küffardan zabt ve tahlisi pek 
kolaydır.” The appendix of the same telegraph further indicates that Seyyid Ahmed had 
already begun to dispose troops for the east of Sudan but needed artillery for its western 
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part: “Sudan şarkı için tertibat-ı lazime yaptık. Şeyh Muhammed eş-Şerif bu hususda 
bize müsade edecektir. Sudan garbi [için] ise bize esliha lazımdır...”346 
Even if the elucidative capacity of the official documents are disregarded, it is 
obvious that there was “evidence of co-ordination in the German and Turkish plans to 
detain British troops in Egypt [that] appeared when the same week in February which 
saw the advance of the Senussi from Siwa saw also the concentration on the Sudan 
frontier of the forces of Ali Dinar, Sultan of Darfur.”347 The intention of Ali Dinar to 
invade Sudan in conjunction with the attacks of Senusis seems to have legitimized the 
counter attack of the British authorities who indeed decided to occupy Darfur in July 
1915. Sir Reginald Wingate, the Governor-General conducted military operations during 
this period with Sudanese troops. The British operation launched towards the end of 
1916 resulted in the entrance of Condominium troops to al-Fashir on 23 May. 
Afterwards, Ali Dinar fled to Marra Mountains, carrying out fighting.348 Finally, he was 
killed on 6 November 1916 in the affair of Jebel Juba, and the civil war in Sudan 
disappeared.349 After that date on, the Ottomans began to retreat in the Sinai-Palestine 
front, meeting the British counter attack under the command of Sir A. Murray and it 
seems not possible to find any trace of Teşkilat concentration in Sinai. Besides, the 
Senusis had already taken the course of Trablusgarp and this period witnessed Seyyid 
İdris’ take-over of the Senusi leadership. Although, the resistance movement in Libya 
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lost power under the command of Seyyid İdris who negotiated with the Italians and 
British, the Teşkilat carried on to organize resistance in Libya, this time against only the 
Italians, until the end of the war. All these, in turn, marked that the Ottoman project of 
rollbacking the British army of Egypt has come to an end and Libya remained as a mere 
operational base of the Teşkilat in entire North Africa.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 ADMINISTRATIVE AND OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF 
THE TEŞKİLAT-I MAHSUSA: AN ASSESSMENT 
 
Were the Teşkilat activities in Syria and North Africa, various aspects of which have 
been examined and highlighted in the previous chapters, merely the outcome of the 
attempts of a bunch of adventurers? Or, was there a conscious and rational power behind 
the scenes that organized and authorized the Teşkilat to set up its units over a great part 
of the aforementioned regions and prevailed there with short interruptions between 1914 
and 1916? If so, when was this organization founded and who ran it? What were its 
institutional and operational characteristics? What were its tasks and to whom was it 
responsible? What was the relationship between the central organization of the Teşkilat 
and its extensions’ concentration in the distant territories of the Empire? What was the 
position of Eşref Kuşçubaşı whose role on and within the Teşkilat has instantly been 
emphasized? These are the questions that will be attempted to answer in the following 
pages by referring to and evaluating the available documentation on the Teşkilat and 
giving particular emphasis to the historical evidence related to the region concerned.  
It should, however, be noted that such questions have long been subjects of 
discussion among historians and various attempts have been made at identifying the 
nature of the Teşkilat. Most of these attempts were summarized in the first chapter; 
therefore, there is no point in reiterating them here. Instead, an alternative interpretation 
 119 
of the Teşkilat will be offered basically in the light of little-used archival materials a 
portion of which was partly utilized by the authors referred to in the introduction. 
 
A. The chiefs of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa  
 
To begin with, given the present state of research, it seems that the general framework of 
our understanding of the institutional features of the Teşkilat, which have been outlined 
and analysed by historians like Mustafa Balcıoğlu needs serious revision. Archival 
material relating to the operational bases of the Teşkilat, which is used in the present 
study along with the documents which have already been exposed and interpreted might 
contribute to a better understanding of the institutional characteristics of this 
organization and be decisive in elucidating certain points which still remain vague. 
Therefore, a minute examination of the chiefs of the special organization, which has 
long been a controversial issue of the area, might be a good starting point to offer useful 
insights into re-examination of the administrative framework of the Teşkilat while 
enabling historians to reconsider diverse interpretations. Certain answers to such 
questions were offered until the 90s by relying heavily on memoirs. Mustafa Balcıoğlu, 
whose writings pose serious problems deriving basically from a critical and analytical 
approach to the subject of the Teşkilat, provides the following list on the chiefs of the 
Teşkilat: 
 
1- Süleyman Askeri Bey - From the establishment of the office to 14 April 
1915. 
2- Ali Bey Başhampa - 24 May 1915 – 31 October 1918. 
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3- Hüsametin Ertürk - 31 October 1918 – 5 December 1918.350 
 
Balcıoglu, as is the case for nearly all his works, does not usually specify on what 
evidence he came up with this list. It is, however, quite possible that he launched this 
idea by either fraudulently altering some documents or omitting parts of the documents 
he was not able to read.351 This list can be supported by neither the archival evidence nor 
the course of events. Nevertheless, other historians like Atilla Çeliktepe and Hamit 
Pehlivanlı accepted his list without questioning and confirmed that Süleyman Askeri and 
Ali Bey Başhampa presided over the Teşkilat. They even verify that Hüsamettin Ertürk 
was the last chief by relying on his memoir.352 They seem, however, to provide no 
reasonable answer to the following questions: In view of the fact that Süleyman Askeri 
went to Iraq during November 1914, how could he carry on to preside over the Teşkilat 
office in İstanbul until 13 May 1915? How come could CUP expect fruitful results from 
the Teşkilat, which was responsible to operate over a number of bases, while its chief 
was out of İstanbul involving in clashes with the British in Iraq? What happened and in 
what way was the headless Teşkilat managed between 14 April and 24 May? On what 
evidence can the dates of these handovers be authenticated? Is it not possible to make 
allowance for the possibility that Hüsamettin Ertürk overestimated his importance in the 
special organization by indicating himself as the last chief? If claimed that the Umur-i 
Şarkiye office was the continuation of the Teşkilat, then which one of the offices did 
they preside?   
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These are only a few questions Balcıoğlu and his followers could not give a 
sound answer. As is clearly seen, this insight, which has direct effects on the 
administrative features of the Teşkilat, could drag the specialist into an erroneous path 
and accordingly needs revision. At this point, let us have a look at a document, found at 
ATASE, on the chiefs of the special organization that might prove crucial in clarifying 
the problem. According to this document:   
“The foundation of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa office: 17 Teşrin-i Sani 329 (30 
November 1913) 
The departure of Süleyman Askeri Bey to Iraq: Towards the end of Teşrin-i 
Evvel 330 (6-13 November 1914) 
The departure of Halil Bey with the 1st Campaign Force: 6 Kanun-i Evvel 
330 (19 December 1914) 
The departure of Cevad Bey: In May 331 (In May or June of 1915) 
The take over of Ali Bey: In May 331 (In May or June of 1915) 
The illness of Ali Bey: 24 Teşrin-i Evvel 334 (24 October 1918) 
The death of Ali Bey: 31 Teşrin-i Evvel 334 (31 October 1918) 
The appointment of Hüseyin Tosun Bey: 31 Teşrin-i Evvel 334 (31 October 
1918) 
The abolishment of the office: 15 Teşrin-i Sani 334 (15 November 1918) 
The appointment of Hüsamettin Bey, charged with the duty of pursuing the 
formalities”353 
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 122 
 
Examination of this document reveals that the Teşkilat was offically founded on 
30 November 1913 and its chiefs were, in order, Süleyman Askeri Bey, Halil Bey (the 
uncle of Enver Pasha), Cevad Bey (Kızanlıklı), Ali Bey (Başhampa), and Hüseyin Tosun 
Bey. Nevertheless, the reliability of the data contained in this document and to what 
extent it provides the researcher with the real picture of its time should be questioned 
since although the archival materials are relatively more objective than the other sources, 
it might bring together forms of bias and intolerance in considering the role of the 
Teşkilat not to cross-check their authenticity with other sources.  
Pointing to Süleyman Askeri as the first chief of this organization has long been 
an accepted issue among historians, including the ones mentioned above. Nevertheless, 
none of them, except for Keleşyılmaz, could support this argument with evidence; they 
all base their arguments on memoirs and the study by Stoddard, which, again, 
exclusively relied on the memoirs and interviews with a few surviving members of the 
Teşkilat. Similarly, the materials concerning the activities of the Teşkilat in Syria, Egypt, 
and Libya suggest that the first chief was indeed Süleyman Askeri from the foundation 
of the office until the end of October 1914. The last correspondence of the Teşkilat 
                                                                                                                                                
Bey. Even though this insight seems correct, he contradicts himself elsewhere in the article by stating that 
“…Kızanlıklı Cevad Bey, who was interrogated within the context of the trials of the armistice period, 
listed correctly the people that led the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa.” See, Vahdet Keleşyılmaz, “Teşkilat-ı 
Mahsusa’nın Kuruluşu, Başkanları ve Mustafa Kemal” Türkler, vol. 8, 316-320.  The minutes of Cevad 
Bey and the statements of Keleşyılmaz nevertheless contradicts each other in that Cevad Bey listed the 
chiefs as follows in order: Süleyman Askeri, Halil Bey, and himself. He also added that he remained in the 
office as the Central Commander of Dersaadet up to the end of 1918. Thus, Cevad Bey, contrary to what 
Keleşyılmaz suggests, did not count Ali Bey Başhampa and Hüseyin Tosun Bey as the chiefs of the 
organization. See, Kocahanoğlu, 577, 581. Besides, Keleşyılmaz argues that his accuracy on the dates of 
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article by himself; see Vahdet Keleşyılmaz, “Kafkas Harekatının Perde Arkası”, Atatürk Araştırma 
Merkezi Dergisi, no. 47, (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, June 2000), 367-394. In this article, the 
argumentation which is confined into the deepnotes, nonetheless did not provide the researchers with the 
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offıcers with Süleyman Askeri was dated 25 October.354 From this date until his 
departure for Iraq during the first half of November (sometime between 6 and 13 
November) Süleyman Askeri must have been busy with military preparations as the new 
Governor of Basra and Commander of the Basra Division.  
The chairmanship then was taken over by Halil Pasha, the uncle of Enver Pasha 
and the Central Commander of Dersaadet, after Süleyman Askeri had been detached 
from the leadership of the committee which seems to have constituted the nucleus of the 
Teşkilat. This committee formerly consisted of four people: Süleyman Askeri, Atıf Bey 
(Kamçıl), Aziz Bey, and Dr. Nazım Bey. The office, along with its various departments, 
was located in Cağaloğlu (Nur-i Osmaniye), Istanbul. Even though most of the 
correspondences between North Africa and Istanbul bears at the beginning the 
stereotyped phrase “To the directorate of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa” or “To the sublime 
directorate of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa”, this address could still be verified on the basis of 
a number of documents which start with the phrase “To the directorate of the Teşkilat-ı 
Mahsusa in Nur-i Osmaniye, Dersaadet”355 The official and direct contact of the 
Teşkilat with the Ministry of Army was established by its chief. Nevertheless, this duty 
began to be undertaken by the Central Commander in Istanbul after the departure of 
Süleyman Askeri. That is why Halil Bey was mentioned as the second chief in the 
document. It seems however not possible to say that Halil Bey had an effect on the 
committee as much as Süleyman Askeri. Since, the Central Commander had to 
personally get involved in matters of not only the Teşkilat but also the military police, 
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“To the Gendarme Commander Major Hasan Efendi (330 Teşrin-i Evvel 12): Your bands are to engage 
in activity by going in the Sinai Desert...Provided that the British attention is not captured, make sure that 
some of them are dispatched into Egypt urgently. Süleyman Askeri”; ATASE Archive: f: 1836, d: 35, I: 
16.  
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 ATASE Archive: f: 1828, d: 4, I: 1. 
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court martial, fire brigade and so on. Besides, his office was located in the Ministry of 
War. Furthermore, even Halil Bey himself qualifies his duty as one of secondary 
importance.356   
The term of office for Halil Bey was rather short; on 19 December 1914, he 
started off with the 1st campaign force for Dagestan to incite a revolt there and expel the 
Russians from the shores of Caspian sea.357 Then he was replaced by Cevad Bey, the 
new central commander of Dersaadet and of the special organization. That Cevad Bey 
did not have an active duty in the decision-making process of the Teşkilat could be 
understood from the official inquiry of the CUP members in 1919. His mission, similar 
to Halil Bey, was limited to transmittance of orders he received from the Ministry of 
Army, Operation Department, and the Headquarter directly to the Teşkilat office in Nur-
i Osmaniye. He was also to transmit the orders from the Teşkilat to the departments 
concerned.358 If the chief was not Cevad Bey, then the intelligence reports that relate to 
the Teşkilat concentration in North Africa and Syria would not be sent directly to the 
Central Command of Dersaadet. Besides, if the chief resided in Nur-i Osmaniye, then 
those correspondences would not bear at the beginning the phrase “to the Central 
Command of Dersaadet”.359 
The Teşkilat, abolished in May of 1915, was replaced by the Umur-i Şarkiye 
Dairesi which was established as an office the same month within the Ministry of War. 
This replacement could be followed in the correspondences addressed “to the directorate 
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of the Umur-i Şarkiye Office, Ministry of War”.360 The emergence of this office, 
however, did not mark a completely new intelligence system; it was rather the 
improvised continuation of the previous one, the Teşkilat. In this way, the intermediation 
between the office and the Ministry of War came to an end and this change, in turn, 
made the exchange of information system among various military departments more 
effective. At the same time, the possible emergence of a centrifugal force was 
automatically warded off by having the office as a subdivision of the general 
headquarters. The first chief of the Umur-i Şarkiye was Ali Bey (Başhampa) who 
presided over the office from its establishment until 24 October 1918, the date of his 
illness. Indeed, the intelligence reports pertaining to North Africa and Syria between the 
aforementioned dates were signed by “the chief of the Umur-i Şarkiye Office, Ministry 
of War”.361  
The last chief of the organization was Hüseyin Tosun Bey who replaced Ali Bey 
Başhampa officially after his death on 31 October 1918. He must however have stood in 
for Ali Bey Başhampa for a week while he was sick and dying. The term of the office 
for Hüseyin Tosun Bey lasted only fifteen days, until the abolishment of the office on 15 
November 1918. On the other hand, the assertion that the last chief was Hüsamettin 
Ertürk is based on his memoirs, where he overestimated his own role in the office. First 
of all, Hüsamettin Ertürk has contradictory statements relating to the chiefs of the 
organization. According to him, the chiefs were as follows: Süleyman Askeri, Ali Bey 
Başhampa, and himself.362 Nevertheless, elsewhere in the book, he states that he was 
                                                 
360
 ATASE Archive: f: 1839, d: 49, I: 1/338. 
361
 For examples see, ATASE Archive: f: 1839, d: 49, I: 1/338; f: 1842, d: 64, I: 1/12; f: 1858, d: 136, I: 
3/16; f: 1858, d: 136, I: 6/5.   
362
 Ertürk, 4. 
 126 
stand-in for Ali Bey Başhampa and charged with the duty of officially abolishing the 
organization, whose name was to be changed into Umum Alem-i İslam İhtilal 
Teşkilatı.363 Nonetheless, the sources pertaining to the period where Hüsamettin Ertürk 
may have been the chief, roughly between 31 October and 15 November, do not record 
Hüsamettin Ertürk as “the chief of the Umur-i Şarkiye office” but “kaymakam 
Hüsamettin from the Umur-i Şarkiye office”.364 Another interesting point is that the 
reports sent to “kaymakam Hüsamettin” were those concerning only North Africa, not 
other operational bases of the organization. This fact however breaks out to be mind-
bending when it is known that Hüsamettin Ertürk was the director of the North African 
Board, one of the subdivisions of the Umur-i Şarkiye at that time.365 Besides, Tarık Zafer 
Tunaya mentions that Ali Bey Başhampa and Hüseyin Tosun Bey were once the 
directors of the Africa and Trablusgarb Department of the Teşkilat.366 It is therefore not 
difficult to imagine that Hüseyin Tosun Bey must have remained in office as the director 
when Ali Başhampa was appointed as the chief of Umur-i Şarkiye and Hüsamettin 
Ertürk must have been appointed to the directorship of Africa Board when Hüsamettin 
Tosun became the last chief of the Umur-i Şarkiye.367 Finally, after the abolishment of 
the office, Hüsamettin Ertürk must have been charged with the duty of pursuing the 
abrogation process and become the chief of an underground organization which should 
have been the unofficial continuation of the Umur-i Şarkiye.368 
1. Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa Office (30 November 1913) 
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• Süleyman Askeri Bey (30 November 1913 – 2nd week of 
November 1914) 
• Halil Bey ( 2nd week of November 1914 – 19 December 1914) 
• Cevad Bey (19 November 1914 – May or June 1915) 
 
2. Umur-i Şarkiye Office (May or June 1915) 
• Ali Bey Başhampa (May or June 1915 – 31 October 1918) 
• Hüsamettin Tosun Bey (31 October 1918 – 15 November 1918) 
• The Abrogation of the Office (15 November 1918) 
 
B. Central Structure  
 
Coming back to the questions asked at the beginning of the chapter, one should go on 
with the Teşkilat’s central institutional structure, which might prove crucial in 
elucidating certain points. The Teşkilat appears to have been divided into four sections 
and each section was headed by a military officer. All of the sections were subordinate 
to the administrative committee, consisted of five people: 
Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa Office:369 
1. Administrative Committee: 
• Süleyman Askeri Bey, Halil Bey, Cevad Bey (chiefs) 
• Atıf Bey (Kamçılı), deputy manager 
• Aziz Bey, deputy manager of Emniyet-i Umumiye 
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• Dr. Nazım Bey 
• Dr. Bahattin Şakir Bey 
2. Departments:370  
• Rumeli Section, headed by Arif Bey 
• Kafkasya Section, headed by Captain Rıza Bey 
• Africa, Trablusgarb Section, hedaded by Hüseyin Tosun Bey 
and Ali Başhampa Bey 
• Eastern Provinces Section, headed by Dr. Bahattin Şakir Bey 
and Ruşeni Bey 
 
The transformation from the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa into the Umur-i Şarkiye in May or June 
1915 reflected an increasing sophistication in the central organization. This time, it was 
divided into seven sections, each one headed by a military officer. All of the sections 
were in subjection to the chief, who was under the direct control of Chief of Staff:  
 
Umur-i Şarkiye Office: 
1. “Translation and Compilation Department 
• Director: Infantry Major Ali Rıza Bey371 
2. “India, Egypt, Afghan, Arabia Department 
• Director: Dr. Fuad Bey 
• Afghan, India section: (?) Abdürrab Bey 
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• Egypt section: Cavalry First lieutenant Yusuf Efendi 372 
3. “Eastern Department 
• Director: Infantry Captain Mehmet Nuri Efendi 
• Honorary director: Köprülüzade Fuad Bey373 
4. “Eastern Africa, Western Africa, Shipment, Follow-up affairs, Personal 
affairs, and Courier Departments 
• Director: Cavalry Lieutenant Colonel Hüsamettin Bey 
• Eastern Africa section: Reserve Paymaster assignee Nuri Efendi 
• Western Africa section: this as well (bu dahi) 
• Shipment section: Assistant Sergeant Major  İlhami Efendi 
• Courier section: ...(?) Tayyib Efendi and Nefer Dürri Efendi 
• Follow-up Section: Assistant Sergeant Major İhsan Efendi and Platoon 
head Salih Efendi 
• Personal affairs section: Nefer Hidayet Efendi”374 
5. “Papers and Filing Department 
• Director: Infantry Master Captain Muhtar Efendi 
6. Rumeli Department 
• Director: Infantry Captain Fuad Efendi”375 
7. “Accounting Department 
• Director: Infantry Master Captain Ali Rıza Efendi” 376 
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These two structures reveal that the Teşkilat was an organization, which 
struggled to cluster in all regions that were considered to be part of the Ottoman war 
strategy377 and the organization’s activities in the regions in question were the work of a 
conscious, rational, and an organized center in Istanbul, which authorized those groups 
to set up units over the distant territories of the Empire and of the Entente powers.  
Besides, the modest structure of the Teşkilat might prove crucial to understand 
how it served as the basis for the development of a broader system that would come out 
with the establishment of the Umur-i Şarkiye Dairesi. The emergence of this office 
seems to have owed much to advanced planning and improved patterns of organization. 
In this context, it seems possible to say that this improvisation brought in more 
professionalism in both monitoring the threats and taking action. Since, the increase in 
the formation of the subdivisions in Umur-i Şarkiye Dairesi might be regarded as the 
product of not only the shifting demands of intelligence but also the growing workload, 
which could be dealt with only by specialization.   
As is clearly seen, the Teşkilat was a corporate body which had its own 
headquarters, chiefs, directors, vice directors, and officers in charge of various regions. 
In respect to the administrative hierarchy, technically speaking, this body was 
subordinate neither to the intelligence office of the Ministry of Interior Affairs nor to the 
intelligence department of the Ottoman General Staff (2. Şube) although they often 
collaborated; Teşkilat was directly connected to the Enver Pasha, chief of the general 
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staff. Since, the Teşkilat’s program of activity and working principles were determined 
by him.378 Actual work was carried out by a triad. At the top were Enver Pasha and his 
staff; in the middle were Teşkilat’s intelligence officers in Istanbul who collated and 
assessed material provided by the third component, the agents-officers and intelligence 
gatherers who were clustered in different regions of the Empire and of the Entente 
powers.  
 
C. Regional Structure  
 
It appears that the organization had no branches in the provinces of the regions in 
question, but only in the fronts and borders. These branches were typically formed of a 
headquarter of three people. In terms of the region under examination, the very first one 
of those units was stationed in Yafa most probably during the second half of September 
1914, its headquarters comprising of Gendarme Commander Major Hasan Efendi, 
Lieutenant Colonel Bahaeddin Bey (Manastırlı), and an officer whose name cannot be 
specified.379 Another one was established by Nuri Pasha in Sellum during August of 
1915 as a military and a political intelligence bureau. The bureau would be run, similar 
to the previous one, by three people, namely Captain Hasan Fehmi380, first Lieutenant 
Mısırlı Ahmed Ebu Ali381, and first Lieutenant Mısırlı Lütfi Efendi382. Likewise, the 
Teşkilat committee dispatched to Darfur by Nuri Pasha during January 1915 also 
consisted of three people, namely Major Tarık, Captain Ebu Şari (?), and Beşir Fuad 
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Bey.383 All these headquarters were to receive instructions from the head organization of 
the Teşkilat through the Ministry of War, and were subordinate to the same organization 
in all matters, as Süleyman Askeri puts forward in his telegraph adressed to Hasan 
Efendi: “...3 kişilik bir merkez-i umumi teşkili münasib görülmüştür. Mezkur merkez-i 
umumi harbiye nezareti vasıtasıyla Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa heyet-i idaresinden talimat 
alacak ve her hususda idareye merbut olacaktır.”384 The head organization on the other 
hand was subject to the supervision of Ministry of War, which was again under Enver 
Pasha, in terms of its actions, administration, and disposition of troops, so were the 
branches to the commander of the army.385  
It was the central command in Istanbul that was charged with the duty of 
dispatching the voluntary detachments formed under the command of the Teşkilat to the 
regions. These detachments were dispatched to the army headquarters pre-determined by 
the instructions of the Ministry of War. Having been enlisted and supplied at the posts 
on their way, they were included in the army.386 Therefore, it is possible to visualize that 
the infantry battalion formed and authorized by the Umur-i Şarkiye Office in İstanbul 
during the first half of October 1915 was dispatched to Libya most probably by the 
mediation of the central commander, Cevad Bey, and enlisted and supplied around 
Muğla, where they sailed to Libya to join Senusi headquarters at Bir-i Vaar.387  Central 
command at the same time transferred orders concerning requests by the Teşkilat such as 
ammunition and equipment for those going to the fronts and those who were already at 
the fronts. In this context, it can be said that the Teşkilat was enabled to communicate 
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through the central command with almost all the subdivisions of the Ministry of War.388 
It should, however, be noted that this communication was secured by the Umur-i Şarkiye 
chief after the abolishment of the Teşkilat.  
 
D. Mission of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa  
 
Another significant aspect of the Teşkilat was that it paid great attention to the usage of 
ideological expressions like pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism. In North Africa and Syria, 
as the majority of the populace was ethno-religiously homogeneous, composed to a great 
extent of Muslim-Arabs, great stress was laid on Islamism by the Teşkilat, which seems 
to have been pretty knowledgeable of the social fabric of the region. Nevertheless, there 
seem to be no document which supports that a survey on the social constitution and 
cultural dynamics of the region had been carried out. Then, it might be plausible to argue 
that the characteristics of the region were known by experience by those who had 
organized the resistance there since 1910. But if the organization reconciled itself merely 
to the declaration of jihad, this would not be instrumental for the Ottomans. Therefore, 
the agents of the Teşkilat not only propagated the jihad but also struggled to provide 
armaments and money as well as promotion and gifts given by the Sultan for the local 
religious leaders of the region. In this context, volunteers were recruited by the Teşkilat 
commanders, who were directly appointed from Istanbul, under the cognizance of the 
army and the department of conscription. The recruitment of volunteers from the urban 
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of Nablus and Birüssebi by Mümtaz Bey, of Akabe by Eşref Bey, and of Awlad Ali tribe 
by Nuri and Cafer Askeri Beys might represent good examples in this sense.  
 Archival materials indicate that the main mission of those forces was to function 
as auxiliary and additional troops for the army. As it is examined in detail in Chapter 
Two, the first Canal campaign was launched with the guerilla-type attack of the forward 
echelons of the diversionary columns (the Teşkilat forces), in order to take hold of the 
key points on the advance line of the army. The situation, however, was somewhat 
different in Libya; the command of the Africa Groups established by the Teşkilat agents 
with the exception of a few Turkish soldiers was almost entirely made up of local Senusi 
forces. Thus, nearly the entire fighting force in Libya consisted of volunteers. No doubt, 
the recruitment of a considerable number of Syrians and Libyans as well as Egyptians 
would not only be comforting for the Fourth Army and Africa Groups but also a 
meaningful message to the British, who controlled Egypt and instigated an Arab 
uprising. As auxiliary and irregular forces, these troops, recruited and trained by the 
Teşkilat agents, were charged with the duties of band warfare, incursions, sabotages, 
demonstration attacks, demolishment of telegraph and railroad lines, cutting off enemy 
access to Syria and Libya, and allocation of mobile forces to the areas which needed 
reinforcement. 
On the basis of this study, it is possible to generalize about a number of missions 
of the Teşkilat. To start with, in order to gather information on the enemy, the Teşkilat 
recruited and handled agents; also apprehended and questioned refugees, and Bedouins 
in this region. In the field of topographical intelligence, reconnaissance patrols formed 
by the Teşkilat accumulated reports covering specific topics such as the location, 
condition, troop movements, and artillery of the British forces; the location of the wells 
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and their state of water, the quality and quantity of fuel and aliment resources across the 
desert; survey of the impediments such as wire fence and artificial water flood; the 
appropriate movement line of military items like ammunition and bridge building 
equipment. As detailed in Chapter Two, von Kress gave a number of orders to these 
effects to the Teşkilat. Similar missions were also undertaken by the Teşkilat in Libya as 
treated in Chapter Three. In this context, it is plausible to state that these field reports 
dispatched to the army commanders after being analyzed and assessed, determined to a 
certain extent the Ottoman order of battle and deployment in the regions in question.  
In the field of counter intelligence, the Teşkilat was faced with problems of field 
security and counter espionage. In this context, the British were staved off getting 
information about the movement of Ottoman detachments in the desert; accordingly, 
people interrogated within Sinai. Besides, a number of the enemy agents were seized and 
employed sometimes as double agents to plant false reports and gather information on 
the enemy. For instance, the Teşkilat agents followed a long time two British spies, 
originally Egyptians, named Meşil? el-Salih and İbrahim Marş?. Having captured both 
of them at their house in Cairo, the Teşkilat agents found out that these spies were used 
in establishing an intelligence network both in Hayfa and Kahire.389 The Teşkilat was 
also engaged in activities for intentional disinformation. At this point, it might be helpful 
to remind the gossip that was spread in Egypt such that an Ottoman force of 150.000 or 
300.000 was about to penetrate from Elariş into Egypt. Spies and informers were used to 
pick up and receive news from Egypt, and to create antagonism between the British and 
Muslims by all means possible. As examined in chapters Two and Three, the Teşkilat 
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cells both in Yafa and Sellum were charged with duties to this effect. They were also 
charged with the duty of cutting of the routes through which the British obtained 
information.     
The Teşkilat was also engaged in psychological warfare. Accordingly, it 
circulated in the region propaganda materials generally prepared by local religious 
leaders like Abdülaziz Çaviş. The agents were also trained on how to influence or coerce 
the Muslim-British soldiers to make them capitulate or come over to the Turkish side. 
Spies and informers employed to establish relations with the populace in Egypt were 
also used to incite them by either exaggerated or entirely fabricated information. 
Furthermore, the formation of relatively small-scale Teşkilat units under the district 
commanders was aimed at not only enlarging the campaign forces but also benefiting 
from their religious and political impact on both the British and Muslims. 
The Teşkilat used various sources to gather information on the enemy such as 
soldiers, Bedouins, refugees, tourists, defectors, informers in Egypt and Libya. Not 
surprisingly then, an uncertain portion of the information gathered was unreliable. It was 
after the flaw of such erroneous (either exaggerated or intentionally fabricated) 
Süleyman Askeri  ordered Hasan Efendi to draft the reports in three ways such as 
“personally seen”, “reported by a secondary person”, or “estimated”.390 The intelligence 
of the Teşkilat was however acquired capability to verify information from other 
sources. By this way, unlike the British intelligence which relied heavily on air 
reconnaissance for corrobation, Ottoman intelligence did not have to rely on 
unauthenticated reports for a long time. The Teşkilat’s major means for corroboration in 
this region were diplomatic agents, agents of the Ministry of Interior Affairs, and of the 
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intelligence department of the General Staff. These reports from various informants 
helped to expose and neutralize the exaggerations and fabrications of the agents so that 
the credibility of intelligence was enhanced. In this context, it seems that the Teşkilat 
benefited greatly from the reports of ambassador to Athens, Galib Kemal Bey; of Rome, 
Nabi Bey; military attaché Ali Mümtaz; the director of Emniyet-i Umumiye, İsmail Bey; 
all of which were dispatched to the Teşkilat having been adressed to the General Staff. 
The intelligence sent, espeically from diplomatic agents like Nabi Bey was concerned 
with the information on the enemy at strategic and operational levels, while the other 
sources generally provided the Teşkilat with information at the tactical and local level. 
 
E. On the Role of Eşref Kuşçubaşı 
  
From the viewpoint of this study, it would not be incorrect to think that the role of Eşref 
Kuşçubaşı in the Teşkilat has long been exaggerated and distorted. The information in 
the previous pages justify this assumption, which becomes very plausible when 
considering the explanatory capacity of the official documents. One of the assertions 
was put forth by Cemal Kutay such that Eşref Bey was the founder and the first chief of 
the Teşkilat.391 The first assertion seems to be a generally accepted interpretation in the 
literature. Even in the very absence of  works on the foundating dynamics of the Teşkilat 
but only the memoirs of Eşref Bey, it seems still risky and difficult to suggest that the 
organization was shaped and founded upon the experiences of Eşref Bey in a very small-
scale revolutionary party in Arabia between 1903 and 1907, and on the Libyan and 
Balkan fronts. This argumentation does not necessarily support the assertion but rather 
                                                 
391
 Kutay, Birinci Dünya Harbinde Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa, 11-13, 19.  
 138 
means to shelve the experiences of not only the Yıldız Hafiye Teşkilatı, which might 
have triggered the CUP to set up its own underground network but also of the 
intelligence departments of both the Ministries of Interior and War. At the same time, it 
means to usurp and wipe out the rights and efforts of a number of important personalities 
on the organization such as Enver Pasha, Talat Pasha, Süleyman Askeri, Kızanlıklı Halil 
Bey, Tunuslu Cevad Bey, Nuri Pasha, Ali Bey Başhampa, Hüseyin Tosun Bey, İzmitli 
Mümtaz Bey, and others. Furthermore, it is clear that such an effort in the name of 
creating a hero does not make allowance for the conjunctural necessities of the time and 
the mentality that activated it.     
The second assertion that Eşref Bey was the first chief of the organization until 
the outbreak of the World War I is also doubtful.392 This argument cannot be supported 
on the basis of either the archival documents or the secondary sources, but only by 
relying on the memoirs of Eşref Bey. First of all, it is alleged by Cemal Kutay that Eşref 
Bey as the director of the Teşkilat along with his brother, Selim Sami and a couple of 
other agents, were sent to Turkestan through India to incite the inhabitants against the 
British rule at the eve of the war.393 This information however might well be used to 
refute Kutay’s main argument and one might easily wonder how Eşref Bey continued to 
preside and run the Teşkilat office in İstanbul while he was out of the country, 
organizing revolutions at an outstation very long way off the center. One might also 
wonder how come CUP could expect fruitful results from the Teşkilat, which was 
responsible to operate over a number of bases, while its chief was out of İstanbul and in 
what way the headless Teşkilat was run between the departure and return of Eşref Bey. It 
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can also be asked why thousands of official documents as well ass Stoddard, who makes 
most of the memoirs of Eşref Bey, like Kutay, as well as the others who were engaged in 
the activities of the Teşkilat and of those that can interpret the program of the Teşkilat, 
do not indicate him as the first chief, but they point to Süleyman Askeri. These are only 
a few questions the late Kutay left unanswered. 
Considering Stoddard’s interpretations, one should be prudent too, since, a few 
of his explanations about Eşref Bey, no doubt refutable, could drag the specialist into an 
erroneous path. According to Stoddard, Eşref Bey was not the chief of the Teşkilat but 
its director of Arabia, Sinai, and North Africa.394 Firstly, as already pointed out, there 
seems to be no such post in the organization. If there was, then it would be most 
probably bestowed on Mümtaz Bey, leader of the Teşkilat forces in Syria, or Nuri Pasha, 
the brother of Enver Pasha who controlled all the forces in Libya. The organic structure 
of the organization at any rate was not proper to authorize someone at the front with 
such a responsibility and as explained earlier, the directors of Africa, Trablusgarb 
section of the Teşkilat, Hüseyin Tosun and Ali Başhampa Beys, resided in the central 
office in İstanbul. At the same time, if Eşref Bey was the director in fact, then there 
would be no need for Mümtaz Bey, Hasan Efendi and Nuri Pasha to receive orders 
directly from Istanbul but from Eşref Bey. Besides, if he were in command, then Eşref 
Bey would not act under Mümtaz Bey and Hasan Efendi.   
In order to support his argument, Stoddard furthermore alleges that Eşref was the 
commander of voluntary units engaged in the Canal campaign and was, like Süleyman 
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Askeri, directly related to Enver Pasha.395 This argument also appears to be doubtful. It 
gives the impression that as if not only Süleyman Askeri and Eşref Bey had equal 
responsibility to Enver Pasha but that Eşref Bey was the commander of Teşkilat units in 
Syria. To the contrary, as the research has shown, Eşref Bey was the commander of a 
unit composed of 600 volunteers, which was included in the Urban Command which 
was led by Mümtaz Bey. At this point, it should be appropriate to remind that Eşref Bey 
was engaged in the demonstration attack against Kantara which was led by Mümtaz Bey 
during the first canal campaign and received orders not from Enver Pasha but from 
various commanders like Süleyman Askeri, Cemal Pasha, Colonel Kress von 
Kressenstein, and Mümtaz Bey. Maybe this was the reason why Eşref Bey gave very 
little information about Süleyman Askeri and Mümtaz Bey in his memoirs.  
Who is Eşref Bey then? On the basis of this research, it now seems more 
plausible to say that Eşref Bey was no more than an important Teşkilat agent who had 
established close contact with the Ottoman ruling class during his experiences in the 
Tripoli and Balkan wars, and was well versed in intelligence and guerilla warfare. 
Because of these and his close knowledge of the terrain and its inhabitants, he 
contributed to the Teşkilat during World War I especially in the recruitment of 
volunteers and irregular combat.  Nevertheless, he was neither the founder and first chief 
of the Teşkilat nor the director of its Arabia, Sinai, and North Africa section. Therefore, 
it is not incorrect to conclude that the role of Eşref Kuşçubaşı on the Teşkilat is highly 
exaggerated mainly due to the efforts of Cemal Kutay to create “a hero” and partly due 
to the inclination of Philip H. Stoddard towards taking for granted the greater part of the 
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information Eşref Bey provided him. Accordingly, relevant parts of these works and the 
works mainly based upon them should be approached with a great caution. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The Teşkilat has so far not constitued a major area of research, altough some aspects of 
this subject have been examined by Stoddard, whose findings formed the central themes 
of the debate on the Teşkilat among a very limited number of historians. This debate 
however has been developed on the basis of historical sources which are extremely 
limited in number and inadequate in content. Particularly the memoirs and interviews 
with a few surviving members of the Teşkilat formed the main sources for various 
aspects of the debate. Nevertheless, it may not provide a firm basis for a comprehensive 
examination and evaluation of the Teşkilat before and during World War I without 
taking into account the elucidative capacity of the archival and secondary sources details 
of which have been examined in Chapter One.  
 Therefore, in this study, I attempted to utilize a little-known and used archival 
source, the Şube-i Mahsusa registers, where documents pertaining to the Teşkilat are 
compiled, in order to provide new ground for further discussions on the subject. In this 
context, this study seems to have demonstrated that the Şube-i Mahsusa registers, which 
encompass documentary evidence concerning more than fifteen operational bases of the 
Teşkilat, should be employed in studies dealing with regional case studies and 
administrative and operational characteristics of the Teşkilat as well as intelligence in 
the late Ottoman period in general.  
Based mainly on these registers, this case study, first of all, points out the major 
flaws of the literature on the Teşkilat. In this context, I emphasized the need for further 
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case studies by an evaluation of primary and secondary sources on the Teşkilat. 
Subsequently, I drew attention to the fact that the present level of our knowledge about 
the plans and operations of the Teşkilat forces against and in Egypt during World War I, 
particularly from mid 1914 until late 1916, is very poor in terms of the analysis of this 
phenomenon at a micro level in different localities.  
Accordingly, having depicted the strategic framework the Teşkilat was 
incorporated into the study devoted itself into unfolding different aspects of the 
Teşkilat’s concentration in Sinai, Libya, and Sudan. At this point, analysis of the Şube-i 
Mahsusa registers enabled us to better document the developments in this region, most 
of which were used for the first time, thus providing not only new insight into various 
aspects of a crucial organization, but also valuable information which is comparable to 
other operational bases of the Teşkilat. Finally, a number of questions concerning the 
administrative and operational characteristics of the Teşkilat were answered on the basis 
of the evaluation of the avaliable documentation on the Teşkilat and giving particular 
emphasis to historical evidence related to the region concerned. Though an analysis 
based mainly on a small part of a much larger experience of the Teşkilat, such a 
discussion is expected not only to enable us to break down the main characteristics of 
the administrative and operational mechanisms of the Teşkilat, but also to draw critical 
attention to the flaws of the historiography, which are treated in detail in Chapter One.    
  In conclusion, one may ask whether or not the Teşkilat was successful. In terms 
of the realization of its objectives in the region, success of the Teşkilat was limited. As 
forward echelons of the diversionary columns, the Teşkilat achieved to take hold of the 
key points on the advance line of the army in Sinai. It also satisfactorily fulfilled the 
reconnaissance facilities and recruited almost 3000 volunteers as auxiliary forces for the 
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Canal campaigns. Besides, they seem to have been successful in counter-intelligence 
activities for a long time. As examined in chapter Twp, strict control of the region by the 
Teşkilat prompted “Maxwell to complain that ‘the frontier is guarded jealously by the 
Turks. As they have seized all our agents east of the frontier it is difficult to get positive 
news.”396 Also, the British had to concentrate troops along the canal to defend it against 
the Ottoman army in which the Teşkilat played a key role.  
It is possible to say that the Teşkilat gained its actual success in Libya. Since, the 
entire organization here came into being by the efforts of the Teşkilat. First of all, the 
British plans to attract the Senusis were frustrated and Seyyid Ahmed was skillfully led 
to take place on the side of the Ottomans. In this context, it can be said that the raids and 
sabotage attempts of the Teşkilat were more organized and successful than those 
launched in Sinai. Besides, in this region, the armed forces established by the Teşkilat 
managed to make their way into Egypt, eventually occupying places like Sellum, Seydi 
Barani, Mersa Matruh, and the Siva oasis. At the same time, the Teşkilat coordinated 
relations between the Senusis and Sultanate of Darfur and as a result, the British had to 
worry about not only the Western frontier but also the south. Although the British 
defeated both, they had to detain a considerable number of forces on their Western 
frontier until the end of the war.  
Despite such successes, the Teşkilat had certain failures. Firstly, the bands in 
Sinai could not leak out into Egypt to raise a revolt there in support of the Turks. 
Although a number of plans were made, only a few people managed to get into Egypt 
from the Sinai frontier. The agents in Egypt, on the other hand, seem to have been sent 
there before the war. In this context, the Teşkilat was not in a state of diffuculty in 
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getting intelligence from Egypt. Nevertheless, the agitation activities showed their 
impact on the Egyptians only for a short time and then became ineffective through 
measures taken by the British. As a matter of fact, the Egyptians did not revolt when the 
Ottoman army was seen near the Canal. In regard to the mine laying activities, it should 
also be noted that the Teşkilat could not do more than sinking a British ship, leading the 
Canal traffic to close only for one day.  
As a result, the Ottoman plan to invade Egypt from three directions failed. The 
principle cause of this failure appears to have been the implemantation of such a grand 
design without developing the substructure needed and this seems to have formed the 
main basis on which the failure of the Teşkilat  should be discussed. On the basis of this 
research, lack of coordination stands out above all and it was this lack of coordination 
between Cemal and Nuri Pashas which partially created the problem of synchronization. 
Yet, this failure in synchronization was, to a great extent, also caused by some other 
problems. During the first Canal campaign, the Senusis did not attack from the Western 
frontier partially because of their dependency on the British authorities for foodstuff, and 
partially because of the lack of arms and ammunition. When the Senusis began to invade 
Egypt from the western frontier, this time, the Ottomans could not manage to attack 
from the east due to military problems brought about by the offensive against the 
Gallipoli and the efforts of Cemal Pasha to suppress the Arab rebels in Syria. Another 
problem on the Ottoman side was the shortage of arms and ammunition. As examined in 
many examples, the Teşkilat generally could not meet even half of the equipment its 
local branches demanded. Thus, the weakness of the Ottoman army seriously limited the 
ability of the Teşkilat.  
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This does not necessarily mean that the Teşkilat did not make any mistakes on its 
own. As Eşref Kuşçubaşı puts forward, the Teşkilat erred in a number of judgments. 
First of all, it underestimated the effectiveness of the British measures taken against the 
Islamist propaganda. It failed in analyzing that the idea of pan-Islam was not a secret 
power for the Muslims of Egypt. Secondly, the Teşkilat wrongly assumed that the 
Egyptian reaction against British imperialism would automatically lead the Muslims to 
rebel in the name of their masters, the Ottoman Empire. The Teşkilat also estimated that 
a victory against the British on the Canal would make a refreshing effect on the morale 
of the Egyptians who supported the Ottoman cause. By the defeat, however, this 
estimation turned out to be useless. Besides, the sabotage attempts against the Canal and 
the efforts at placing agitators in Egypt were small scale and not well planned. This grew 
out of overconfidence and the lack of financial sources in Egypt. Finally, the Teşkilat 
overestimated the warring capacity, loyalty, and the religious enthusiasm of the Bedouin 
auxiliary forces.397  
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APPENDIX K 
 
Harbiye Nezareti Umur-i Şarkiye  
Dairesi Müdüriyetine 
495 
 
Levazımat-ı Umumiye Dairesi Riyaset-i Alisine 
 
Şeyh Ahmed eş-Şerif Senusi hazretlerinin maiyyetinde zirde esamisi muharrer üç zat ba 
emri nezaret-penahi emrinde azimet edeceklerinden Bandırma’dan İzmir’e kadar 2. 
mevki şimendifer tesviyesinde itasına müsade ve lazım gelenlere emr ve havale 
buyurulması maruzdur. 
 
Harbiye Nezareti Umur-i Şarkiye Dairesi Müdürü 
 
- Senusi Şeyhi Seyyid Süleyman 
- İhvan-ı Senusiyyeden Mahmud 
- İhvan-ı Senusiyyeden Salih 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: ATASE Archive: f: 1858, d: 136, I: 7/6. 
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APPENDIX L 
 
 
 
 
Harbiye Nezareti Umur-i Şarkiye  
Dairesi Müdüriyetine 
 
Afrika Grupları Kumandanlığı Cenab-ı Alisine 
Afrika Grupları Kumandanlığı mıntıkasında istihdam kılınmak üzere ba emri nezaret 
penahi Muamelat-ı Zatiye Müdüriyeti’nden Umur-i Şarkiye Dairesi emrine verilen 
merbut listede mufassal künyeleri muharrer topçu zabit efendiler ile topçu küçük zabitan 
ve mektebli miralyöz kıdemli serçavuşu bu kere izam kılınmıştır efendim.  
 
Harbiye Nezareti Umur-i Şarkiye Dairesi Müdürü 
Ali Başhampa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: ATASE Archive: f: 1859, d: 141, I: 1/26 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
